The effects of bigger rewards in individual tournaments on efforts and risk taking: evidence from chess

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 979-995
Author(s):  
Rasyad A Parinduri ◽  
Yoong Hon Lee ◽  
Kung Ming Tiong

Abstract We examine the effects of bigger rewards in individual dynamic tournaments on efforts and risk taking using the three-point rule in chess. Most chess tournaments use the standard rule while some tournaments use the Bilbao rule, which is identical to the three-point rule in soccer: We observe the same pairs of chess players playing under both rules, a research design that fits fixed-effect models. We find the Bilbao rule makes games 33% more decisive, mostly to white players’ advantage, who win 50% more games. We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule works: It encourages players to play longer and discourages them from using drawish openings. These results suggest incentive schemes that provide bigger rewards for better performances work in individual multi-stage tournaments in which efforts and financial rewards are directly linked, and in which strategic interactions among teammates and with competitors are less complex.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Gruener ◽  
Ilia Khassine

This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in endowment and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative ac-tions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. Our paper adds value to the literature by extending Gneezy (2005) in two elements. First, we systematically vary the initial endowment of the players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions. Our main findings are: (i) non-students behave more honestly than students, (ii) students are more likely to trust the opponent’s message, and (iii) students and non-students be-have differently to variation in initial endowment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
AKPAN, FIDELA COSMAS

The study made an assessment of language laboratory and teaching and learning of English language pronunciation among undergraduate students in Nigerian tertiary institutions. In order to carry out this study, specified research objective was developed from which and used for the study. The research design for this study is an Expost Facto design. The population of this study consisted of all HND II students in Akwa Ibom State Polytechnic, Ikot Osurua, Ikot Ekepene in 2019/2020 academic session. The sample size for the study is 302 respondents, representing 10% of the student population. The Multi-stage sampling was used to select the respondents. The instrument was validated by two research experts. Data from the completed questionnaires was subjected to percentage analysis. The findings showed and concluded that there is significant effect of language laboratory and teaching and learning of English language pronunciation among undergraduate students in Nigerian tertiary institutions. The study recommended that, Since lecturers quality was significantly related to students’ achievement in English Language pronunciation, lecturers should possess the requisite qualifications before being recruited to teach. Furthermore, the English language lecturers should adopt better teaching strategies during the teaching-learning process.


Author(s):  
Gobet Fernand

Considerable research has been carried out on chess in the last seventy years. While classic research has centred on perception, memory, and decision making, contemporary research has focused on deliberate practice, individual differences, and education. Contrasting with classical research, which has mainly used experiments and computer modelling, more recent research has tended to use questionnaires, interviews, and analysis of computer databases as source of information. This article reviews these recent research trends, focusing on what has been learnt from chess research with respect to deliberate practice, intelligence, and transfer of skill. It also discusses ageing and risk taking between civilizations as examples of computer database analyses. Results clearly indicate that deliberate practice is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for achieving high levels of expertise. Other factors are important, some of which are innate. One of them is intelligence. Data show that chess players on average are more intelligent than individuals who do not play chess, and that chess skill positively correlates with intelligence. These results are unlikely to be explained by the hypothesis that chess leads to an increase of intelligence, as the results of experiments using chess instruction to bring about far-transfer effects are inconsistent. In addition, experiment designs used in chess instruction research are typically insufficient to allow strong conclusions about causality. Research using chess databases have led to interesting results, but its generalisability is likely to be limited. The article ends with recommendations for future research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 237 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Frank Mueller-Langer ◽  
Patrick Andreoli-Versbach

Abstract Existing theory suggests that three “order effects” may emerge in multi-stage tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger “effective prize” after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, leading participants might engage in sabotage activities to protect their lead thereby decreasing the rivals’ output. Finally, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have “nothing to lose” (risk-taking). The expected order effects based on existing theory cannot be supported empirically in a natural experiment setting, where professional teams compete in a two-stage tournament with asymmetric initial conditions and clear incentives.


The Batuk ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-48
Author(s):  
Prakash Shrestha

This paper aims to examine the understanding of organizational politics and its impact on the job performance of Nepal's civil service employees. The research design adopted in this study consists of a descriptive and causal-comparative research design. Based on a multi-stage random sampling, 250 civil servants in five ministries of the Nepal Government were selected as sample. The response rate was 76.40 percent. The findings of this research indicate that strong organizational politics exist at government offices. Mainly, over politics exist in the case of pay and promotion policies. Likewise, going along to get ahead and general political behavior are also common at these offices. The job performance level, however, was found at an average level. The inferential results indicate that there is a significant negative impact of organizational politics (in terms of going along to get ahead, pay and promotion policies, and general political behavior) on the job performance of employees. Therefore, leaders and administrators of ministries and other government offices need to keep an eye open in such realities and try to reduce unnecessary politics at workplaces so that the civil servants can focus on delivering effective services to the general public.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark David Nieman

The strategic nature of political interactions has long captured the attention of political scientists. A traditional statistical approach to modeling strategic interactions involves multi-stage estimation, which improves parameter estimates associated with one stage by using the information from other stages. The application of such multi-stage approaches, however, imposes rather strict demands on data availability: data on the dependent variable must be available for each strategic actor at each stage of the interaction. Limited or no data make such approaches difficult or impossible to implement. Political science data, however, especially in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, are not always structured in a manner that is conducive to these approaches. For example, we observe and have plentiful data on the onset of civil wars, but not the preceding stages, in which opposition groups decide to rebel or governments decide to repress them. In this article, I derive an estimator that probabilistically estimates unobserved actor choices related to earlier stages of strategic interactions. I demonstrate the advantages of the estimator over traditional and split-population binary estimators both using Monte Carlo simulations and a substantive example of the strategic rebel–government interaction associated with civil wars.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1400
Author(s):  
Tianyi Ma ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Xuchuan Yuan

In recent years, researchers have been devoted to illustrating the correlation between bankers’ pay contracts and a bank’s risk-taking behavior where corporate governance is concerned, especially throughout the past four decades and by using empirical analysis. Despite being a widespread concern, the causality of this relationship is not thoroughly understood. We initiate this research by modeling bankers’ multi-stage decisions of option investment and bond investment from the perspective of theoretical analysis, and by analyzing the function image results using data from Wells Fargo & Co. from the ExecuComp, BvD Orbis, and CRSP-COMPUSTAT databases. We aim to deeply explore the mechanism of how compensation influencing on risk. We are the first to find that it has a “risk cap”, which is the optimal risk level to maximize the return of decision-making. We are also the first to discover the optimal decision coefficient level to maximize the decision return, during which the internal causes and mechanisms of the impact of bankers’ compensation on a bank’s default risk are revealed. We also illustrate the influence of the number of periods. We expect our findings to provide advice for establishing policies when designing pay contracts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prapaporn Samriangjit ◽  
Kowat Tesaputa ◽  
Kanokorn Somprach

<p class="apa">The objectives of this research were: 1) to investigate the elements and indicators of collaborative leadership of primary school administrators, 2) to explore the existing situation and required situation of collaborative leadership of primary school administrators, 3) to develop a program to enhance collaborative leadership of primary school administrators, and 4) to investigate the effect of development for collaborative leadership of primary school administrators, from the usage of developed program. Research and Development (R&amp;D) was employed which designed 4 stages, a sample group of 753 primary school administrators and teachers, chosen by multi-stage sampling, gave quantitative data; and experts purposively chosen were asked to provide qualitative input. The statistics used in this research included the percentage, mean, standard deviation, the Priority Need Indicator (PNI <sub>Modified</sub>), and Dependent t-test. The results found that 7 elements 65 indicators. The training program which was developed and reviewed consists of four modules: Module 1, Characteristics of trust and commitment; Module 2, Paradigms of shared vision and collective decision making; Module 3, Skills in transforming change, risk taking and conflict management; Module 4, Assessment and reflection on collaborative leadership influences in fulfilling duties. In the implementation of the training program for 12 weeks employing 8 training kits, the 30 primary school administrators who volunteered to join significantly improved their test scores after the training and felt very highly satisfied with the program. In addition, the collaborative leadership of primary school administrators posttest was at higher level than the pretest at .01 level.</p>


2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Tetnowski

Qualitative case study research can be a valuable tool for answering complex, real-world questions. This method is often misunderstood or neglected due to a lack of understanding by researchers and reviewers. This tutorial defines the characteristics of qualitative case study research and its application to a broader understanding of stuttering that cannot be defined through other methodologies. This article will describe ways that data can be collected and analyzed.


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