scholarly journals Technology Entry in the Presence of Patent Thickets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bronwyn H Hall ◽  
Georg von Graevenitz ◽  
Christian Helmers
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg von Graevenitz ◽  
Stefan Wagner ◽  
Dietmar Harhoff

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Po-Hsuan Hsu ◽  
Hsiao-Hui Lee ◽  
Tong Zhou

Patent thickets, a phenomenon of fragmented ownership of overlapping patent rights, hamper firms’ commercialization of patents and thus deliver asset pricing implications. We show that firms with deeper patent thickets are involved in more patent litigations, launch fewer new products, and become less profitable in the future. These firms are also associated with lower subsequent stock returns, which can be explained by a conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on a general equilibrium model that features heterogeneous market betas conditional on time-varying aggregate productivity. This explanation is supported by further evidence from factor regressions and stochastic discount factor tests. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.


Author(s):  
Pradip Ninan Thomas

This chapter explores the politics and geopolitics of software patents. Beginning with an introduction to patents as intellectual property (IP), it explores its conflictual nature, especially in the context of free and open source software. This chapter deals with the Indian State’s ambivalent attitude towards the patenting of software, the pressure brought by the Business Software Alliance and others to harmonize India’s patent laws with US requirements, and the consequences of ‘patent thickets’ and its impact on creativity and innovation. It highlights the fact that there is growing recognition of the need for software sovereignty in India, illustrated by the fact that the Indian government has invested in a number of organizations that are committed to local solutions in software, although this ethos is contested by the IP and patent lobbies.


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Rodriguez

Patent pools do not correct all problems associated with patent thickets. In this respect, patent pools might not stop the outsider problem from striking pools. Moreover, patent pools can be expensive to negotiate, can exclude patent holders with smaller numbers of patents or enable a group of major players to form a cartel that excludes new competitors. For all the above reasons, patent pools are subject to regulatory clearance because they could result in a monopoly. The aim of this article is to present the relationship between patents and competition in a broad context.


2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 899-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. M. Cockburn ◽  
M. J. MacGarvie ◽  
E. Muller

Technovation ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 42-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Fischer ◽  
Philipp Ringler

First Monday ◽  
2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geertrui Van Overwalle ◽  
Esther Van Zimmeren ◽  
Birgit Verbeure ◽  
Gert Matthijs

Recent years have shown a remarkable increase of patents in the field of ICT and genetics. The omnipresence of patents in those areas has raised serious concerns about access to and use of ICT and genome related inventions, as the expansion of patents in those fields might result in a patent thicket. Collaborative licensing models, such as patent pools and clearing houses, have attracted great attention, as they might serve as a mechanism to deal with patent thickets in ICT and genetics and facilitate access to ICT and genomic patents. It remains to be seen to what extent the lessons from the collaborative rights experiments in ICT and genetics, can be applied in a cyberinfrastructure setting.


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