Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (492) ◽  
pp. 1195-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Paul Horwich

Response to Paul Horwich

dialectica ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Paul Horwich

scholarly journals Alethic Deflationism and Normativity: A Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 292
Author(s):  
Massimo Dell'Utri
Keyword(s):  
Final Analysis ◽  
Normative Concept ◽  
Paul Horwich ◽  
The World ◽  
Conceptual Resources ◽  
The Way

The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong”—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich’s argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world.***Deflacionismo Alético e Normatividade: Uma Crítica***O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mundo.

scholarly journals A Modest Minimalism?

2008 ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Jaan Kangilaski
Keyword(s):  
Final Part ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Stepping Stone ◽  
Paul Horwich

My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne’s account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.

Truth -- Meaning -- Reality, by Paul Horwich.

Mind ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 120 (480) ◽  
pp. 1262-1270
Author(s):  
C. S. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Paul Horwich

Horwich, Wittgenstein et la théorie de la signification en tant qu'«usage»

Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-460
Author(s):  
Denis Sauvé
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Paul Horwich

ABSTRACTPaul Horwich writes in his recent book, Meaning (p. 3): “the picture of meaning to be developed here is inspired by Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a word is constituted from its use—from the regularities governing our deployment of the sentences in which it appears.” Horwich makes no claim to a faithful exegesis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations but I argue in the present article that the conception of meaning he develops in his book is actually quite close to that of the author of the Investigations. I do this by comparing the views of the two philosophers. I also examine the question of holism, which, as it seems, is inseparable from the notion that use is constitutive of meaning.

Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Newhard
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Truth Predicate ◽  
Minimal Theory ◽  
Paul Horwich ◽  
Minimalist Theory

Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a Substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these Claims with Quine's disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism is given a careful exegesis, in which seven known objections are traced to the disquotational Schema, and two new objections are raised. A version of disquotationalism which avoids two of the seven known objections is recommended. In section II, an examination of minimalism shows that it faces eight of the nine objections facing disquotationalism, plus a new objection.

scholarly journals Paul Horwich: Significado como Uso/Paul Horwich: Meaning as Use

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 172
Author(s):  
Juliano Santos do Carmo
Keyword(s):  
Paul Horwich

Este artigo tem por objetivo geral destacar alguns aspectos fundamentais para o entendimento adequado do significado linguístico centrado na ideia de “uso”. A noção de uso enquanto determinante do significado foi proposta pela primeira vez por Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas (1953). Desde então, surgiram muitas tentativas de compatibilizar a noção de uso com as demais perspectivas oferecidas pelo filósofo naquela obra, não obstante, a questão ainda permanece distante de atingir um consenso. Recentemente, a teoria do significado como uso proposta por Paul Horwich, reacendeu o debate a respeito das noções de uso, significado e naturalismo semântico. A abordagem inspiradora de Horwich tem se revelado uma excelente estratégia tanto no que se refere a evidenciar a pertinência da proposta wittgensteiniana, como no sentido de oferecer soluções eficazes às objeções recorrentes que ela enfrenta. O objetivo específico deste trabalho é mostrar o modo como Horwich pretende resolver algumas daquelas objeções.

Truth. Paul Horwich

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hartry Field
Keyword(s):  
Paul Horwich
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