Paul Horwich (Ed.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, pp. 356, £40.50. Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1993, (trans. A. Levin), pp. xx + 310, £30.50/$43.75 cloth, £12.75/$18.25 paper

1994 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 923-926
Author(s):  
Stathis Psillos
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Paul Horwich

Philosophy of Science

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Social Enterprise ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
Scientific Systems

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.

scholarly journals Ludwik Fleck e a presente história das ciências

1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilana Löwy
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Ludwik Fleck ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions

O médico e epistemologista Ludwik Fleck desenvolveu, nas décadas de 1920-30, uma abordagem bastante original para o estudo das ciências. Ele apoiou sua epistemologia em duas bases: por um lado, em sua própria experiência profissional de bacteriologista e imunologista; por outro, na reflexão da Escola Polonesa de Filosofia da Medicina sobre as práticas dos médicos. Tal escola julga que os 'fatos científicos' são construídos por comunidades de pesquisadores - segundo os termos de Fleck, "coletivos de pensamento". Cada coletivo de pensamento elabora um "estilo de pensamento" único, composto pelo conjunto de normas, saberes e práticas partilhados por tal coletivo. Os recém-chegados são socializados em seu estilo de pensamento particular e adotam, portanto, seu olhar específico sobre o mundo. Os fatos científicos produzidos pelos membros de um dado coletivo de pensamento trazem sempre a marca de seu estilo de pensamento. Graças a isso, eles são incomensuráveis com os 'fatos' produzidos por outros coletivos de pensamento. A incomensurabilidade dos fatos científicos, aumentadas pela necessidade de 'traduzi-los' em outro estilo de pensamento para sua utilização pelas outras comunidades profissionais é, aos olhos de Fleck, uma fonte importante de inovação nas ciências e na sociedade. Por muito tempo esquecidas, as idéias de Fleck foram redescobertas nas décadas de 1960-70, em primeiro lugar por Thomas Kuhn (que, na introdução de The structure of scientific revolutions presta uma homenagem explícita à sua obra), depois pelos sociólogos das ciências. Além de sua influência diretamente perceptível, a epistemologia de Fleck mostra profundas afinidades com as novas tendências que se afirmam no estudo das ciências: a consideração das práticas dos pesquisadores e o interesse por suas técnicas materiais, discursivas e sociais.

Beyond Logical Empiricism

Dialogue ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Shea
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theoretical Language ◽  
Scientific Discourse ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Paul Feyerabend

The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory.In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today.

scholarly journals O problema da racionalidade da ciência no século XX e as implicações para um ensino crítico e reflexivo da ciência

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Letícia Lenzi
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Science Education ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Science Technology ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Scientific Judgment ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
New Criteria ◽  
Rationality Of Science

ResumoAo longo do século XX a concepção tradicional de racionalidade da ciência sofreu duras críticas, principalmente após os trabalhos de Thomas Kuhn a respeito dos critérios de evolução das teorias científicas ao longo da história. Assim, filósofos da ciência assumiram a tarefa de redefinir o que se entende por racionalidade da ciência, garantindo novos critérios para salvaguardar a consistência do juízo científico na articulação das ideias e teorias. Neste artigo, evidenciam-se essas questões para se discutir ações que possam promover uma educação científica crítica e reflexiva, contemplando a relação entre Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade e uma compreensão mais adequada da natureza da ciência. Palavras-chave: Racionalidade da ciência; Natureza da ciência; Educação científica. AbstractThroughout the twentieth century, the traditional conception of rationality of Science suffered harsh criticism, especially after Thomas Kuhn's work concerning the development criteria of scientific theories throughout history. Thus, philosophers of Science have assumed the task of redefining what is meant by rationality of Science, guaranteeing new criteria to safeguard the consistency of scientific judgment in the articulation of ideas and theories. In this article, these issues are highlighted to discuss actions that can promote critical and reflective scientific education, considering the relationship between Science, Technology and Society and a better understanding of the nature of Science.Keywords: Rationality of Science; Nature of Science; Science education.

scholarly journals Ilmu dan Agama dalam Perspektif Filsafat Ilmu

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-25
Author(s):  
Ahmadi Ahmadi ◽  
Afroh Nailil Hikmah ◽  
Agus Yudiawan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Significant Contribution ◽  
Science And Religion ◽  
Science Knowledge ◽  
Science Approach ◽  
Basic Concepts

This paper aims to understand the two basic concepts that are the focus of the discussion, namely science and religion through a philosophy of science approach. This approach assumes seeing the foundation that allows the development of theoretical arguments about the nature of science (knowledge, science) and religion studied in the basic concepts of Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science that is meant must have been formulated in a contextual-humanist-sociological manner that is social salvation. So that it can make a significant contribution to humanity as a whole. Thus, the Philosophy of Science will dynamically always be in line with the main mission of Islam, namely rahmatan Lil 'ālamīn.  

scholarly journals El significado de las rocas: El debate de Kuhn y Taylor sobre la base hermenéutica de la ciencia

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Normal Science ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Pure Data ◽  
Revolutionary Science ◽  
La Salle University

RESUMENA finales de los años 80s, Thomas Kuhn y Charles Taylor fueron invitados a un debate en La Salle University. Taylor defendió que las ciencias naturales no son ciencias hermenéuticas, pues se fundamentan en datos puros, carentes de significado. Kuhn rechazó la tesis de la existencia de datos puros, sosteniendo que las ciencias naturales operan con significados y poseen una base hermenéutica. En la postura de Kuhn pueden apreciarse ambivalencias como resultado de sus viejos compromisos teóricos con el proyecto explicativo formulado en La estructura de las revoluciones científicas y como mostraré, vinculado a la existencia de una tensión entre dos perspectivas filosóficas sobre la ciencia.PALABRAS CLAVEHERMENÉUTICA, CIENCIA NORMAL, CIENCIA REVOLUCIONARIA, TENSIÓN, CIENCIAS HUMANASABSTRACTBy the end of the 1980s, Thomas Kuhn and Charles Taylor participated in a debate at La Salle University. Taylor defended that natural sciences are not hermeneutical sciences, since they are based on the pure, meaningless data. Kuhn rejected the thesis of the existence of pure data, arguing that natural sciences work with meanings and have a hermeneutic foundation. Kuhn’s position presents ambivalences as a result of his former theoretical commitments with the explicative project formulated in The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions and as I will show, linked to the existence of a tension between two philosophical perspectives on science.KEYWORDSHERMENEUTICS, NORMAL SCIENCE, REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE, TENSION, HUMAN SCIENCES

scholarly journals The Case for Explicit Instruction of the Nature of Science in Secondary Science Education through the Incorporation of the History and Philosophy of Science

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
Brian Cartiff
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Scientific Literacy ◽  
Explicit Instruction ◽  
General Level ◽  
College Science ◽  
California Institute Of Technology ◽  
Institute Of Technology ◽  
Science Instructors ◽  
Richard Feynman

Richard Feynman, the celebrated physicist, is frequently attributed as saying that “philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.” Professor Feynman taught at the California Institute of Technology for many years, but perhaps this experience did not afford him the best view of the general level scientific literacy of most people. The inventive Feynman would likely be disappointed in the rigid nature of much pre-college science instruction, and he would definitely be disappointed in the lack of student understanding of the nature of science. The Next Generation Science Standards emphasize the nature of science as one of their standards, but currently most pre-college science instructors do not address this learning target or only do so through the indirect approach of using inquiry lessons. There is strong evidential support for including the explicit instruction of the philosophy of science and the history of science in pre-college science classrooms as a way of augmenting scientific literacy and enhancing student views on the nature of science. This article discusses some of the potential benefits of this instruction and some of the obstacles that must be overcome to implement it.

scholarly journals Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-246
Author(s):  
Georgy S. Levit ◽  
◽  
Uwe Hossfeld ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
History Of Biology ◽  
Darwinian Revolution ◽  
Common Descent ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Research Programmes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Mathematical Sciences

Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in the 19th century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwinian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.

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