The Philosophical Progress of Hume’s Essays , by Margaret Watkins

Mind ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cottrell
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Progress

The Philosopher's Progress: C.S. Lewis' Intellectual Journey from Atheism to Theism

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-143
Author(s):  
Norbert Feinendegen
Keyword(s):  
Christian Faith ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Intellectual Journey ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Although Lewis describes his intellectual journey to the Christian faith in Surprised by Joy and The Pilgrim's Regress, the actual steps of his progress from Atheism to Theism are still a matter of controversy. Based on Lewis' letters, his diary All My Road Before Me and recently published sources (in particular ‘Early Prose Joy’), this paper gives an outline of the main steps of Lewis' philosophical progress during the 1920s. The first part sketches the five main stages Materialism, Realism, Absolute Idealism, Subjective Idealism, and Theism, and submits a proposal for their dating. The second part describes these stages in greater detail and discusses the reasons that urged Lewis to adopt a new philosophical position at a particular time. It will become apparent that a thorough philosophical understanding of these stages is an indispensable prerequisite for any serious effort to establish a chronology of Lewis' intellectual progress during these years.

scholarly journals Philosophy as Synchronic History

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Way

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

A Conception of Philosophical Progress

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton Golding ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Questions

There is no consensus about appropriate philosophical method that can be relied on to settle philosophical questions and instead of established findings, there are multiple conflicting arguments and positions, and widespread disagreement and debate. Given this feature of philosophy, it might seem that philosophy has proven to be a worthless endeavour, with no possibility of philosophical progress. The challenge then is to develop a conception of philosophy that reconciles the lack of general or lasting agreement with the possibility of philosophical progress. I present such a conception in this paper. I argue that the aim of philosophy is to resolve philosophical problems, which is different from establishing settled and final answers or positions. Philosophical problems involve inadequate or incongruous conceptions that cannot be settled once and for all but can be resolved by transforming our conceptions so they are now congruous and adequate. There is philosophical progress every time a warranted, defensible position is developed that resolves a philosophical problem, even if there are competing resolutions and further problems to resolve, as there always are in philosophy.

Rejecting Beliefs, or Rejecting Believers? On the Importance and Exclusion of Women in Philosophy

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey S. Holtzman
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Gender Equality ◽  
Person Perception ◽  
Academic Disciplines ◽  
Gender Imbalance ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Philosophical Progress

Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person‐perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person‐perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.

scholarly journals rethinking consensus in the community of philosophical inquiry: a research agenda

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Kei Nishiyama
Keyword(s):  
Research Agenda ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Japanese Students ◽  
Philosophical Progress

In Philosophy for Children (P4C), consensus-making is often regarded as something that needs to be avoided. P4C scholars believe that consensus-making would dismiss P4C’s ideals, such as freedom, inclusiveness, and diversity. This paper aims to counteract such assumptions, arguing that P4C scholars tend to focus on a narrow, or universal, concept of “consensus” and dismiss various forms of consensus, especially what Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) call meta-consensus. Meta-consensus does not search for universal consensus, but focuses on the process by which people achieve various non-universal forms of consensus, such as agreement on the value of opponents’ normative view or agreement on the degree to which they accept opponents’ view. This paper argues that such meta-consensus is a key part of what Clinton Golding (2009) calls “philosophical progress,” which is the essential element that makes inquiry philosophical. In other words, without meta-consensus and philosophical progress, inquiry ends in merely conversation or antagonistic talk. Drawing on the example of P4C conducted with Japanese students, this paper shows how meta-consensus is achieved in the community of philosophical inquiry and how it contributes to make inquiry philosophical.

scholarly journals Is Argument for Conservatives? or Where Do Sparkling New Ideas Come From?

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Bailin
Keyword(s):  
Critical Reflection ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
New View

Rorty claims argument is inherently conservative and philosophical progress comes from "sparkling new ideas," not argument. This assumes an untenable opposition between the generation and the evaluation of ideas, with argument relegated to evaluation. New ideas that contribute to progress arise from critical reflection on problems posed by the tradition, and constrained by the criteria governing evaluation. Thinking directed toward the criticism and evaluation of ideas or products is not algorithmic; it has a generative, creative component. An overall assessment in any complex circumstance requires constructing a new view from the questioning, weighing, rejecting, reconciling, and integrating of numerous divergent points of view. Thus, the process of argumentation can issue in new ideas.

Philosophical Progress

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Gutting
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Philosophical Progress

This article begins by reflecting on the Cartesian project of beginning with a skeptically unassailable first truth and from there progressively building up a system of philosophical truths. It then presents a less problematic but similar project associated with contemporary analytic philosophy, noting, however, that it too fails to yield progress in answering the fundamental questions of philosophy. Next, the author examines the idea that philosophy might nonetheless progress in the manner of empirical science, never answering its fundamental questions but generating important intermediary results. Then, giving up the assumption that we need philosophy to ground our pre-philosophical convictions (“philosophical foundationalism”), the author proposes an alternative view of philosophy as providing rigorous theoretical formulations of general pictures, and on this basis, discusses philosophical disagreement, the role of intuitions in philosophy, philosophical knowledge, and the interaction of science and philosophy. Finally, the author presents his conclusions about philosophical progress.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document