A Conception of Philosophical Progress

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clinton Golding ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Questions

There is no consensus about appropriate philosophical method that can be relied on to settle philosophical questions and instead of established findings, there are multiple conflicting arguments and positions, and widespread disagreement and debate. Given this feature of philosophy, it might seem that philosophy has proven to be a worthless endeavour, with no possibility of philosophical progress. The challenge then is to develop a conception of philosophy that reconciles the lack of general or lasting agreement with the possibility of philosophical progress. I present such a conception in this paper. I argue that the aim of philosophy is to resolve philosophical problems, which is different from establishing settled and final answers or positions. Philosophical problems involve inadequate or incongruous conceptions that cannot be settled once and for all but can be resolved by transforming our conceptions so they are now congruous and adequate. There is philosophical progress every time a warranted, defensible position is developed that resolves a philosophical problem, even if there are competing resolutions and further problems to resolve, as there always are in philosophy.

Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism

1996 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yael Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Reasoning ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Nationalist Discourse ◽  
Mathematical Problems ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Philosophical questions are not like empirical problems, which can be answered by observation or experiment or entitlements from them. Nor are they like mathematical problems which can be settled by deductive methods, like problems in chess or any other rule-governed game or procedure. But questions about the ends of life, about good and evil, about freedom and necessity, about objectivity and relativity, cannot be decided by looking into even the most sophisticated dictionary or the use of empirical or mathematical reasoning. Not to know where to look for the answer is the surest symptom of a philosophical problem.Isaiah BerlinCritics of recent philosophical analyses of nationalism suggest that nationalism is a unique social phenomenon that cannot, and need not, be theorized. Are there, indeed, some special features constitutive of nationalism that might defy theorization? Those answering this question in the affirmative point to the plurality and specificity of national experiences, as well as to the emotional and eclectic nature of nationalist discourse.

To Mental Illness via a Rhyme for the Eye

1996 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 165-189
Author(s):  
T. S. Champlin
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Physical Illness ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Problematic Relationship ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intellectual Journey ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Shed Light

The intellectual journey on which I am about to embark, although not an unusual one in philosophy, may at first seem strange to those who are in the habit of looking to science for the answers to their big questions, including their philosophical questions. For I propose to shed light on the problematic relationship between two things, namely, mental illness and physical illness, by comparing their relationship to the relationship between two other things, namely, a rhyme for the eye—which will be explained shortly for the benefit of anyone unfamiliar with this concept—and a rhyme for the ear. Yet these two pairs of things are not related in any way by subject-matter. In philosophy, however, this sort of deliberate dislocation can be beneficial. As Wittgenstein himself once remarked, ‘A philosophical] problem can be solved only in the right surrounding, we must give the problem a new surrounding, we must compare it to cases we are not used to compare [sic] it with.’

scholarly journals 中國哲學史方法論----以四方架構為中心/The Methodology of Chinese Philosophical History–Exemplifies by the Four Square Framework

Asian Studies ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 3-27
Author(s):  
Baurui DUH
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Philosophy ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Four Square ◽  
Philosophical Questions

摘要針對傳統文本詮釋的需求，筆者提出一套「中國哲學史方法論」。以「宇宙論、本體論、工夫論、境界論」為哲學基本問題所組成的四方詮釋架構，它既有詮釋文本的功能，更有溝通中西的效果。同時，不妨礙仍以西方哲學的形上學、知識論、倫理學為進路進行「中國哲學研究」。關鍵詞：中國哲學方法論, 中國哲學史方法論, 宇宙論, 本體論, 工夫論, 境界論, 文本詮釋, 分類判教 The author suggests a method of text interpretative orientated methodological approach which has given the name of methodology of Chinese philosophical history. It is actually an interpretational system constructed by four basic philosophical questions which have all marked Chinese philosophy. They are cosmology, ontology, practical theory and theory of perfect personality. This paper focuses on introducing the methodology, its functioning, as well as its contributions and limitations. Any scholar can use this methodology to do his or hers own research work, as well as apply traditional Western philosophical method to the Chinese philosophy without any contradiction. 

The Examined Life Re-examined

1992 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Colin Radford
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Childhood And Youth ◽  
Philosophical Questions

In Part One of The Examined Life (Radford, 1989) I recalled certain episodes from my childhood and youth in which, as I came to realize later, I had been exercised by a philosophical problem. By so doing I hoped not only to convey to non-professionals what philosophy is—or is like—but to show them that they too were philosophers, i.e., had been exercised by philosophical questions. In Part Two I gave some examples of how such problems may be treated by a professional, in articles.

What is a philosophical problem?

Think ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
pp. 17-28
Author(s):  
P.M.S. Hacker
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
The World ◽  
Philosophical Questions

To what extent are philosophical questions and problems like other kinds of questions and problems, such as the those tackled by the physical sciences? Peter Hacker suggests that the problems of philosophy are conceptual, not factual, and that their solution or resolution is more a contribution to a particular form of understanding than to our knowledge of the world.

Hegel's Political Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Systematic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Normative Significance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Hegel famously argues that his speculative method is a foundation for claims about socio-political reality within a wider philosophical system. This systematic approach is thought a superior alternative to all other ways of philosophical thinking. Hegel’s method and system have normative significance for understanding everything from ethics to the state. Hegel’s approach has attracted much debate among scholars about key philosophical questions—and controversy about his proposed answers to them. Is his method and system open to the charge of dogmatism? Are his claims about the rationality of monarchy, unequal gender relations, an unelected second parliamentary chamber, and a corporation-based economy beyond revision? If not, does his political philosophy collapse into relativism? Since Hegel’s method is supposed to save him from either extreme, is there anything about his criticism of previous philosophies that could make his approach attractive to contemporary thinkers? Or is it preferable to focus on Hegel’s conclusions only, disregard his method, and interpret him in a non-systematic reading? This groundbreaking collection of new essays by leading interpreters of Hegel’s philosophy is dedicated to the questions that surround Hegel’s philosophical method and its relationship to the conclusions of his political philosophy. It contributes to the ongoing debate about the importance of a systematic context for political philosophy and the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy, and it engages with contemporary discussions about the shape of a rational social order and gauges the timeliness of Hegel’s way of thinking.

Reconsidering philosophical questions and neuroscientific answers: Two pillars of inquiry

Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Tschaepe
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Initial Process

AbstractI propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013). My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey’s pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce’s three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce’s three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.

MAKING PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS: THE BIG QUESTIONS, APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, AND THE PROFESSION

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Brake
Keyword(s):  
General Public ◽  
Creative Development ◽  
Core Set ◽  
Applied Philosophy ◽  
The World ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
What Matters

Abstract:The debate over whether philosophy makes progress has focused on its failure to answer a core set of “big” questions. I argue that there are other kinds of philosophical progress which are equally important yet underappreciated: the creative development of new “philosophical devices” which increase our ability to think about the world, and the broadening of philosophical topics to ever greater adequacy to what matters. The conception of philosophy as defined by a narrow “core” set of questions is responsible for skepticism about progress, as well as for philosophy’s “marketing problem” — its failure to reach the general public. I argue for abandoning the distinction between “core” and “marginal” questions. The greater openness of philosophy to methodological diversity and diversity in topics, especially applied topics, will make a distinct kind of progress: in the breadth and completeness of the questions asked, phenomena investigated, and theories generated. Such openness may also make philosophy more hospitable to more diverse practitioners. This would also be conducive to progress, in the sense of reaching true answers to philosophical questions: greater diversity of philosophical practitioners has epistemic benefits, such as increasing objectivity.

Philosophical Progress

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Opposite View ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Do So

Can there be progress in philosophy? On the one hand, it is often thought that problems in philosophy, in contrast to those in science, are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of books, papers, journals, conferences, graduate programmes, websites, etc.? Who is right? And what turns on who is right? This book defends a reasonable optimism about philosophical progress. Optimistic, because the author argues that, contrary to a widespread attitude of pessimism common even among professional philosophers, we have correctly answered philosophical questions in the past and therefore should expect to do so in the future; The work discusses several examples from philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Reasonable, because the optimism the author has in mind does not extend to every instance of the sort of problem called ‘philosophical’ or even to every subkind of that sort of problem.

The Philosopher's Progress: C.S. Lewis' Intellectual Journey from Atheism to Theism

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-143
Author(s):  
Norbert Feinendegen
Keyword(s):  
Christian Faith ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Intellectual Journey ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Although Lewis describes his intellectual journey to the Christian faith in Surprised by Joy and The Pilgrim's Regress, the actual steps of his progress from Atheism to Theism are still a matter of controversy. Based on Lewis' letters, his diary All My Road Before Me and recently published sources (in particular ‘Early Prose Joy’), this paper gives an outline of the main steps of Lewis' philosophical progress during the 1920s. The first part sketches the five main stages Materialism, Realism, Absolute Idealism, Subjective Idealism, and Theism, and submits a proposal for their dating. The second part describes these stages in greater detail and discusses the reasons that urged Lewis to adopt a new philosophical position at a particular time. It will become apparent that a thorough philosophical understanding of these stages is an indispensable prerequisite for any serious effort to establish a chronology of Lewis' intellectual progress during these years.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document