scholarly journals Against Person Essentialism

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 129 (515) ◽  
pp. 715-735
Author(s):  
Eric T Olson* ◽  
Karsten Witt
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Mental Powers ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Over Time

Abstract It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.

scholarly journals On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 39-56
Author(s):  
Eric T. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Over Time

AbstractDerek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's own.

Personal identity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marya Schechtman
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Place Identity ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Numerical Identity ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Biological Approach ◽  
Metaphysical Question ◽  
Over Time

While many areas of philosophy are concerned with issues of personal identity, the investigation most usually referred to as ‘the problem of personal identity’ within analytic philosophy centers on the question of what makes individuals at different times the same person. This is a complex and difficult question because we change a great deal over the course of our lives. A woman of 50, for instance, is made up of largely different matter from her ten-year-old self, and looks quite different. Her beliefs, desires, and values have probably changed a great deal; she has a host of memories and relationships that her ten-year-old self did not have, and she fills quite different social roles. Despite all of this we might unequivocally judge that the woman before us is the same person as the ten-year-old. Philosophers of personal identity seek to describe what it is that constitutes the identity of the fifty-year-old and the ten-year-old (if they are indeed identical). As it is usually conceived, the question of personal identity is a metaphysical question and not an epistemological question. Rather than asking how we know when someone at one time is identical to someone at another time, it asks what it is that actually makes it the case that they are the same. This question is also a question of numerical identity rather than qualitative or psychological identity; it is about the relation that makes something the self-same entity over time rather than about what makes entities indistinguishably similar to one another (see Identity). This last distinction is important to make because in everyday speech talk of personal identity is often connected to questions about what someone truly believes or desires, or what is fundamentally important to them, and not about what makes them a single entity. Everyday talk of identity is thus connected to judgments about similarity of character or personality. Historically, there have been three main approaches to addressing the metaphysical question about the numerical identity of persons over time. One defines identity in terms of the continuation of a single immaterial substance or soul; one in terms of psychological continuity; and one in terms of bodily or biological continuity, although there have been several other approaches offered as well. All of these accounts have had their adherents, and all have their difficulties. The bulk of philosophical discussion of personal identity during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has focused on the relative merits of psychological and biological approaches. For most of this period psychological accounts were dominant. These views, inspired by John Locke, hold that a person at time t2 is the same as a person at earlier time t1 just in case there is an overlapping chain of psychological connections (memories, beliefs, desires, etc.) between the person at t2 and the person at t1. They have a great deal of intuitive appeal, capturing the widely held sense that if biological and psychological continuity were to diverge, the person would go where the psychological life goes, but they have also been subject to some important objections. Many of these are related to the fact that psychological continuity does not have the same logical form as identity. For instance, a person existing now could in principle be psychologically continuous with two people in the future, but cannot be identical to both of them since they are not identical to each other. Toward the end of the twentieth century, biological accounts of identity re-emerged with new vigour, mounting a serious challenge to the dominance of psychological accounts. Defenders of the biological approach say that we are, most fundamentally, human animals who persist as long as a single human organism does. The biological approach allows that psychological continuity may be of tremendous importance to us, and that we may identify with our psychological states, but insists this continuity is no part of what determines our literal persistence as single entities. Biological theorists point out that if we think of persons as entities distinct from human animals we will be left with a number of awkward questions about the relation between persons and animals, making psychological continuity theories deeply implausible. In response, defenders of the psychological approach have argued that biological accounts suffer from many of the same deficits with which they charge psychological theories. A metaphysical view in which persons are constituted by human animals has also been offered to show a way in which a psychological account of identity can avoid the difficulties with explaining the relation of persons to human animals uncovered by animalists. As the debate between animalists and psychological theorists has continued, a variety of other views have been put forward, including narrative accounts of identity and minimalist accounts which place identity in the continuation of bare sentience. Over time a number of interesting general questions.

Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity

Metaphysica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149
Author(s):  
Nils-Frederic Wagner ◽  
Iva Apostolova
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Neutral Monism ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Over Time

AbstractStandard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension (e. g. psychological continuity), and the objective, third-person dimension (e. g. biological continuity) of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look at neutral monism offers a novel way to tackle these problems; counting on the most fundamental building blocks of reality to be ontologically neutral with regards to subjectivity and objectivity of personal identity. If the basic units of reality are, in fact, ontologically neutral – but can give rise to mental as well as physical events – these basic units of reality might account for both subjectivity and objectivity in personal identity. If this were true, it would turn out that subjectivity and objectivity are not conflictive dimensions of personal identity but rather two sides of the same coin.

Memories of Venice: Analysis of two thought experiments by Derek Parfit

Human Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-135
Author(s):  
Andrej Rozemberg
Keyword(s):  
Episodic Memory ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Memory Trace ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Past Experiences ◽  
Over Time

Abstract It is commonly believed that our episodic memory teaches us about the reality of personal identity over time. Derek Parfitt’s notion of quasi-memory challenges this belief. According to Parfit, q-memories provide us with knowledge of past experiences in the same way that memory does, without presupposing that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person. Various aspects of Parfit’s theory have met with criticism from scholars such as D. Wiggins, J. McDowell, M. Schechtman, and others. In this paper, I will focus primarily on the holistic argument that q-memories cannot be squared with the complex nature of mental life. This is a well-known argument and, when understood as criticism of memory-trace copying, is accepted by some q-memory proponents. In this paper, I will try to show why it is impossible to defend quasi-memory, even when wholesale psychological continuity applies, and why post-fission persons are not genuine cases of q-memories.

scholarly journals Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
Religious Dimensions ◽  
Per Se ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Philosophical Project ◽  
Philosophical Debates ◽  
Over Time

This book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Ruth Boeker’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. She argues that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, Boeker argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, she shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, she argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.

Choosing for others as Continuing a Life Story: The Problem of Personal Identity Revisited

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Blustein
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Advance Directives ◽  
Advance Directive ◽  
Life Story ◽  
Treatment Decisions ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Continuity Theory ◽  
Single Person ◽  
Over Time

Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory of personal identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular set of actions, experiences, and characteristics is that of a given person rather than someone else.

Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold W. Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
Hybrid View ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist).

The Distinction between [P] and [S]

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.

scholarly journals Joint Action without Mutual Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Figà Talamanca
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cooperative Hunting ◽  
Mutual Awareness ◽  
Shared Practice ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.

DRESSES, FABRIC AND SPECIAL ITEMS AND VALUES OF THE OTTOMAN PADIŞAH AND BÜROKRATS (1670-1672)

ATLAS JOURNAL ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 1740-1758
Author(s):  
Kayhan ATİK
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Dress Code ◽  
Arrival Date ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Research Article ◽  
The People ◽  
The World ◽  
Cultural Structure ◽  
Over Time

The need for cover is a requirement in all parts of the world. More or less this need has been realized in almost every society. In addition, clothing is one of the basic needs of human beings. This basic need has become a pleasure over time, and the temporary innovation that has entered the life of society with the desire to dress completely or the need for change has turned into an excessive, common indulgence shown by the society for a certain period of time. When we evaluate clothing in terms of nations, it has gained very different meanings with the effect of the cultural structure of the society. Considering this situation in the context of civilizations, of course, we can say that it has presented a similar privilege. In short, every society has made its dress code suitable for its culture and civilization. As in the rest of the world, the robes, dresses, turbans and fabrics of the Ottoman sultans showed themselves clearly as an indicator of the position, wealth and status. Especially caftans, fabrics and patterns, each one is a masterpiece of art. Despite having a simple form according to researches, Ottoman caftans have a very magnificent appearance and beauty. The decorations made for these caftans, lining and moldings, fur ornaments, ornaments made with buttons are very perfect. These caftans have aroused the admiration of the whole world with their fabric, motif and splendor, and many researches have been done on these caftans, which have been exhibited and preserved in various local and foreign museums. The sultan's clothes in the Topkapı Palace Museum Sultan's Clothes Archive consist of approximately 2500 pieces. Most of these are hilat, robes and shalwars. In addition, although it is less, there are also children's (prince's) clothes, so there are no women's clothes. RESEARCH ARTICLE ATLAS Journal International Refereed Journal On Social Sciences e-ISSN:2619-936X Arrival Date : 19.03.2021 Published Date : 30.04.2021 2021, Vol:7, Issue:40 pp: 1740- 1758 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31568/atlas.676 ATLAS INTERNATIONAL REFEREED JOURNAL ON SOCIAL SCIENCES Year: 2021 Vol:7 Issue: 40 1740 Here, 21 caftans belonging to Fatih Sultan Mehmet, 77 caftans belonging to Suleiman the Magnificent, 13 caftans belonging to I. Ahmet, II. 30 caftans belonging to Osman, IV. While it is known that there were 27 caftans belonging to Murat, the caftans belonging to six rulers before Fatih Sultan Mehmet were not mentioned by name. In this study, the money spent for the clothes of the sultan in the Archives of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, Topkapı Palace Museum, the cocks and dresses that the sultan had to buy from the council; In dâbü's-sâ, we will focus on the kafân, sarık, other items and values that are deserved by the landlords, the palace-i Atiq aghas, the boys, the Treasury, the cellar, the lords of the Voyage rooms and the people in charge. Keywords: Ottoman, Sultan, Bureaucrat, Clothes, Fabric, Special Items.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document