scholarly journals Erratum to: Spillovers and strategic interaction in immigration policies

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Immigration Policies

Dynamics of Immigration: From Humanitarianism to Securitization

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reumah Suhail
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Country Of Origin ◽  
Immigration Policies ◽  
World War ◽  
Post World War Ii ◽  
Immigration Process ◽  
History Of ◽  
Selection Of

The paper addresses the different aspects of the politics of immigration, the underlying factors that motivate, force or pressurize people to move from their country of origin to new abodes in foreign nations. In the introduction the paper discusses different theories playing their due role in the immigration process, namely Realism and Constructivism. The paper examines the history of immigration and post-World War II resettlement followed by an analysis of how immigration policies are now centered towards securitization as opposed to humanitarianism after 9/11, within the scenario of globalization. Muslim migrant issues and more stringent immigration policies are also weighed in on, followed by a look at immigration in regions which are not hotspot settlement destinations. Lastly an analysis is presented about the selection of a host country a person opts for when contemplating relocation; a new concept is also discussed and determined whereby an individual can opt for “citizenship by investment” and if such a plan is an accepted means of taking on a new nationality.

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

scholarly journals Reformulating Jan Tinbergen’s normative vision on welfare and security

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332096977
Author(s):  
S Mansoob Murshed
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Individual Behaviour ◽  
World Government ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Intellectual Legacy

This article builds on the intellectual legacy of Jan Tinbergen by extending his analysis on welfare and security into a framework involving strategic interaction. I first incorporate welfare and security in terms of interstate tensions into a single utility or payoff function. An uncertain world is characterized by states that are more peaceful, and others where nations are more hostile to each other. Both conflictual and peaceful outcomes lie along a spectrum of hostility short of war. The strategies adopted by the two countries, which promote peace, can be complements or substitutes. This means that they can go up or down in response to increases in the strategies of its rival. I demonstrate that non-cooperative behaviour between nations is Pareto inferior to cooperative behaviour, because the latter is associated with more actions and efforts to promote peace. Cooperative behaviour is akin to Tinbergen’s notion of world government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states also leads to moral hazard, and there can be free-riding in joint peaceful behaviour by some nations, particularly when the strategies of the countries are substitutes. The model is extended to aggressive international behaviour, including that mandated by populist plebiscites or election victories, as well as an outline of individual behaviour driven by identity-based politics.

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