Intrahousehold Bargaining, Female Autonomy, and Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from India

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1928-1968 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Heath ◽  
Xu Tan

Abstract Standard models of labor supply predict that unearned income decreases labor supply. We propose an alternative noncooperative household model in which a woman’s unearned income improves her autonomy within the household, which raises her gains from working and can increase her labor supply. We find empirical support for this model, using women’s exposure to the Hindu Succession Act in India as a source of exogenous variation in their unearned income. Exposure to the Hindu Succession Act increases a woman’s labor supply by between 3.8 and 6.1 percentage points, particularly into high-paying jobs. Autonomy increased by 0.17 standard deviations, suggesting that control of income is a potential channel for these effects. Thus, policies that empower women can have an additional impact on the labor market, which can further reinforce autonomy increases.

2017 ◽  
pp. 22-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ivanova ◽  
A. Balaev ◽  
E. Gurvich

The paper considers the impact of the increase in retirement age on labor supply and economic growth. Combining own estimates of labor participation and demographic projections by the Rosstat, the authors predict marked fall in the labor force (by 5.6 million persons over 2016-2030). Labor demand is also going down but to a lesser degree. If vigorous measures are not implemented, the labor force shortage will reach 6% of the labor force by the period end, thus restraining economic growth. Even rapid and ambitious increase in the retirement age (by 1 year each year to 65 years for both men and women) can only partially mitigate the adverse consequences of demographic trends.


Author(s):  
Lex Thijssen ◽  
Marcel Coenders ◽  
Bram Lancee

AbstractIn this study, we present the results of a large-scale field experiment on ethnic discrimination in the Dutch labor market. We sent fictitious job applications (N = 4211) to vacancies for jobs in ten different occupations in the Netherlands. By examining 35 different ethnic minority groups, we detect considerable differences in discrimination rates, predominantly between Western and non-Western minorities. Furthermore, we find little systematic variation in discrimination patterns with regard to gender, regions, and occupations, pointing to the existence of an ethnic hierarchy that is widely shared among employers. Finally, we do not find empirical support for the hypothesis that adding personal information in job applications reduces discrimination.


2021 ◽  
pp. 152700252110246
Author(s):  
Luke Petach ◽  
Dustin Rumbaugh

American football season reduces the Monday labor hours of employed men by two-thirds of an hour. A similar effect is found for Friday labor hours. We term these effects the “hangover effect” and “happy hour effect.” Consistent with a wide class of labor market models, the labor supply effect varies over the business cycle, increasing in expansions. The hangover effect implies an intertemporal elasticity of labor supply on the order of 0.014. Evaluated at the median hourly wage, our estimates imply an annual economic cost of foregone earnings associated with football season in the neighborhood of $5.06 billion.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Goldberg

I use a field experiment to estimate the wage elasticity of employment in the day labor market in rural Malawi. Once a week for 12 consecutive weeks, I make job offers for a workfare-type program to 529 adults. The daily wage varies from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution, and individuals are entitled to work a maximum of one day per week. In this context (the low agricultural season), 74 percent of individuals worked at the lowest wage, and consequently the estimated labor supply elasticity is low (0.15), regardless of observable characteristics. (JEL C93, J22, J31, O15, O18, R23)


Author(s):  
José Alberto Molina ◽  
Jorge Velilla ◽  
Helena Ibarra

AbstractThis paper analyzes the intrahousehold bargaining power of spouses in Spanish families, in a collective framework. We estimate household labor supply equations and, under certain testable restrictions, we obtain a theoretically derived sharing rule for household income, which characterizes intrahousehold bargaining power. Then, using unique data on decision-making in the household, we construct Pareto weights, and study the validity of the collective model by comparing the theoretical sharing rule and the constructed Pareto weight. The results reveal that both the observed Pareto weight and the theoretical sharing rule display qualitative similarities, thus providing direct empirical support to the collective model. Furthermore, the results suggest that Spanish wives behave more altruistically, while husbands behave more egoistically. This should be taken into account by policy makers and researchers when analyzing inequality in the household, and contemplating specific policies affecting the household.


Author(s):  
Shoshana Grossbard

This chapter reviews models of marriage, with special emphasis on how the sex ratio can help explain outcomes such as marriage formation, the intramarriage distribution of consumption goods, labor supply, savings, type of relationship, divorce, and intermarriage. Economic models of marriage pioneered by Gary Becker are reviewed in the first section and then extended in the next section to incorporate the labor market for the work-in-household approach of Grossbard. The following section discusses challenges in identifying exogenous variation in sex ratios and presents empirical evidence on the impact of sex ratios on labor supply, consumption, savings, and several other outcomes.


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