Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice

2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (623) ◽  
pp. 2779-2804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingting Ding ◽  
Andrew Schotter
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Real World ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
The Real ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Incentive Compatible Mechanism

Abstract While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.

scholarly journals Social Learning in the Real-World: ‘Over-Imitation’ Occurs in Both Children and Adults Unaware of Participation in an Experiment and Independently of Social Interaction

PLoS ONE ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. e0159920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten ◽  
Gillian Allan ◽  
Siobahn Devlin ◽  
Natalie Kseib ◽  
Nicola Raw ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Learning ◽  
Real World ◽  
The Real

scholarly journals Equivalence of Stochastic and Deterministic Mechanisms

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1367-1390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-Chun Chen ◽  
Wei He ◽  
Jiangtao Li ◽  
Yeneng Sun
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Type Distribution ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Multidimensional Types ◽  
Social Surplus ◽  
Interdependent Valuations ◽  
Incentive Compatible Mechanism

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.

scholarly journals Mechanism design without quasilinearity

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoya Kazumura ◽  
Debasis Mishra ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Monotonicity Property ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Type Space ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Type Spaces ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Strategy Incentive

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (i) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property, (ii) we establish a revenue uniqueness result (for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it), and (iii) we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue‐maximizing mechanism must charge zero payment for the worst alternative (outside option). These results are applicable in a wide variety of problems (single object auction, multiple object auction, public good provision, etc.) under suitable richness of type space. In particular, our results are applicable to two important type spaces: (a) type space containing an arbitrarily small perturbation of quasilinear type space and (b) type space containing all positive income effect preferences.

Scheduling Robotic Actions by Genetic Algorithms

1996 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-204
Author(s):  
R. J. Abbott ◽  
M. L. Campbell ◽  
W. C. Krenz
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Genetic Algorithms ◽  
Real World ◽  
Hybrid Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
The Real ◽  
Short Period

A hybrid genetic algorithm is used to schedule tasks for a satellite that can be modeled as a robot whose goal is to retrieve objects from a two-dimensional field. The objective is to find a schedule that maximizes the value of objects retrieved. Typical of the real-world tasks to which this corresponds is the scheduling of ground contacts for a communications satellite. An important feature of our application is that the amount of time available for running the scheduler is not necessarily known in advance. This requires that the scheduler produce reasonably good results after a short period, but that it also continue to improve its results if allowed to run for a longer period. We satisfy this requirement by developing what we call a sustainable genetic algorithm.

scholarly journals Second Life: A Hope for Ideal, But Only in Its Imaginary

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Xiaowei Huang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Worlds ◽  
Real World ◽  
Second Life ◽  
Virtual World ◽  
The Real ◽  
Short Period ◽  
The Relationship

Second Life, one of the most popular of virtual world was invented by Linden Lab Corporation: its philosophical statement is that Second Life is 'a place where you can turn the pictures in your head into a kind of pixelated reality’ (Rymaszewski, 2007, p. iv). Second Life is, for many reasons to be considered in this essay, a representative example of the (offline/real) world. This paper will argue that virtual worlds such as Second Life are an extension of the real world. Two major questions were posed earlier in this essay: ‘Does the virtual world represent the real world?’ and ‘Is it a refuge for its participants from the real world’. We can answer these questions. First of all, the virtual world is an extension of the real world, because it is built from, and continues to make use of, ideas, meanings, identity categories, performances, narratives and values derived from the real world. Secondly, Second Life is clearly not, in the long term, a refuge for its participants from the real world. Second Life can be understood as a virtual place that allows people to have temporary fun; however, it is only for a moment or for a short period, because the relationship between the virtual and the real world is interpenetrated.

Current Issues: Evidence-Based Practice for the Real World: Thoughts on Clinical Education in Communication Disorders

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne K. Bothe
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Education ◽  
Real World ◽  
Evidence Based Practice ◽  
Communication Disorders ◽  
University Faculty ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Real ◽  
Language Pathology

This article presents some streamlined and intentionally oversimplified ideas about educating future communication disorders professionals to use some of the most basic principles of evidence-based practice. Working from a popular five-step approach, modifications are suggested that may make the ideas more accessible, and therefore more useful, for university faculty, other supervisors, and future professionals in speech-language pathology, audiology, and related fields.

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