scholarly journals Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesi Cruz ◽  
Philip Keefer ◽  
Julien Labonne

Abstract Despite the prominence of information in theories of electoral accountability, providing voters with information often fails to improve politician performance. Using two experiments in the Philippines, we show that when voters are unfamiliar with basic government capabilities, merely informing them of what politicians could do is sufficient to decrease support for incumbents. However, politicians can counteract this decrease in support by increasing clientelistic practices such as vote buying. Our work shows how even neutral information campaigns can improve the leverage of voters vis-a-vis their politicians, offering guidance for the design of interventions to change the electoral equilibrium in clientelistic countries.

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 382-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesi Cruz

The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 352-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Hicken ◽  
Stephen Leider ◽  
Nico Ravanilla ◽  
Dean Yang

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.


2021 ◽  
pp. 026010792110346
Author(s):  
Tristan Canare ◽  
Ronald U. Mendoza

Access to information is a key factor influencing political behaviour and decisions. Recent studies on vote buying and selling have tried to unpack the possible drivers behind this phenomenon; yet, few studies have empirically examined the role of different sources of information. This study contributes to the nascent literature in this area by turning to a unique dataset from a survey of low-income voters in Metro Manila, the Philippines. It empirically examined the relationship between access to information and vote selling behaviour by low-income voters. It also studied other correlates of vote selling and the possible factors linked to receiving an offer. The results suggest that the quantity of information has no significant relationship with the likelihood of accepting the offer and voting for the candidate for whom the offer was made. However, the quality of information does matter. In particular, access to sources of ‘good quality information’ is negatively associated with completing the vote selling transaction (i.e., accepting the offer and voting for the candidate). This study also found evidence that when money is used for vote buying, it appears to be targeted at those with greater needs, confirming the literature that vote buying activities tend to be well targeted at poor and low-income communities. Unsurprisingly, vote buying offers are more likely in areas where elections are closely contested, and they are also more likely in socially cohesive communities. Our findings also suggest that vote buying may not necessarily be effective in the sense that it encourages only few voters to change their candidate preference. This coheres with earlier studies suggesting that vote buying and selling merely caps a longstanding patron–client relationship between politicians and low-income voters. JEL: D72, D91, K49


1997 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 947-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Sidel

Accounts of the various local, congressional, and national elections held in the Philippines since 1986 have highlighted three enduring features of Philippine democracy in the post-Marcos era. First of all, large numbers of politicians who held office for many years in the Marcos and pre-Marcos periods have won reelection, as have numerous other members of long-entrenched political families (Soriano 1987; Gutierrez 1992). Secondly, most of these politicians and clans have been known to enjoy not only political longevity but also economic preeminence within their respective municipal, congressional, or provincial bailiwicks, through landownership, commercial networks, logging or mining concessions, transportation companies, or control over illegal economies (Gutierrez 1994). Finally, evidence that fraud, vote-buying, and violence have decisively shaped the conduct and outcome of these elections (Tancangco 1992) has led some commentators to conclude that the celebrated transition from “authoritarianism” to “democracy” in Manila has been less than complete in its local manifestations (Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991, 5). With the revival of electoral politics in 1987, analysts thus began to offer evocative descriptions of, and various explanations for, the distinctive nature of Philippine democracy, with references to political clans, dynasties, caciques, warlords, and bosses appearing with great frequency in journalistic and scholarly accounts, and terms like cacique democracy, mafia democracy, feudalism, warlordism, and bossism gaining considerable currency.


2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1013-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eka Suaib ◽  
Kamaruzaman Jusoff ◽  
Muh. Zein Abdullah ◽  
La Husen Zuada ◽  
I Wayan Gede Suacana

Purpose The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between leadership and the party’s image and voters’ satisfaction and voters’ loyalty in the regional election of the North Konawe District, Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach The study design is quantitative methods (Creswell, 2010). It is an explanatory research, investigating the relationship between variables (Kothari, 2004). The study population was the voters who participated in the 2015 regional head election of North Konawe. The population in this study was 37,429 people spread over 12 districts and 135 villages, and the sample size of this study was 276 respondents, based on sample size formulation in (Bungin, 2008). The method used to analyze the data in this study is generalized structured component analysis (GSCA), which investigate comprehensively the inner model (hypothesis testing for the structural model) and the outer model (measurement model for unobservable variables). The Sobel test (under the GSCA model) was used to test whether a particular variable mediates the relationship between endogenous variables and exogenous variables. Findings The party’s image influences voters’ satisfaction. The party’s image will not directly influence voters’ loyalty, but it will influence voters’ loyalty with the mediating effect of voters’ satisfaction. Research limitations/implications The findings of this study that makes the social security program as one of the themes in the competition reinforces previous studies such as in the Philippines, Thailand, Mexico and Brazil (2012). Various jargons are often thrown around to gain votes and support from the poor. For example, the term “populist economy”, where free public health and education services are often declared in various political campaigns, both in the legislative member and regional head elections. Practical implications The results of this research, i.e. the influence of the party’s image for electoral interests, would reinforce the results of previous studies. Sometimes the politicians use the poverty program, which is apparently neutral, but actually for the sake of political interests (Gallego, 2015). The results of this study show that the manipulation of government programs is often done to help the politicians in mobilizing the voters. However, in practices, the voters? satisfaction and loyalty are interpreted differently. The voters do not always sell their votes because of what they receive; it could be that the voters receive the assistance by considering it as a fortune or wage in return for helping the politicians. It was proved by the results of this study that the incumbent lost the election. Social implications Using the party’s image in a political contest has created serious implications in the development of democracy in Indonesia. Indonesia, which has chosen democracy as a political route, is still highly vulnerable to clientelistic practices. Although procedurally Indonesia has paved the main democratic consolidation after the reform, ranging from the legislative election to the presidential election to the regional head election, the practice of money politics is still occurring widely. The problem of vote-buying is more difficult to solve because law enforcement mechanisms are not conducted properly. For example, only three days were given to prove the allegation of vote-buying. Of course, this short time makes it difficult to prove the practice of money politics at lower levels. Originality/value The originality of this research can be seen from the following explanation: based on the results of data processing, there are interesting things observed, with the party’s image as the exogenous variable, voters’ satisfaction as the intervening endogenous variable and voters’ loyalty as the pure endogenous variable. This means that more and more community empowerment will increase the desirability of a candidate. This is unique in itself, where with this result, it can be concluded that North Konawe communities are more affected by the nature of the aid empowerment, durable and sustainable/long-term rather than momentary relief (cash).


2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (S2) ◽  
pp. S27
Author(s):  
Teodoro Javier Herbosa

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