Philippine politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu

1997 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 947-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Sidel

Accounts of the various local, congressional, and national elections held in the Philippines since 1986 have highlighted three enduring features of Philippine democracy in the post-Marcos era. First of all, large numbers of politicians who held office for many years in the Marcos and pre-Marcos periods have won reelection, as have numerous other members of long-entrenched political families (Soriano 1987; Gutierrez 1992). Secondly, most of these politicians and clans have been known to enjoy not only political longevity but also economic preeminence within their respective municipal, congressional, or provincial bailiwicks, through landownership, commercial networks, logging or mining concessions, transportation companies, or control over illegal economies (Gutierrez 1994). Finally, evidence that fraud, vote-buying, and violence have decisively shaped the conduct and outcome of these elections (Tancangco 1992) has led some commentators to conclude that the celebrated transition from “authoritarianism” to “democracy” in Manila has been less than complete in its local manifestations (Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991, 5). With the revival of electoral politics in 1987, analysts thus began to offer evocative descriptions of, and various explanations for, the distinctive nature of Philippine democracy, with references to political clans, dynasties, caciques, warlords, and bosses appearing with great frequency in journalistic and scholarly accounts, and terms like cacique democracy, mafia democracy, feudalism, warlordism, and bossism gaining considerable currency.

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 97-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman

In May 2010, national elections in the Philippines saw front-runner presidential candidate Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III win a landslide victory which set the stage for an orderly transition of power from the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This article argues that Aquino's victory, rather than signalling a clear departure from the old ways of doing politics or the mere reproduction of established patterns of oligarchical politics, points towards a more gradual and limited change in the mobilisation of voters in the Philippines. This change, it is further argued, reflects in part the rise of “public opinion” as a social fact in Philippine politics and society in the period since the resurrection of formal democratic institutions and regular elections. The article identifies the broad parameters of the rise in polls and surveys in the Philippines, and, drawing on the critical insights of Pierre Bourdieu, examines the nature and significance of “public opinion” itself. However, the argument advanced here is a cautionary one, indicating that, while the emergence of public opinion as a social fact alters political calculations and dynamics associated with voter mobilisation, the politics of public opinion may only have limited transformative potential for democracy in the Philippines.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ma. Rhea Gretchen Arevalo Abuso

The 2016 national elections in the Philippines have been regarded as the most revealing and consequential democratic practice to the human rights situation in the country for two reasons. First, the overwhelming election of Rodrigo Duterte to the presidency was because of his campaign promise to rid the country of drugs and criminality within “3 to 6 months” through bloody and violent means. Second, the son and namesake of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, whose authoritarian regime in the 1970’s was responsible for countless human rights violations, narrowly lost his vice-presidential bid by a mere 270,000 votes. These turns of events beg the question: how could Filipinos, who experienced a bloody and violent regime at the hands of a dictator, choose to elect national leaders widely associated with human rights violations? This paper addresses this question through the use of in-depth interviews with Filipino college students in key cities in the Philippines in order to describe the Marcos regime from the perspective of the generation that did not experience the period. The research aimed to understand how memories of past human rights violations are formed and shaped, how these memories are crucial to the improvement of the human rights situation in society, and how to ensure that mistakes of the past are not repeated. The study found that widespread revisionist notions about the Marcos regime can be attributed to the absence of meaningful martial law and human rights education in the country.  However, the study also found that young Filipinos regard the social institution of education as the most trustworthy bearer of information on human rights and violent regimes. This highlights the crucial role of schools and educators in promoting human rights in society.


2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Sopranzetti

On May 20, 2014, the Royal Army imposed martial law on Thailand, with the declared purpose of restoring peace to the people. Allegedly, the military intervened to put an end to seven months of political turmoil that had begun when the PDRC—the English acronym for the Thai People's Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State—occupied key street intersections and government offices in Bangkok. The conservative mobilization had demanded the deposition of elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the complete dismissal of “the Thaksin system”—a network that had dominated electoral politics in the previous thirteen years, in the PDRC's view through corruption and vote-buying. To fight this injustice, the PDRC had called for deep constitutional reforms before the next elections could be held.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 382-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesi Cruz

The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 100-123
Author(s):  
Arjan Aguirre

Abstract 2018 is a year of so much uneasiness and tension in Philippine politics. It saw one of the greatest crises in the Supreme Court, the bloodiest period in local politics of late, and successive attempts to silence critics of the president and the government. This year also witnessed major political alignments in the Duterte administration: a change in the leadership of the Senate, the election of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Speaker of the House, the rivalry between Hugpong ng Pagbabago and Partido Demokratiko ng Pilipinas-Lakas ng Bayan, and the eventual termination of the alliance with the radical left. This review aims to understand these developments in Philippine politics. It seeks to know why are there so many rifts and shifts in the political rule of Duterte. These changes can be interpreted as part of an ongoing transition toward democratic regression under the Duterte regime. The disruptive events that ensued throughout the year should be understood as the offshoot of the extant efforts to alter the political status quo since the election of Duterte in 2016. The administration uses these events to consolidate its power by rallying its supporters for the 2019 midterm elections and reconfiguring the alignments within the Duterte bloc.


2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Corstange

AbstractVote buying and vote selling are prominent features of electoral politics in Lebanon. This article investigates how vote trafficking works in Lebanese elections and examines how electoral rules and practices contribute to wide and lively vote markets. Using original survey data from the 2009 parliamentary elections, it studies vote selling with a list experiment, a question technique designed to elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions. The data show that over half of the Lebanese sold their votes in 2009. Moreover, once we come to grips with the sensitivity of the topic, the data show that members of all sectarian communities and political alliances sold their votes at similar rates.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 352-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Hicken ◽  
Stephen Leider ◽  
Nico Ravanilla ◽  
Dean Yang

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Brownlee

This article revisits the electoral emphasis of hybrid regime studies, arguing instead that the impact of elections is structured by variations in prior political institutions, particularly the dismantlement or maintenance of a ruling party. Duration tests on 136 regimes indicate that ruling parties reduce the chance of regime collapse, while “electoral autocracy” has no significant effect. A paired comparison of Malaysia and the Philippines then shows how variations in party institutions propelled divergent courses of authoritarian dominance and democratization. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia's ruling party (UMNO) bound together otherwise fractious leaders, twice deflecting potent electoral challenges. By contrast, when Ferdinand Marcos abandoned the Nacionalista Party after 1972, he fueled the movement that would subsequently oust him. The efficacy of opposition parties Semangat '46 and United Nationalist Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) was thus heavily imbricated with the institutions of the regimes they challenged and less contingent on short-term electoral politics.


1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-234
Author(s):  
James A. Curry

One of the more recent drop-outs from the world's electoral club was the Philippines, a nation with a remarkably stable two-party system stretching, in the years since independence, over some twenty-five years. With the imposition of martial law in September 1972, the curtain was drawn, at least temporarily, on the longest running democracy in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this study is neither to praise nor bury the pre-1972 Philippine electoral system, but rather to look more closely at some recurring patterns which emerged during this period—patterns which, it will be argued, conform to a “machine model” of politics.


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