Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games

2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1037-1067 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Franke ◽  
José Pedro Correia
Keyword(s):  
Signalling Games

scholarly journals Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen ◽  
Mogens Jensen ◽  
Birgitte Sloth
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Learning ◽  
Signalling Games

Hybrid learning in signalling games

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 1119-1127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Barrett ◽  
Calvin T. Cochran ◽  
Simon Huttegger ◽  
Naoki Fujiwara
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Learning ◽  
Signalling Games

Ambiguity and context learning in signalling games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Tang
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Structural Evolution ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Context Learning ◽  
Ambiguous Words ◽  
Lattice Network ◽  
Signalling Games

Abstract Lexical ambiguity is present in many natural languages, but ambiguous words and phrases do not seem to be advantageous. Therefore, the presence of ambiguous words in natural language warrants explanation. We justify the existence of ambiguity from the perspective of context dependence. The main contribution of the paper is that we constructed a context learning process such that each interlocutor can infer their opponent’s private belief from the conversation. A sufficient condition for successful learning is provided. Furthermore, for cases in which learning fails, we investigate how the interlocutors choose among degrees of ambiguous expressions through an adaptive learning process. Lastly, we apply our model in the lattice network, demonstrating that structural evolution favours ambiguity as well.

On Assertoric and Directive Signals and the Evolution of Dynamic Meaning

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Franke
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Language Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Linguistic Typology ◽  
Modelling Techniques ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Signalling Games

Basic speech-act distinctions apply quasi-universally across languages, but little attention has been paid so far to formally modelling the evolution of these. Even worse so, standard models of language evolution from evolutionary game theory deliver functionally ambiguous meanings: evolved meanings in Lewisean signalling games seem hybrids between assertions and directives. This has been noted by Lewis (1969) already, but has only recently received renewed attention (Huttegger, 2007; Blume and Board, 2011; Zollman, 2011). Contrary to previous modelling attempts this paper argues that a functional distinction in formal models should be based on criteria that linguistic typology uses to distinguish clause types cross-linguistically. The paper then offers two simple models that delineate assertoric and imperative meanings once by semantic denotation and once by pragmatic effect. The latter requires us to go beyond standard modelling techniques: in order to account for the dynamic meaning element of “giving a directive” we need a mechanism of co-evolving meanings and norms.

scholarly journals Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games

2002 ◽  
Vol 357 (1427) ◽  
pp. 1595-1606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl T. Bergstrom ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Michael Lachmann
Keyword(s):  
Vector Field ◽  
Solution Method ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Minimal Cost ◽  
Field Solution ◽  
Signalling Theory ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
Mathematical Justification ◽  
Signalling Games

Much of the literature on costly signalling theory concentrates on separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able to exactly infer the signaller's condition from the signal sent. In this paper, we introduce a vector–field solution method that simplifies the process of solving for separating equilibria. Using this approach, we show that continuous signalling games can have low–cost separating equilibria despite conflicting interests between signaller and receiver. We find that contrary to prior arguments, honesty does not require wasteful signals. Finally, we examine signalling games in which different signallers have different minimal–cost signals, and provide a mathematical justification for the argument that even non–signalling traits will be exaggerated beyond their phenotypic optimum when they are used by other individuals to judge condition or quality.

Rationalization and Incomplete Information

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Battigalli ◽  
Marciano Siniscalchi
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
First Order ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Intuitive Criterion ◽  
Signalling Games

We analyze a family of extensive-form solution procedures for games with incomplete information that do not require the specification of an epistemic type space a la Harsanyi, but can accommodate a (commonly known) collection of explicit restrictions D on first-order beliefs. For any fixed D we obtain a solution called D-rationalizability.In static games, D-rationalizability characterizes the set of outcomes (combinations of payoff types and strategies) that may occur in any Bayesian equilibrium model consistent with D; these are precisely the outcomes consistent with common certainty of rationality and of the restrictions D. Hence, our approach to the analysis of incomplete-information games is consistent with Harsanyi's, and it may be viewed as capturing the robust implications of Bayesian equilibrium analysis.In dynamic games, D-rationalizability yields a forward-induction refinement of this set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. Focusing on the restriction that first-order beliefs be consistent with a given distribution on terminal nodes, we obtain a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In signalling games, this refinement coincides with the Iterated Intuitive Criterion.

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