Binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements—who are persons ‘claiming through or under’ a party?

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-386
Author(s):  
Vicky Priskich
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Arbitration ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia

Abstract The International Arbitration Acts of the UK, Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong recognize that third persons who are non-signatories to an arbitration agreement but who are ‘claiming through or under’ a party to the arbitration agreement have the status of a party.1 In the UK and Singapore that status means not only that court proceedings involving such non-signatories may be stayed in favour of arbitration but it also binds them to an award. In Hong Kong that status binds non-signatories to an award. In Australia, that status affects whether court proceedings involving non-signatories are stayed in favour of arbitration. A recent judgment by a majority of Australia’s highest appeal court, the High Court of Australia, in Rinehart v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd2 has taken a different approach to that prevailing in England as to the range of persons who are capable of ‘claiming through or under’ a party to the arbitration agreement, thereby significantly expanding the range of disputes involving non-signatories that must be referred to arbitration.3 The issue has not arisen for determination before appellate courts in Singapore or Hong Kong. Rinehart therefore represents an important development in common law jurisdictions, compelling arbitration between a signatory and non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.

1 The Historical Origins of the ‘Penalty’ Rule

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Halson Roger
Keyword(s):  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Early History ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Penalty Clauses ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia

The penalty doctrine has recently been subject to extensive review in the highest appellate courts of the Supreme Court of the UK and the High Court of Australia. Despite the agreement between senior appellate tribunals in the two major common law jurisdictions on the importance of a historical perspective, both propose subtly different historical analyses to justify very different conclusions about the ambit of the modern common law jurisdiction to set aside so-called penalties. This disagreement makes necessary an investigation of the history of the control of penalty clauses back to its earliest origins, in order to understand the modern doctrine. This chapter discusses the early history prior to 1600, later history from 1600 to 1915, and the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor Co (1915).

scholarly journals INTERPRETATION AND RECTIFICATION IN AUSTRALIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies
Keyword(s):  
New South ◽  
Common Law ◽  
New South Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
South Wales ◽  
Housing Corporation ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
High Court Of Australia

Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47, the High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in Australia from the law in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] C.L.J. 62).

Australian Bills of Rights and the ‘New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Evans ◽  
Julia Watson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Key Features ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
The Impact

This chapter examines the influence of the new Commonwealth model of human rights protection (exemplified by the UK Human Rights Act 1998) on the form of the two Australian statutory Bills of Rights, and then considers the impact of Australia's distinctive legal culture and constitutional structure on the operation of these instruments. In particular, it examines the impact of culture and structure in the decision of the High Court of Australia in R. v Momcilovic [2011] HCA 34; (2011) 280 A.L.R. As a result of that case, key features of the Australian Bills of Rights now diverge from the dominant UK approach, a divergence so striking that it may no longer be possible to identify the Australian Bills of Rights as exemplars of the new Commonwealth model.

scholarly journals ACCESSORY LIABILITY: PERSISTING IN ERROR

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Beatrice Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
South Australia ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
High Court ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Bodily Injury ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
High Court Of Australia

IN Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia (HCA) declined to follow the Privy Council and UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in abolishing the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise, as PAL is known in South Australia. Under the Australian doctrine, liability for murder is imposed where an individual “is a party to an agreement to commit a crime and foresees that death or really serious bodily injury might be occasioned by a co-venturer acting with murderous intention and he or she, with that awareness, continues to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise” (at [1]). This reflects the very position that was abandoned in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 Ruddock v The Queen UKPC 7 as a “wrong turn” of the English common law.

18. Freedom of expression

2020 ◽  
pp. 451-481
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
The Uk

This chapter focuses on some of the laws relating to freedom of expression in the UK. Freedom of expression is widely considered to be a necessary feature in any democratic state. The chapter considers the extent to which restrictions are placed on the freedom of expression in the UK in two particular contexts. It considers laws for the control of obscenity and indecency, the publication of obscene matter, the test of obscenity, defences, powers of search and seizure, and the possession of pornographic images. The discussion also considers that part of the law of contempt of court which relates to restricting the ability of the media to report court proceedings. This chapter is confined to the law relating to obscenity and indecency and contempt of court on the basis that they share the important characteristic of being regulated by both statute and the common law.

Part I Foundations, Ch.2 Settlement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Waugh John
Keyword(s):  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Land Ownership ◽  
High Court ◽  
Native Title ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Indigenous Land

This chapter explores the law of Australian colonization and its relationship with the laws of Australia's Indigenous peoples. A line of legal continuity links the Australian Constitution to the imposition of British law made during the colonization of Australia and to the decisions of colonial courts that treated the Australian colonies as colonies of settlement. Those decisions, after some initial doubts, displaced the diverse and intricate laws of Australia’s Indigenous peoples, who have occupied the continent for tens of thousands of years. Only in relation to native title to land have later courts made a major reassessment of the status of Indigenous laws. There, the High Court has challenged the factual assumptions of earlier decisions and found accommodation for Indigenous land ownership within the common law, but left the legal framework of colonization otherwise intact.

scholarly journals Citation as a measure of ‘impact’: Female legal academics at a disadvantage?

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 267-274
Author(s):  
Katy Barnett
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Preliminary Data ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Academic Work ◽  
The United States ◽  
High Court ◽  
Elite Universities ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Court Of Australia

This article discusses whether the demand that law academics show citations by a superior court is disadvantageous to women, using the citations of academic work by the High Court of Australia from 2015, 2016 and 2017. The preliminary data show that male academics were cited much more often than female academics (even for works written after 1999), and academics who were cited were associated primarily with ‘elite’ universities in Australia, England and the United States. The use of citation by superior courts may not really show ‘impact’ but may rather indicate that the common law displays historical and unconscious biases.

Joint Enterprise Liability: Recent Developments and Judicial Responses

2019 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-135
Author(s):  
Edward Grigg
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
High Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Law ◽  
Satisfactory State ◽  
Joint Enterprise ◽  
High Court Of Australia

This article reconsiders the decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 and the merits of joint enterprise liability. The article is structured in three sections. First, it outlines the background to the appeal in Jogee and argues that the Supreme Court’s decision is welcome on both normative and jurisprudential grounds. Second, it considers subsequent academic criticism and the approaches taken by the High Court of Australia and Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. Third, it responds to these differing perspectives and suggests that Jogee has left the law in a more satisfactory state, but that accessorial liability as a whole remains in need of further clarification.

Consideration and the Joint Promisee

1978 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Coote
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Important Group ◽  
Reasonable Degree ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
Husband And Wife

It is one of the best-known axioms of the common law of contract that consideration must move from the promisee. Expanded, this means that no person can in contract enforce a promise for which he has not provided consideration. As a principle, it has on its side the highest authority and a reasonable degree of antiquity.Ten years ago, however, the High Court of Australia came up with a formula which, while purporting to respect the principle, would, if accepted, have the effect of reducing its impact in a potentially important group of cases. In Coulls v. Bagot's Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. four of the five High Court judges expressed the view that a joint promisee, if she were party to a contract, could sue to enforce it notwithstanding that she had not herself furnished any part of the consideration. The case concerned a widow whose late husband had contracted to grant a licence to a quarrying company for the extraction of metal from a quarry which the husband owned. Under the contract royalties were to be paid to the husband and wife jointly while they both lived, and there after to the survivor of them. The wife's only part in the proceedings had been to append her signature to the contract document. Barwick C.J. and Windeyer J. (dissenting) held that the plaintiff was a party to the contract and, as a joint promisee, could enforce it notwith-standing that her husband alone had provided the consideration. McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ. agreed that if she had been a party the fact that it was her husband who had provided the consideration would not have been an impediment to her.

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