Identification in Auction Models with Interdependent Costs

2020 ◽  
Vol 128 (10) ◽  
pp. 3820-3871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Somaini
Keyword(s):  
Auction Models

Analysis of All-Pay Auction Models

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarada P. Sahu ◽  
Shankhadeep Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Auction Models ◽  
All Pay Auction

scholarly journals Auction models with resource pooling in modern supply chain management

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-134
Author(s):  
Lihua Chen ◽  
Liying Wang ◽  
Yingjie Lan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Resource Pooling ◽  
Auction Models ◽  
Auction Model

Purpose In this paper, the main focus is on supply and demand auction systems with resource pooling in modern supply chain from a theoretical modeling perspective. The supply and demand auction systems in modern supply chains among manufacturers and suppliers serve as information sharing mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to match the supply and demand such that a modern supply chain can achieve incentive compatibility and economic efficiency. The authors design such a supply and demand auction system that can integrate resources to efficiently match the supply and demand. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose three theoretic models of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according to the Vickrey auction principle. They are supply auction model with demand resource pooling, demand auction model with supply resource pooling, and double auction model with demand and supply resource pooling. For the proposed auction models, the authors present three corresponding algorithms to allocate resources in the auction process by linear programming, and study the incentive compatibility and define the Walrasian equilibriums for the proposed auction models. The authors show that the solutions of the proposed algorithms are Walrasian equilibriums. Findings By introducing the auction mechanism, the authors aim to realize the following three functions. First is price mining: auction is an open mechanism with multiple participants. Everyone has his own utility and purchasing ability. So, the final price reflects the market value of the auction. Second is dynamic modern supply chain construction: through auction, firm can find appropriate partner efficiently. Third is resources integration: in business practices, especially in modern supply chain auctions, auctioneers can integrate resources and ally buyers or sellers to gain more efficiency in auctions. Originality/value In the paper, the authors propose three theoretic models and corresponding algorithms of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according using the Vickrey auction principle, which achieves three functions: price mining, dynamic modern supply chain construction and resources integrating. Besides, these proposed models are much closer to practical settings and may have potential applications in modern supply chain management.

scholarly journals NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION OF ACCELERATED FAILURE TIME COMPETING RISKS MODELS

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 905-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sokbae Lee ◽  
Arthur Lewbel
Keyword(s):  
Competing Risks ◽  
Failure Time ◽  
Nonparametric Identification ◽  
Accelerated Failure Time ◽  
Rank Condition ◽  
Survivor Function ◽  
Auction Models ◽  
Regression Functions ◽  
Accelerated Failure ◽  
Identification Strategy

We provide new conditions for identification of accelerated failure time competing risks models. These include Roy models and some auction models. In our setup, unknown regression functions and the joint survivor function of latent disturbance terms are all nonparametric. We show that this model is identified given covariates that are independent of latent errors, provided that a certain rank condition is satisfied. We present a simple example in which our rank condition for identification is verified. Our identification strategy does not depend on identification at infinity or near zero, and it does not require exclusion assumptions. Given our identification, we show estimation can be accomplished using sieves.

Contract Negotiation in E-Marketplaces

2009 ◽  
pp. 267-275
Author(s):  
Larbi Esmahi ◽  
Elarbi Badidi
Keyword(s):  
Customer Service ◽  
Intelligent Agents ◽  
Virtual Agents ◽  
Electronic Market ◽  
Market Place ◽  
Negotiation Strategy ◽  
Intelligent Computing ◽  
Contract Negotiation ◽  
Auction Models ◽  
Agent Interaction

The advancement in distributed and intelligent computing has facilitated the use of software agents for implementing e-services; most electronic market places offer their customers virtual agents that can do their bidding (i.e., eBay, onSale). E-transactions via shopping agents constitute a promising opportunity in the e-markets (Chen, Vahidov, & Kersten, 2004). It becomes relevant what kind of information and what kinds of bargain policies are used both by agents and by the market place. There are several steps for building e-business: (1) attracting the customer, (2) knowing how they buy, (3) making transactions, (4) perfecting orders, (5) giving effective customer service, (6) offering customers recourse for problems such as breakage or returns, and (7) providing a rapid conclusion such as electronic payment. In the distributed e-market paradigm, these functions are abstracted via agents representing both contractual parts. In recent years, many researchers in intelligent agents’ domain have focused on the design of market architectures for electronic commerce (Fikes, Engelmore, Farquhar, & Pratt, 1995; Schoop & Quix, 2001; Zwass, 1999), and on protocols governing the interaction of rational agents engaged in such transactions (Hogg & Jennings, 1997; Kersten & Lai, 2005). While providing support for direct agent interaction, existing architectures for multiagent virtual markets usually lack explicit facilities for handling negotiation protocols, since they do not provide such protocols as an integrated part of the framework. In this article we will discuss the problem of contract negotiation in e-marketplaces. In the next section, we will present related models commonly used to implement negotiation in e-markets, game theory models, auction models, and contract-net protocols. Then the following section continues with the presentation of a negotiation protocol based on dependency relations. We then present a negotiation strategy based on risk evaluation. The conclusion summarizes the article and paves the further way concerning the truth in the negotiation strategy and the use of temporal aspects on commitments and executions of contracts.

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