scholarly journals The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Shareholders and Managers of Foreign Firms

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jefferson Duarte ◽  
Katie Kong ◽  
Lance A. Young ◽  
Stephan Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals The Impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Shareholders and Managers of Foreign Firms*

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 417-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jefferson Duarte ◽  
Katie Kong ◽  
Stephan Siegel ◽  
Lance Young
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact

An examination of the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets for foreign firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 522-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hostak ◽  
Thomas Lys ◽  
Yong George Yang ◽  
Emre Carr
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact

Executive Compensation: New vs. Old Economy and the Impact of NASDAQ Crash and Sarbanes Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Paulo Vieito ◽  
Antonio Melo Cerqueira ◽  
Elísio Brandão ◽  
Walayet A. Khan
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Old Economy ◽  
The Impact

An empirical examination of the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the reduction of pension expense manipulation

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Diane Parker ◽  
Nancy J. Swanson ◽  
Michael T. Dugan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact

Does board independence constrain insider opportunism?

2020 ◽  
pp. 031289622094638
Author(s):  
Dewan Rahman ◽  
Robert Faff ◽  
Barry Oliver
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Exogenous Shocks ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Trading Restrictions ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Identification Strategy

We examine whether insider opportunism is reduced by board independence. Using a sample of 18,194 firm-year observations over the period 1996–2016, we show that board independence constrains opportunistic insider trading. Our identification strategy uses the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act) and associated changes to the listing rules of NYSE/NASDAQ as a source of exogenous shocks in board independence. Our results are economically significant as insider opportunism declines by about 10.5%. We find that insider trading restrictions is the channel through which board independence reduces insider opportunism. Our additional analyses show that in competitive and R&D (research and development) intensive firms, the impact of board independence on opportunism is less pronounced. We also find that board independence constrains opportunism only in less complex firms. However, in co-opted boards, independent directors are less effective. Overall, we support the monitoring channel of board independence for reducing insider opportunism. JEL Classification: G14, G34, G40

The Impact of Client and Misstatement Characteristics on the Disposition of Proposed Audit Adjustments

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Arnold Wright, and ◽  
Sally Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We present evidence on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments during a unique time period, immediately following several U.S. financial scandals and surrounding calls for reforms in auditing and financial reporting, which culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). During this period, auditors and their clients faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators. In addition, auditors had to contend with changed incentives, a new external regulator (i.e., the PCAOB), and upcoming annual PCAOB inspections. We extend prior studies by considering a broader range of factors potentially impacting the resolution of proposed adjustments, including the effect of client tenure, strength of internal controls, and repeat adjustments. Data on 458 proposed adjustments are obtained from the working papers of a sample of 163 audit engagements conducted during 2002 by a Big 4 firm. We find that 24.2 percent of proposed adjustments were subsequently waived. The results indicate audit adjustments are more likely to be waived for clients with whom the audit firm has had a longer relationship, although the pattern does not reflect favoring such clients. We also find that adjustments are more likely to be waived for repeat adjustments. Data Availability: Due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating audit firm the data are proprietary.

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