Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments

2017 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 250-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Bassi
2011 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROB DELLINK

This paper investigates which drivers affect the formation and stability of international climate agreements (ICAs). The applied model STACO is used to project costs and benefits of an international agreement on climate change mitigation activities. The simulation results show that an incentive-based permit allocation scheme is an essential driver in stabilizing larger coalitions. Regional damage shares turn out to be another driver of coalition formation but global damages do not seem to be, thus illustrating that international coalition formation is a matter of relative costs and benefits across regions. No allocation scheme can, however, assure the stability of a global agreement due to huge free-rider incentives. This requires alternative rules, such as a condition that some players are essential in a coalition, or accepting a small loss from cooperation.


1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark N. Franklin ◽  
Thomas T. Mackie

Political scientists who set out to test theories of coalition formation in parliamentary contexts (notably Browne, de Swaan, and Taylor and Laver) found only limited evidence to support the more classical game-theoretic propositions, which predict the formation of coalitions that command a majority of seats in a parliament but are otherwise as small as possible, in some sense of the word ‘small’. As a consequence, Browne later advocated the laying aside of these size theories in favour of theories that took account of the policy preferences of potential coalition partners, and in two separate studies theories were tested that focused upon the ideological component in coalition formation. Both these studies found theories based on presumed policy preferences to perform better than size theories. A more recent study has shown that the relative performance of theories based on size and ideological considerations depends on assumptions made in conducting the research. This study employed multiple regression analysis to establish that both kinds of theory had parts to play in an explanation of formation outcomes, which were dominated sometimes by size and sometimes by ideology, depending on country and time period. In the course of the analysis an additive combination of size and ideology was found to correlate to the extent of r ≃ 0·4 with formation outcomes, producing consistently better predictions than any existing theory.


2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (Supplement-1) ◽  
pp. 111-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágnes Nagy ◽  
Annamária Benyovszki

The turbulence in global financial markets presents a serious challenge to the stability of the monetary policy trilemma configuration. The trilemma states that a country may simultaneously choose only two of the following three policy goals: monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. In order to analyse if the financial crisis brought changes in Romania’s monetary policy preference, we have constructed indexes that measure the trilemma policy goals individually in the period between 2005 and 2012. Using these indices, we have shown that there are significant differences between the means of monetary independence and exchange rate stability indices in the pre- and post-crisis periods.


2000 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-76
Author(s):  
Hee-Min Kim

In this article, I suggest a new typology for the stability of a political system, differentiating policy stability from government stability. I argue that it is when a system is policy-stable that we expect to see a stable and efficacious government. Even when a government change occurs, the policy preferences of the new government are likely to be similar to those of the previous one and we don't expect to see radical policy changes. I go on to show the conditions of policy stability by building a formal model of coalition formation among social groups, assuming a society is made up of social groups with distinctive policy preferences. I show political and social conditions under which stability is likely by studying power distributions among the social groups and the preferences they have over politically salient issues under which a certain set of policies can be stably implemented. In the first part of this article, the government is assumed to have no direct control over societal resources. In the second part, I examine an alternative model in which the government holds direct control over societal resources of its own. I apply the model developed here to the examples of Spain and Sweden throughout this article.


Author(s):  
Francois Bareille ◽  
Matteo Zavalloni ◽  
Meri Raggi ◽  
Davide Viaggi

AbstractA growing body of literature shows that full-cooperation among farmers to manage productive ecosystem services would yield gains with respect to uncoordinated approaches. The public good feature of these ecosystem services may, however, hinder the emergence of a cooperative solution at the landscape scale. In this paper, we introduce in a coalition formation game a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of fruit pollination, where pollinaton depends on the distance to the choosen location of natural habitats. We analyse: (i) which coalitions are stable; (ii) what benefits they provide; (iii) how cooperation depends on the initial landscape structure; and (iv) how policy instruments affect cooperation. The theoretical model presents the rationality of cooperation but, due to the detailed heterogeneity and complex spatial interactions among farms, we use a numerical example to determine the stable coalitions. We find that only small coalitions are stable and that the benefits of cooperation decrease when the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase. Policy instruments can increase the interest for cooperation but per-hectare payments and minimum participation rules may reduce the habitat area at the margin (by decreasing the stability of coalitions). Price premium for the coalition members increase the habitat area but its budget-effectiveness decreases as the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase.


1982 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
pp. 605-613
Author(s):  
P. S. Conti

Conti: One of the main conclusions of the Wolf-Rayet symposium in Buenos Aires was that Wolf-Rayet stars are evolutionary products of massive objects. Some questions:–Do hot helium-rich stars, that are not Wolf-Rayet stars, exist?–What about the stability of helium rich stars of large mass? We know a helium rich star of ∼40 MO. Has the stability something to do with the wind?–Ring nebulae and bubbles : this seems to be a much more common phenomenon than we thought of some years age.–What is the origin of the subtypes? This is important to find a possible matching of scenarios to subtypes.


1999 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 309-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Fukushima

AbstractBy using the stability condition and general formulas developed by Fukushima (1998 = Paper I) we discovered that, just as in the case of the explicit symmetric multistep methods (Quinlan and Tremaine, 1990), when integrating orbital motions of celestial bodies, the implicit symmetric multistep methods used in the predictor-corrector manner lead to integration errors in position which grow linearly with the integration time if the stepsizes adopted are sufficiently small and if the number of corrections is sufficiently large, say two or three. We confirmed also that the symmetric methods (explicit or implicit) would produce the stepsize-dependent instabilities/resonances, which was discovered by A. Toomre in 1991 and confirmed by G.D. Quinlan for some high order explicit methods. Although the implicit methods require twice or more computational time for the same stepsize than the explicit symmetric ones do, they seem to be preferable since they reduce these undesirable features significantly.


Author(s):  
Godfrey C. Hoskins ◽  
V. Williams ◽  
V. Allison

The method demonstrated is an adaptation of a proven procedure for accurately determining the magnification of light photomicrographs. Because of the stability of modern electrical lenses, the method is shown to be directly applicable for providing precise reproducibility of magnification in various models of electron microscopes.A readily recognizable area of a carbon replica of a crossed-line diffraction grating is used as a standard. The same area of the standard was photographed in Phillips EM 200, Hitachi HU-11B2, and RCA EMU 3F electron microscopes at taps representative of the range of magnification of each. Negatives from one microscope were selected as guides and printed at convenient magnifications; then negatives from each of the other microscopes were projected to register with these prints. By deferring measurement to the print rather than comparing negatives, correspondence of magnification of the specimen in the three microscopes could be brought to within 2%.


Author(s):  
E. R. Kimmel ◽  
H. L. Anthony ◽  
W. Scheithauer

The strengthening effect at high temperature produced by a dispersed oxide phase in a metal matrix is seemingly dependent on at least two major contributors: oxide particle size and spatial distribution, and stability of the worked microstructure. These two are strongly interrelated. The stability of the microstructure is produced by polygonization of the worked structure forming low angle cell boundaries which become anchored by the dispersed oxide particles. The effect of the particles on strength is therefore twofold, in that they stabilize the worked microstructure and also hinder dislocation motion during loading.


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