English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 805-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Fouirnaies ◽  
Hande Mutlu-Eren
2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (8) ◽  
pp. 5072-5086
Author(s):  
Samad Ali ◽  
Aidin Ferdowsi ◽  
Walid Saad ◽  
Nandana Rajatheva ◽  
Jussi Haapola

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 665-691
Author(s):  
Marcelin Joanis

This article adopts the perspective of second-generation fiscal-federalism theory to provide an empirical assessment of Canada’s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In the context of the literature on the political economy of intergovernmental grant programs, it examines the influence of political considerations on the evolution of the Canadian fiscal arrangements under the Constitution Act of 1982. Fixed-effect regression results exploiting data from the 1982 to 2012 period show a statistically significant relationship between changes in both federal and provincial electoral variables and changes in a province’s total federal transfer revenues. Changes to social transfers appear to be more reactive to changes in the political environment than do changes in equalization transfers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth S. Lowande ◽  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Andrew J. Clarke

Research on presidential distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on federal domestic spending. Yet, presidential influence on public policy extends well-beyond grant allocation. Since the early 20th Century, for example, the president has had substantial discretion to adjust tariff schedules and non-tariff barriers “with the stroke of a pen.” These trade adjustments via presidential directive allow us to test the logic of presidential particularism in an area of policy understudied among presidency scholars. We examine unilateral adjustments to US trade policies between 1917 and 2006, with a detailed analysis of those made between 1986 and 2006, and find that presidents—in accordance with electoral incentives—strategically allocate trade protections to industries in politically valuable states. In general, states in which the president lacks a comfortable electoral majority are systematically more likely to receive protectionist unilateral orders. Overall, our results show that the president’s distributive imperative extends into the realm of foreign affairs, an arena in which the president has substantial authority to influence public policy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuomas Höylä ◽  
Christoph Bartneck ◽  
Timo Tiihonen

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Bradley Cousins ◽  
Marielle Simon

To enhance the relevance and usefulness of social science research, large-scale research grant allocation policies are emphasizing, if not requiring, the formation of research partnerships between researchers and members of the community of practice. The emergence of a revisionist conception of traditional dissemination and utilization theoretical frameworks is consistent with this policy direction, but supportive empirical evidence remains thin. This study reports on a multi-method evaluation of a major Canadian strategic grant program that has such partnership guidelines. Surveys of 74 funded projects and four case profiles and interviews with researchers, members of the community of practice, and grant application adjudicators concerning a strategic grant program called Education and Work in a Changing Society provided the primary basis for investigating the nature and impact of policy-induced partnerships. Results show favorable effects of partnerships on research and dissemination strategies and impact in the practice community, but ideological and pragmatic issues surfaced as inhibitory factors. The results are discussed in terms of implications for the revisionist dissemination and utilization framework, the role of granting agencies and ramifications for future research and grant allocation policy.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Harding ◽  
Neil Warren ◽  
Gillian Beer ◽  
Ben Phillips ◽  
Kwabena Osei

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 949-974 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIAMPAOLO GARZARELLI ◽  
LYNDAL KEETON

AbstractThis article contributes to an institutional economics analysis of the public economy by answering the following question: what is the role of intergovernmental grants in laboratory federalism? In line with factual evidence, the fiscal federalism literature on policy experimentation hints that grants can be employed to stimulate policy innovation through trial and error learning. Yet it lacks a theory of policy experimentation through grants, meaning that, in effect, we lack a fiscal theory of laboratory federalism. In the proposed approach, an intergovernmental grant is likened to a fiscal institution for political compromise between levels of government that frames policy experimentation options and constraints. At the same time, since policy solutions are not always easy to find or to implement, policy experimentation requires some degree of flexibility. Thus, the article shows that the extent of experimentation induced by a grant is influenced (or, more fashionably, nudged) by the conditionality attached to the grant. It argues, moreover, that if a grantor would like to induce more (less) experimentation, then, all other things equal, a grant with fewer (more) conditions attached should fare better than a grant with more (fewer) conditions attached.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document