Olson, Jonas. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 224. $55.00 (cloth).

Ethics ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 125 (4) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225
Author(s):  
Matt Lutz ◽  
Stephen Finlay
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Oxford University Press

scholarly journals On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Oxford University Press ◽  
Moral Facts

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

scholarly journals Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Wouter Floris Kalf
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

V-Moral Error Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-418
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Argument From Analogy ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

The Analogy

2019 ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document