Instrumental Realism: The Interface between Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Technology. Don Ihde

Isis ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-530
Author(s):  
Davis Baird
2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-82
Author(s):  
Ashwin Jayanti ◽  

This paper shall concern itself with two variants of instrumental realism that have developed independently of each other and have made a mark on contemporary philosophies of science as well as of technology in their own respective ways. One is that of Don Ihde, the progenitor of the postphenomenological approach to technoscience, and the other that of Davis Baird, who emphasizes the epistemic centrality of instruments as bearers of knowledge in themselves. I shall juxtapose Ihde’s instrumental realism with the instrumental realism of Baird, both of whom emphasize the importance of experimentation and instrumentation to any comprehensive philosophy of science. Whereas Ihde wants to extend hermeneutics to science praxis, Baird wants to maintain an epistemological commitment to what he calls ‘thing knowledge.’ In comparing and contrasting these two variants of instrumental realism, I shall discern the implicit ontological and epistemological claims that underlie the two realisms in the background of scientific realism and critically evaluate their contributions to a more comprehensive understanding of science, technology, and the relation between the two.


1995 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Roger Fellows

The essays collected here do not constitute a philosophy of technology, in the sense which, for instance, Don Ihde requires. According to Ihde the philosopher of technology must reflectively analyse technology in such a way ‘as to illuminate features of the phenomenon of technology itself’. The contributors to this volume do not concern themselves with the essentiahst enterprise of defining technology; they more or less take it for granted that the reader is familiar with a variety of technologies such as Information Technology, and proceed from there. Hence the title is the conjunctive one of Philosophy and Technolog..


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Simons ◽  

Among the contemporary philosophers using the concept of the Anthropocene, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers are prominent examples. The way they use this concept, however, diverts from the most common understanding of the Anthropocene. In fact, their use of this notion is a continuation of their earlier work around the concept of a ‘parliament of things.’ Although mainly seen as a sociology or philosophy of science, their work can be read as philosophy of technology as well. Similar to Latour’s claim that science is Janus-headed, technology has two faces. Faced with the Anthropocene, we need to shift from technologies of control to technologies of negotiations, i.e., a parliament of things. What, however, does a ‘parliament of things’ mean? This paper wants to clarify what is conceptually at stake by framing Latour’s work within the philosophy of Michel Serres and Isabelle Stengers. Their philosophy implies a ‘postlinguistic turn,’ where one can ‘let things speak in their own name,’ without claiming knowledge of the thing in itself. The distinction between object and subject is abolished to go back to the world of ‘quasi-objects’ (Serres). Based on the philosophy of science of Latour and Stengers the possibility for a politics of quasi-objects or a ‘cosmopolitics’ (Stengers) is opened. It is in this framework that their use of the notion of the Anthropocene must be understood and a different view of technology can be conceptualized.


2020 ◽  
pp. 68-76
Author(s):  
Tomas Nemunas Mickevičius

In this article some important aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is addressed. It is argued against Don Ihde’s observation that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology mostly concerns the large scale technological phenomena of industrial revolution – actually in Heidegger’s oeuvre we can find reflection on such micro-scale post-industrial technologies as cybernetics, biotechnologies etc. The critique of the essentialism of Heideggerian philosophy of technology by such authors as Andrew Feenberg, Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek is presented. It is suggested that earlier Heidegger’s concept of the essence of technology as “machination” (Machenschaft) is less susceptible to such criticism: whether technologies are exploitative and turning nature into “standing reserve”, or whether they are ecological and nature-friendly, whether they are understood as autonomous force, or democratically controlled process – it could be said that through contemporary technologies reality is increasingly turned into artifice and entities are revealed as makeable and producible.


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