Indubitables in Ethics: A Cartesian Meditation

Ethics ◽  
1947 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Spiegelberg
Keyword(s):  
Cartesian Meditation

The Constitution of the Alter Ego in Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-191
Author(s):  
Lorraine Viscardi-Murray
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
General Statement ◽  
Life World ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
Fifth Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Alter Ego

AbstractThis paper explores Husserl's phenomenological description of the constitution of the alter ego within the sphere of transcendental subjectivity. It is important at the start to point out that the Other plays a crucial role in securing the intersubjective nature of the experienced world. Although Husserl goes on in the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" to consider the constitution of an objective world common to all subjects and the establishment of a community of monads, my primary focus in this paper will be the examination of the initial steps whereby the sense, "other ego," is constituted by the transcendental ego. My main task, then, will be to examine the reduction to the sphere of ownness, the appresentative transfer of sense from ego to alter ego, and the criterion of harmonious behavior. My primary criticisms will center around certain difficulties inherent in the attempt to uncover a primordial sphere of ownness and problems that arise from a shift in concern from the life-world (everyday) attitude to the attitude following the performance of the epoché. Part I of the paper will consist of a general discussion of Husserl's phenomenological project, Part II will be a detailed study of the alter ego, and Part III a general statement of problems and objections.

scholarly journals El papel de la darse-previo en la fenomenología trascendental

Phainomenon ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52
Author(s):  
Roberto J. Walton
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Surface Level ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

Abstract This article is an attempt to clarify the role of pregivenness by drawing on the accounts afforded by Eugen Fink both in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and in the complementary writings to this study. Pregivenness is first situated, along with givenness and non-givenness, within the framework of the system of transcendental phenomenology. As a second step, an examination is undertaken of the dimensions of pregivenness in the natural attitude. Next, nonpregivenness in the transcendental sphere is examined with a focus upon the way in which indeterminateness does not undermine the possibility of a transcendental foreknowledge in the natural attitude, and on the other hand implies the productive character of phenomenological knowledge. After showing how, with the reduction, the pregivennes of the world turns into the pregivenness of world-constitution, the paper addresses the problems raised by the nonpregivenness both of the depth-levels and the reach of transcendental life. By unfolding these lines of inquiry, transcendental phenomenology surmounts the provisional analysis of constitution at the surface level as well as the limitation of transcendental life to the egological sphere. Finally, it is contended that Fink’s account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenenness because is does not deal with the pregivenness that precedes acts and is the condition of possibility for primary passivity. Reasons for the omission of impressional or primary pregivenness are suggested.

scholarly journals Philosophical Practice as Self-modification: An Essay on Michel Foucault’s Critical Engagement with Philosophy

2018 ◽  
pp. 8
Author(s):  
Sverre Raffnsøe ◽  
Morten Thaning ◽  
Marius Gudmand-Høyer
Keyword(s):  
Truth Telling ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Early Modernity ◽  
Collège De France ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
History Of ◽  
To Come

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today.

scholarly journals Paul Ricœur’s Search for a Just Community. The Phenomenological Presupposition of a Life “with and for others”

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-54
Author(s):  
Marc De Leeuw
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
Early Analysis ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Communal Life ◽  
The Social ◽  
Alternative Conceptualization ◽  
Just Community ◽  
Fifth Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Prolonged Response

The aim of this article is to examine how Ricœur’s critique of Husserl’s and Levinas’s notions of intersubjectivity informs his own alternative conceptualization of the intra- and interpersonal as a complex intertwining of moral selfhood and a just community. My first assumption is that law, as a prescriptive intervention in the social structure of our communal life, presupposes a phenomenology of our “being with others”. My second assumption is that Ricœur’s entire philosophical anthropology, and specifically his ideas on ethics, legality and justice, can be read as a prolonged response to Husserl’s solipsistic deadlock in the famous Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Taken together these two assumptions connect Ricœur’s early analysis of phenomenology with his complex reconceptualization of moral selfhood in Oneself as Another, culminating in the ethical maxim of “a good life with and for others in just institutions.”

scholarly journals Sobre el fenomenologizar como cinestesia concretizante

2021 ◽  
pp. 223
Author(s):  
Pablo Posada Varela
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Logical Investigation ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Basic Concepts

Nos proponemos, en este artículo, sentar las bases necesarias para investigar la correlación entre algunas formas de epojé y las reducciones a las que dichas suspensiones abren, y que corresponden a una concreción cada vez más rica. Nuestra aproximación de la concreción fenomenológica se apoya, abiertamente, en la mereología (i.e. se atiene a los estrictos términos de la IIIª Investigación Lógica). Tras un breve repaso de algunos conceptos mereológicos aplicados al giro transcendental de la fenomenología, trataremos de apresar, mereológicamente, la especificidad de la problemática finkeana en su VIª Meditación Cartesiana. Habremos pues de diseccionar las partes de la correlación transcendental cruzándolas con el particular lugar que, en esa concreción (i.e. de la correlación transcendental), ocupa esa “parte” no concrescente (sino indirectamente concretizante) que es el yo fenomenologizante. Ella conformará la “parte” antecedente del “todo” (en sentido lato) de la cinestesia fenomenologizante que tratamos de elucidar, y cuyo consecuente será el todo (ahora sí en sentido estricto) de la correlación transcendental. Intentamos así contribuir al esclarecimiento del proceso de reducción fenomenológica, sentando las bases para una investigación sobre las articulaciones concretas entre epojé y reducción.The aim of this paper is to lay the ground for understanding the correlation between some forms of epochè and the reduction they open to, which corresponds, each time, to a richer type of concreteness. Our approach of phenomenological concreteness is mereological (i.e. within the very terms of the 3rd Logical Investigation). Therefore, after remembering some basic concepts of the husserlian mereology and their possible use within transcendental phenomenology, we try to grasp the specificity of the questions posed by Eugen Fink in his 6 th Cartesian Meditation. We shall expose the parts of the transcendental correlation and then account for the particular role played, “within” this concretion (i.e. that of the transcendental correlation), by this particular “part” which is the phenomenologizing ego (if not concrescent, yet indirectly concretizing). The phenomenologizing ego will be the antecedent “part” or term within this “whole” (lato sensu) consisting on the phenomenologizing kinesthesis. Thereafter, the consequent term of such a kinesthesis corresponds to the whole (this time stricto sensu) of the transcendental correlation. We thus intend to throw some light on the process of phenomenological reduction and set the basis for further investigations regarding the concrete articulation between epochè and reduction.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document