Strikebreaking or Solidarity in the Great Steel Strike of 1919: A Split Labor Market, Game-Theoretic, and QCA Analysis

1995 ◽  
Vol 100 (6) ◽  
pp. 1479-1519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cliff Brown ◽  
Terry Boswell
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Split Labor Market

The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States

1999 ◽  
Vol 24 (02) ◽  
pp. 411-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Auerhahn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Moral Panics ◽  
Theoretical Formulation ◽  
Market Dynamic ◽  
Paid Labor ◽  
Labor Market Dynamics ◽  
Split Labor Market

Edna Bonacich's (1972) theoretical formulation of Split labor market dynamics as underlying the content and process of ethnic antagonism is expanded and applied to an historical analysis of the development of antidrug laws in the United States. The campaigns and resultant legislation against opium, cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana are subjected to a split labor market analysis that incorporates the notion of moral panics and an understanding of the ways in which law may be used as a “weapon” in the furtherance of class interests. The article concludes that each of these campaigns came about as the result of an underlying split labor market dynamic and adds to Bonacich's original formulation the response of criminalization of the threatening labor group by the higher-paid labor group.

The Tenant Labor Market and Lynching in the South: A Test of Split Labor Market Theory

1988 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Corzine ◽  
Lin Huff-Corzine ◽  
James C. Creech
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
The South ◽  
Market Theory ◽  
Split Labor Market

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Younes Brumand ◽  
Masoomeh Salary
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Status ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

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