Defense Spending and Defense Voting in the House: An Empirical Study of an Aspect of the Military-Industrial Complex Thesis

1976 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Cobb
2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Edgerton

This article highlights the until quite recently neglected political-economic thinking in matters of defense in twentieth-century Britain. It argues that retrieving such analyses from the interwar years is an excellent although partial way to get at an alternative picture of interwar defense spending and the arms industry. Interestingly, the political-economic approach fell out of favor in the nuclear age, but became central from the 1970s in critical discussion of British militarism. Yet that political-economic view was limited in that it made important assumptions about the civilian origins and nature of modern war. The article challenges these assumptions, noting the military origins and nature of most military technologies, and indeed of many civilian technologies, too.


1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-299
Author(s):  
Roger W. Lotchin

Like many modern historians’ concepts, the notion of political culture comes to us from the social sciences, especially anthropology and political science. One assumes that political culture is a term familiar to most readers. The term metropolitan-military complex may require some explanation. I coined the phrase some years ago when undertaking a study of San Francisco politics. At the time, the inquiry was fairly conventional. Yet as I worked through the struggles over municipal services, labor and management problems, political structure, mass transit, minorities, parties, reformers, bosses, and so forth, the role of the military loomed ever larger. The longer the military was investigated, the more important that role appeared to be. Eventually, I changed the focus of my study from politics, conventionally defined, to the relationship between cities and the military. President Dwight D. Eisenhower used the term military-industrial complex in his 1961 farewell address to describe an alliance among technicians, congressmen, bureaucrats, military men, and businessmen. He did not define his words rigorously, but he left the definite impression that the military-industrial complex (MIC) was national in scope and something close to a conspiracy on behalf of greater defense spending. The president also implied that the MIC had only recently appeared. Subsequent commentators on the subject have largely followed this approach, stressing the importance of conspiracy, militarism, Washington bureaucrats, big business, and big congressmen. They have also accepted the World War II or cold war origins of the alliance as well as its national scope.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasily Zatsepin

The article views the Russian defense budget as a representation of national strategic interests, priorities, and policies. Although Russia conforms to the United Nations' statistical standard for reporting military expenditure, several budget categories are hidden in other parts of the federal budget. Transparency in defense spending has been decreasing steadily. The budgeting process itself is cumbersome and opaque. Parliamentary control over the budget process and control over the execution of defense appropriations are limited. Importantly, frequent changes in the system of national accounting impede historical comparisons. The study finds that the low quality of defense management, dominated by members of the military-industrial complex, is a major problem locking Russian defense policy in an institutional trap.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-119
Author(s):  
Edmund F. Wehrle

Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, American organized labor emerged among the most enthusiastic supporters of the military–industrial complex. This study examines that emerging relationship, focusing on the efforts of a group of unionists to mold defense spending into a vehicle for promoting employment and addressing social and economic problems.During the Korean War, labor representatives drafted, lobbied for, and helped administration Defense Manpower Policy #4, a policy channeling defense spending to areas suffering high rates of unemployment. With the advent of the Eisenhower administration, preferential policies fell by the wayside, but organized labor continued to press, with some success for defense spending as a general antidote to economic downturns. Late in the 1950s, the Construction Trades Department of Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO), reacting to double-digit unemployment in their ranks, became an active promoter of fallout shelter construction.Despite some initial success in reimplementing preferential policies during the early months of the Kennedy administration, organized labor's defense agenda quickly ran afoul of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's plans to systematize and rationalize the defense sector.In the end, resistance from military and business leaders greatly impeded labor's progress. At the very least, however, labor's defense agenda reflects a larger social vision and also suggests the very real attraction to many unionists of the military–industrial complex, a malleable economic realm, open to political influence and somewhat removed from the harsh forces of the market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Irina Orlova ◽  
Artem Sukharev ◽  
Maria Sukhareva ◽  
Mikhail Deikun

The main objective of the article is to substantiate a systematic approach to the introduction of all types of innovations in the development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that in the modern world it is especially important to ensure the national security of the country and the defense industry plays a crucial role in this. At the same time, one cannot but note the importance of the defense industry in the production of high-tech civilian products and dual-use products, which enhances the country's competitiveness in the world market. In addition, the relevance of the topic is due to the presence of rather serious problems in the Russian defense industry, which require immediate resolution. The article uses the methodology of structurally functional analysis, the institutional approach and the method of comparative assessments. The authors conclude that technological innovation alone will not be able to achieve strategic results for ensuring national security, only in conjunction with organizational, product, social and marketing innovations, the domestic defense industry is able to solve its tasks.


Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 2103-2123
Author(s):  
V.L. Gladyshevskii ◽  
E.V. Gorgola ◽  
D.V. Khudyakov

Subject. In the twentieth century, the most developed countries formed a permanent military economy represented by military-industrial complexes, which began to perform almost a system-forming role in national economies, acting as the basis for ensuring national security, and being an independent military and political force. The United States is pursuing a pronounced militaristic policy, has almost begun to unleash a new "cold war" against Russia and to unwind the arms race, on the one hand, trying to exhaust the enemy's economy, on the other hand, to reindustrialize its own economy, relying on the military-industrial complex. Objectives. We examine the evolution, main features and operational distinctions of the military-industrial complex of the United States and that of the Russian Federation, revealing sources of their military-technological and military-economic advancement in comparison with other countries. Methods. The study uses military-economic analysis, scientific and methodological apparatus of modern institutionalism. Results. Regulating the national economy and constant monitoring of budget financing contribute to the rise of military production, especially in the context of austerity and crisis phenomena, which, in particular, justifies the irrelevance of institutionalists' conclusions about increasing transaction costs and intensifying centralization in the industrial production management with respect to to the military-industrial complex. Conclusions. Proving to be much more efficient, the domestic military-industrial complex, without having such access to finance as the U.S. military monopolies, should certainly evolve and progress, strengthening the coordination, manageability, planning, maximum cost reduction, increasing labor productivity, and implementing an internal quality system with the active involvement of the State and its resources.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document