How the rule of the market rules the law: the political economy of WTO dispute settlement as evidenced in theUS – Lamb Meatdecision

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 776-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bill Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Rules ◽  
The Law

What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rémi Bachand
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Main Function ◽  
Critical Studies ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Marxist Analysis ◽  
Rate Of Profit

Abstract The main objective of this article is to explore the background of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) crisis using Marxist, neo-Marxist or, at least, Marxist-influenced theories of political economy and international relations. Its purpose is twofold. First, to propose an interpretation of the actual WTO crisis that will address alternative interpretations’ gaps. Second, to advance theoretical inputs founded on Marxist or Marxist-influenced writing in political economy, inputs which could be useful elsewhere in critical studies in international law. At the root of the crisis lies the functioning of neoliberalism (understood as the regime of accumulation promoted by US-dominant classes) and the institutions it uses to regulate itself, to deal with contradictions that hurt its capacity to produce profit, and to allow capital accumulation. One of the most important of these institutions, at the international level, is the WTO. We argue that neoliberalism’s incapacity to continuously provide, since the Asian crisis in 1997, a satisfying rate of profit to US capitalists (and to Western capitalists in general, even if our argument focuses on the former) lured it into a crisis. Since the WTO’s main function is to prevent neoliberalism from being hurt by contradictions that would limit its capacity to provide profits allowing capital accumulation, it was inevitable that one day or another, the struggle faced by the latter would also drag the former down in an institutional crisis.

A correction

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES McCALL SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Supportive Evidence ◽  
Erroneous Conclusion ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Political Controversy

In my article ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: the Politics of Procedure in Appellate body Rulings’ (March 2003), I linked the resignation of Debra Steger, former Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat, to the political controversy regarding amicus curiae submissions. This erroneous conclusion was based on two interviews in Geneva and implicitly supportive evidence from a WTO Reporter article.

scholarly journals The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body as a Voice Mechanism

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 820-861
Author(s):  
Joshua Paine
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This article focuses on the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) – the diplomatic body, consisting of representatives of WTO members, that administers the dispute settlement system. Focusing on the WTO, the article provides one perspective on the relationship between international tribunals and the political bodies that oversee the governance of such tribunals. Specifically, I argue that the DSB operates as an important ‘voice’ mechanism, which enables members to provide regular feedback to WTO adjudicators, and helps sustain the internal legitimacy of WTO adjudication. However, the DSB can also be used in ways that undermine judicial independence. In short, the DSB is a key site where the tension plays out between WTO adjudicators’ independence from members, and control by, and accountability to, members. The episodes examined in detail to develop this argument are the crisis of a generation ago over amicus curiae briefs, and the ongoing crisis over Appellate Body appointments.

scholarly journals On Foreign Investor ‘Privilege’ and the Limits of the Law: A Reply to Ivar Alvik

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 313-319
Author(s):  
Jürgen Kurtz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Investment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Definitive Answer ◽  
State Action ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
Internal Problem ◽  
The Law ◽  
Domestic Companies

Abstract International investment treaties are structurally characterized by inherent asymmetry in the (non-relative) legal protections extended to foreign investors vis-à-vis domestic companies and nationals. For many lawyers, ‘foreign privilege’ is deeply problematic as it violates a foundational legal principle – namely, equality before the law. Yet law and law alone cannot always offer a definitive answer of this sort. At the very least, legal hypotheses should be rigorously tested against insights from other disciplines that can offer sharp analytical light on the complex contours of a given phenomenon. In this reply, I explore the political economy of host state policy as it is formed against three categories of foreign direct investment (FDI). Conceptually (and empirically), this political economy matrix reveals sharply varying levels of risk of hostile state action against distinct forms of FDI. To be sure, this analysis alone does not justify the traditional and expansive model of bilateral investment treaty protections. Yet, at least for some categories, this political economy case reveals an internal problem that is difficult (if not impossible) for the state itself to resolve, and, thus, it may well be rational for such a state to leverage international norms to extend qualified extra-domestic priority to foreign actors.

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