scholarly journals Toward a pragmatic account and taxonomy of valuative speech acts

Pragmatics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-132
Author(s):  
Ernesto Wong García

Abstract This paper presents an account of value ascription as an illocutionary force, based on four claims: (1) that value ascription is a kind of illocutionary force, defining a specific kind of speech act, i.e. valuative speech acts (VSAs); (2) that the point of VSAs is ascribing an axiological value to a referent; (3) that VSAs create a weak, inside-oriented truth commitment; and (4) that they are therefore more about the valuating subject than they are about the valuated object. This illocutionary force is described using criteria taken from contemporary speech act theory as well as others that have proven informative. This description results in a rich taxonomy of VSAs. This shows the viability and fruitfulness of a pragmatic account of value ascription, and it contributes to the development of speech act theory, specifically with regard to the distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary points, and the speech act taxonomy itself.

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Jörg Meibauer

Abstract The notion of an indirect speech act is at the very heart of cognitive pragmatics, yet, after nearly 50 years of orthodox (Searlean) speech act theory, it remains largely unclear how this notion can be explicated in a proper way. In recent years, two debates about indirect speech acts have stood out. First, a debate about the Searlean idea that indirect speech acts constitute a simultaneous realization of a secondary and a primary act. Second, a debate about the reasons for the use of indirect speech acts, in particular about whether this reason is to be seen in strategic advantages and/or observation of politeness demands. In these debates, the original pragmatic conception of sentence types as indicators of illocutionary force seems to have been getting lost. Here, I go back to the seemingly outdated “literal force hypothesis” (see Levinson 1983: 263–264) and point out how it is still relevant for cognitive pragmatics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-291
Author(s):  
Rita Finkbeiner

Abstract Using the example of newspaper headlines, this paper develops a speech-act theoretic approach to aspects of meaning that can be communicated through the use of typographic means. After considering, more generally, the relationship between speech act theory and writing, analogies between prosody and typography are discussed and the claim is developed that typographic means, just as prosodic means, may function as illocutionary force indicating devices. Using Gallmann’s (1985) system of graphic means, newspaper headlines are defined, more specifically, as typographic objects indicating the (meta-textual) illocution type of an announcement of the text topic. Finally, the relationship between the grammatically determined illocution of a (sentential) headline and its typographically determined meta-textual illocution is modeled, on the basis of Searle’s (1982b) account of fictional speech acts, as an interplay of „vertical“ and „horizontal“ rules. The paper closes with a discussion of the more general question whether typographic acts are speech acts.


1987 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rubattel

This article deals with the syntactic properties of pragmatic connectives and with the relationship between their distributional and argumentative properties. Recent discourse models based on speech act theory assume that pragmatic connectives link sentences (or larger units). However, certain phrasal categories too can function as discourse units, and the set of pragmatic connectives therefore includes not only markers linking sentences provided with an illocutionary force (speech acts), but also phrases lacking an asserted illocutionary force (semi-speech acts). Moreover, many connectives either belong to the two subsets or are in complementary distribution, depending on the syntactic environment. Except for coordination, all these connectives are members of only two grammatical categories: Universal subordinators (including complementizers, subordinating conjunctions and prepositions), and modifying adverbs. Coordinate conjunctions are briefly reconsidered, and some arguments are given for restricting this class to et, ou and ni, both on pragmatic and on syntactic grounds.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Mohd Faizal Kasmani ◽  
Sofia Hayati Yusoff ◽  
Osama Kanaker

Abstract Speech-act theory allows us to study how words have an impact in real life and the performative nature of words. At the same time, it can also contribute to an understanding of communication style and communication strategy. In this article, speech-act theory is applied to the conversations of Prophet Muḥammad with the Bedouin in two ways. First, the speech acts of the Prophet are analyzed using the categories put forward by John Searle to see how they function within the conversation. Second, the illocutionary force of an utterance and its perlocutionary effect – based on words and expressions that the Prophet used in his utterances – are examined to discover patterns in his communication strategy towards the Bedouin.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Akhmad Saifudin

This article explains the theory of speech acts proposed by John L. Austin and his student John R. Searle. Speech act theory is a sub-field of pragmatics. This field of study deals with the ways in which words can be used not only to present information but also to carry out actions. This theory considers three levels or components of speech: locutionary acts (the making of a meaningful statement, saying something that a hearer understands), illocutionary acts (saying something with a purpose, such as to inform), and perlocutionary acts (saying something that causes someone to act). Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying the meaning of speaker’s utterance or illocutionary force. There are five types of Illocutionary point according to Searle: declarations, assertives, expressives, directives, and commissives (1979:viii). A speech act, in order to be successful, needs to be performed along certain types of conditions. These conditions were categorized by the linguist John Searle, who introduced the term felicity conditions: propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata Kochańska

AbstractThe present study offers an analysis of two directive constructions in Polish: the V2sg.imp.imperf + midat ‘me’ construction and the (Proszę ‘I request’) + Vinf construction. The two constructions are problematic for speech act theory in that they may be used in a range of different contexts, where they convey different illocutionary forces and produce different interpersonal effects. Hence, it remains unclear how, or indeed whether at all, the illocutionary force and the interpersonal effects of utterances employing the two constructions may be tied to their respective grammatical make-ups. This, in turn, raises two related questions: (i) what motivates the use of each construction in specific contexts? and (ii) how can hearers interpret the construction's specific import in specific interactive circumstances?The claim made in this study is that each construction imposes a particular schematic construal upon the conceived scene, including also ground elements, such as the speaker, the hearer, and their interactive circumstances. The conventional schematic meaning of each construction is motivated by the meanings of its components. Being schematic, the construal conventionally associated with each construction is compatible with a whole range of specific actual interactive circumstances. However, in each specific usage event the intended specific import of the construction may easily be interpreted, given the interactive and interpersonal information saliently present in the context.


AJS Review ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Satlow

In 1962, J. L. Austin published a set of lectures entitled How to Do Things with Words. In this founding document of speech act theory, Austin argues that language not only can say things, but it can also do things (what he calls the illocutionary force of language). Austins signal example of the illocutionary force of language is the wedding ceremony, in which words properly recited actually create a marriage. Later students of speech act theory have expanded the application of this insight: all language, written or spoken, has an illocutionary force that depends on the context of the speech act. All language not only, or even primarily, says; it also does.


Author(s):  
Craige Roberts

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Murray ◽  
William B. Starr

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to serving as a particular type of speech act, that is, to serving as one of the three basic types of language game moves-making an assertion (declarative); posing a question (interrogative); or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). This type of semantics for grammatical mood is illustrated with the imperative.


The essays collected in this book represent recent advances in our understanding of speech acts-actions like asserting, asking, and commanding that speakers perform when producing an utterance. The study of speech acts spans disciplines, and embraces both the theoretical and scientific concerns proper to linguistics and philosophy as well as the normative questions that speech acts raise for our politics, our societies, and our ethical lives generally. It is the goal of this book to reflect the diversity of current thinking on speech acts as well as to bring these conversations together, so that they may better inform one another. Topics explored in this book include the relationship between sentence grammar and speech act potential; the fate of traditional frameworks in speech act theory, such as the content-force distinction and the taxonomy of speech acts; and the ways in which speech act theory can illuminate the dynamics of hostile and harmful speech. The book takes stock of well over a half century of thinking about speech acts, bringing this classicwork in linewith recent developments in semantics and pragmatics, and pointing the way forward to further debate and research.


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