Actes De Langage, Semi-Actes Et Typologie Des Connecteurs Pragmatiques

1987 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rubattel

This article deals with the syntactic properties of pragmatic connectives and with the relationship between their distributional and argumentative properties. Recent discourse models based on speech act theory assume that pragmatic connectives link sentences (or larger units). However, certain phrasal categories too can function as discourse units, and the set of pragmatic connectives therefore includes not only markers linking sentences provided with an illocutionary force (speech acts), but also phrases lacking an asserted illocutionary force (semi-speech acts). Moreover, many connectives either belong to the two subsets or are in complementary distribution, depending on the syntactic environment. Except for coordination, all these connectives are members of only two grammatical categories: Universal subordinators (including complementizers, subordinating conjunctions and prepositions), and modifying adverbs. Coordinate conjunctions are briefly reconsidered, and some arguments are given for restricting this class to et, ou and ni, both on pragmatic and on syntactic grounds.

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-291
Author(s):  
Rita Finkbeiner

Abstract Using the example of newspaper headlines, this paper develops a speech-act theoretic approach to aspects of meaning that can be communicated through the use of typographic means. After considering, more generally, the relationship between speech act theory and writing, analogies between prosody and typography are discussed and the claim is developed that typographic means, just as prosodic means, may function as illocutionary force indicating devices. Using Gallmann’s (1985) system of graphic means, newspaper headlines are defined, more specifically, as typographic objects indicating the (meta-textual) illocution type of an announcement of the text topic. Finally, the relationship between the grammatically determined illocution of a (sentential) headline and its typographically determined meta-textual illocution is modeled, on the basis of Searle’s (1982b) account of fictional speech acts, as an interplay of „vertical“ and „horizontal“ rules. The paper closes with a discussion of the more general question whether typographic acts are speech acts.


Author(s):  
Craige Roberts

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.


The essays collected in this book represent recent advances in our understanding of speech acts-actions like asserting, asking, and commanding that speakers perform when producing an utterance. The study of speech acts spans disciplines, and embraces both the theoretical and scientific concerns proper to linguistics and philosophy as well as the normative questions that speech acts raise for our politics, our societies, and our ethical lives generally. It is the goal of this book to reflect the diversity of current thinking on speech acts as well as to bring these conversations together, so that they may better inform one another. Topics explored in this book include the relationship between sentence grammar and speech act potential; the fate of traditional frameworks in speech act theory, such as the content-force distinction and the taxonomy of speech acts; and the ways in which speech act theory can illuminate the dynamics of hostile and harmful speech. The book takes stock of well over a half century of thinking about speech acts, bringing this classicwork in linewith recent developments in semantics and pragmatics, and pointing the way forward to further debate and research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Jörg Meibauer

Abstract The notion of an indirect speech act is at the very heart of cognitive pragmatics, yet, after nearly 50 years of orthodox (Searlean) speech act theory, it remains largely unclear how this notion can be explicated in a proper way. In recent years, two debates about indirect speech acts have stood out. First, a debate about the Searlean idea that indirect speech acts constitute a simultaneous realization of a secondary and a primary act. Second, a debate about the reasons for the use of indirect speech acts, in particular about whether this reason is to be seen in strategic advantages and/or observation of politeness demands. In these debates, the original pragmatic conception of sentence types as indicators of illocutionary force seems to have been getting lost. Here, I go back to the seemingly outdated “literal force hypothesis” (see Levinson 1983: 263–264) and point out how it is still relevant for cognitive pragmatics.


Pragmatics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hang Su ◽  
Naixing Wei

Abstract This paper extends the concept of local grammar to speech act studies, focusing specifically on apologising in English. It aims primarily to demonstrate the usefulness of a local grammar approach to account for speech acts and ultimately to contribute to the on-going development of corpus pragmatics. Apology expressions in a corpus of scripted TV conversations are first automatically extracted and then manually examined in order to make sure that all remaining instances have the illocutionary force of apologising and thus qualify for further analysis. The subsequent local grammar analyses facilitate the establishment of a local grammar of apology, comprising 14 local grammar patterns. The analyses show that it is promising to develop a set of local grammars to account more adequately for speech acts in general. The relationship between local grammars, functional grammars, and general grammars is further discussed, which suggests that local grammars can be an alternative approach to functional-pragmatic studies of language and discourse. Directions for future research are outlined; and implications and applications are briefly discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Mohd Faizal Kasmani ◽  
Sofia Hayati Yusoff ◽  
Osama Kanaker

Abstract Speech-act theory allows us to study how words have an impact in real life and the performative nature of words. At the same time, it can also contribute to an understanding of communication style and communication strategy. In this article, speech-act theory is applied to the conversations of Prophet Muḥammad with the Bedouin in two ways. First, the speech acts of the Prophet are analyzed using the categories put forward by John Searle to see how they function within the conversation. Second, the illocutionary force of an utterance and its perlocutionary effect – based on words and expressions that the Prophet used in his utterances – are examined to discover patterns in his communication strategy towards the Bedouin.


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-168
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Solan

This chapter explores the relationship between how natural language expresses degrees of certainty in the truth of an assertion on the one hand, and how the law handles this issue on the other. This discussion focuses, in particular, on the hearsay doctrine and on the linguistic elements identified as “evidentials:” expressions that include information about how speakers came to know the assertions they make. The hearsay rule bars certain kinds of speech acts from serving as legal evidence, in particular, assertions that report what another person earlier said, and which are offered to express the truth about the events at issue in a case. The author links the law governing hearsay in terms of speech act theory, a connection also drawn by the philosopher John Langshaw Austin, who observed that statements offered to prove the fact of the speech act rather than the truth of the matter asserted are admissible.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you represent yourself as having the authority to guarantee that Q.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Akhmad Saifudin

This article explains the theory of speech acts proposed by John L. Austin and his student John R. Searle. Speech act theory is a sub-field of pragmatics. This field of study deals with the ways in which words can be used not only to present information but also to carry out actions. This theory considers three levels or components of speech: locutionary acts (the making of a meaningful statement, saying something that a hearer understands), illocutionary acts (saying something with a purpose, such as to inform), and perlocutionary acts (saying something that causes someone to act). Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying the meaning of speaker’s utterance or illocutionary force. There are five types of Illocutionary point according to Searle: declarations, assertives, expressives, directives, and commissives (1979:viii). A speech act, in order to be successful, needs to be performed along certain types of conditions. These conditions were categorized by the linguist John Searle, who introduced the term felicity conditions: propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition.


Pragmatics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-132
Author(s):  
Ernesto Wong García

Abstract This paper presents an account of value ascription as an illocutionary force, based on four claims: (1) that value ascription is a kind of illocutionary force, defining a specific kind of speech act, i.e. valuative speech acts (VSAs); (2) that the point of VSAs is ascribing an axiological value to a referent; (3) that VSAs create a weak, inside-oriented truth commitment; and (4) that they are therefore more about the valuating subject than they are about the valuated object. This illocutionary force is described using criteria taken from contemporary speech act theory as well as others that have proven informative. This description results in a rich taxonomy of VSAs. This shows the viability and fruitfulness of a pragmatic account of value ascription, and it contributes to the development of speech act theory, specifically with regard to the distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary points, and the speech act taxonomy itself.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document