The problem of affectivity in cognitive theories of emotion

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Mikko Salmela
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Individual Object ◽  
Affective Quality ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Philosophy Of Emotions ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Emotion Type

Despite their paradigmatic status in the modern philosophy of emotions, cognitive theories have been criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of affectivity in emotions. I agree with much of this criticism, but I argue that an amended cognitive theory can overcome the flaws of the two main theories, strong cognitivism and componential cognitivism. I argue that feeling cannot be reduced to the evaluative content of emotion and attitudinal mode of holding it as strong cognitivists suggest. Typical emotional feelings are induced by either propositionally explicable or biologically “hard-wired” evaluations instead of being involved in the latter. We, then, face the challenge of explaining why the feeling and the evaluative construal that figure into an emotion are aspects of the same state, unlike occasional feelings and thoughts that happen to occur in us at the same time. I propose that evaluative content and feeling are different kinds of representations of the formal property of an emotional object. This is a second-order property that is ascribed to every individual object of a particular emotion-type in virtue of its perceived first-order properties and that is experienced as a property of those objects in a state of emotion. Evaluative content involves a conceptual representation of the formal property while feeling represents its inherent affective quality.

Cognitive Theories About Cognitive Theory

1976 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 557-558
Author(s):  
ROBERT J. STERNBERG
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Cognitive Theories

Whose Theology? The Promise of Cognitive Theories and the Future of a Disputed Field

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 384-402
Author(s):  
Nickolas P. Roubekas
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Fourth Century ◽  
First Century ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Great Opportunity ◽  
Religious Ritual ◽  
Theory Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Historical Theology

AbstractWithin a general attempt to reconceptualise theology and its position in the modern university, the paper argues that the cognitive science of religion offers a great opportunity to modern theology to engage into interdisciplinary research that could be proven especially profitable to its future. By drawing examples from contemporary Greece and a religious ritual that is disputed by the official Christian Orthodox Church as well as from historical theology and the Arian controversy in the fourth century CE, I argue that Justin Barrett’s cognitive theory of religion, known as ‘Theological Correctness’, can provide to theology a useful tool in understanding the religious beliefs of everyday believers. Without discounting other methodologies, theories, and interpretations, this paper argues that there is space for cognitive theories within theological research that could only benefit theology and its future in the twenty-first century.

Cognitive Theory in Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa: A Review

1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myra Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Eating Disorders ◽  
Anorexia Nervosa ◽  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Bulimia Nervosa ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Cognitive Content ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Questionnaire Studies

This paper reviews cognitive theories of eating disorders as they are usually applied in treatment. More recent theoretical contributions and theory that is not widely applied are also reviewed. A set of hypotheses is derived from these theories and evidence for the validity of each hypothesis is discussed: this includes evidence from treatment studies, questionnaire studies and from experimental psychology. Following review of existing evidence, the paper summarizes the current status of cognitive theory in eating disorders. It then considers ways in which theory and research could be developed in order to improve and extend our understanding of cognitive content and processes in eating disorders. Limitations of existing models are highlighted and gaps in our knowledge, including knowledge of variables that typically have a central role in cognitive theory, are identified. Further strategies to test the validity of hypotheses derived from cognitive theory are suggested, together with strategies that might extend existing theory. It is concluded that much further research is needed, both to test the validity of existing theoretical contributions and to extend theory so that it will be more useful in clinical practice.

scholarly journals The Passionate Beliefs. A Defense of the Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotions

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Sacco
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Potential Problem ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Optical Illusions ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
Cognitive Evaluation ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Principle Of Charity ◽  
Philosophy Of Emotions ◽  
Emotional Conflicts

AbstractThe philosophy of emotions has long been dominated by the view called «cognitivism». According to it, emotions are characterized (and definable) not by mere physical impulses but by a cognitive evaluation of their object. However, despite their success, cognitive theories have to deal with various objections and are divided on how to answer to them. In this essay I want to defend the form of cognitivism claimed by Martha Nussbaum from the most common criticisms. After a brief summary of her account, I confront some of the objections that have been raised against it. In Section 2 I deal with the classic problem of emotions in infants and animals, which lack linguistic abilities. Later, I confront the potential problem represented by cases in which one’s emotion and reasoned judgment seem to differ: in paragraph 3 I consider irrational phobias and fears, to show how they can be accounted for in terms of judgments and thoughts, and not only of perceptions; in paragraph 4 I deal with the objection that «judgementalist» theories (that is, those that describe emotions in terms of judgments and beliefs) violate the «principle of charity», for they ascribe an excessive irrationality to people. I argue that experimental evidence suggest that it is not implausible to assume that people have contradictory beliefs under conditions of uncertainty, and that perceptual theories of emotion (which compare emotional conflicts to optical illusions) fail to account for some fundamental aspects of these phenomena. Finally, in paragraph 5, I deal with the objection according to which a cognitive-evaluative theory cannot explain the sense of passivity that we commonly experience in emotions.

scholarly journals A Theoretical Model for Autism

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-286
Author(s):  
Luís Alfred Vidal de Caralho ◽  
Nívea de Carvalho Ferreira ◽  
Adriana Fiszman
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Unknown Origin ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Neuronal Model ◽  
Central Coherence ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Fundamental Biological Process ◽  
Neural Growth ◽  
Neural Maps

Autism is a mental disorder characterized by deficits in socialization, communication, and imagination. Along with the deficits, autistic children may show savant skills (“islets of ability”) of unknown origin that puzzles their families and the psychologists. Comorbidity with epilepsy and mental retardation has brought the researchers' attention to neurobiological and cognitive theories of the syndrome. The present article proposes a neurobiological model for the autism based on the fundamental biological process of neuronal competition. A neural network capable of defining neural maps—synaptic projections preserving neighborhoods between two neural tissues—simulates the process of neurodevelopment. Experiments were performed reducing the level of neural growth factor released by the neurons, leading to ill-developed maps and suggesting the cause of the aberrant neurogenesis present in autism. The computer simulations hint that brain regions responsible for the formation of higher level representations are impaired in autistic patients. The lack of this integrated representation of the world would result in the peculiar cognitive deficits of socialization, communication, and imagination and could also explain some “islets of abilities”, like excellent memory for raw data and stimuli discrimination. The neuronal model is based on plausible biological findings and on recently developed cognitive theories of autism. Close relations are established between the computational properties of the neural network model and the cognitive theory of autism denominated “weak central coherence”, bringing some insight to the understanding of the disorder.

scholarly journals An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck

Utilitas ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP COOK
Keyword(s):  
Dual Role ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp's reasons and the good objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved problems for buck-passers.

Emotions, Feelings and Contexts: A Reply to Robert Kraut

Dialogue ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Solomon
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Widespread Acceptance ◽  
Ancient Problem ◽  
As If

Unwarranted antagonism between reason and the passions is an ancient problem, dating back at least to Plato. Even philosophers who sought to give the passions their due—David Hume for example—juxtaposed reason and emotion and contrasted them as slave and master (or vice versa). The point of a so-called “cognitive” theory of emotion, simply stated, is to deny this antagonism. The most succinct (if not very informative) statement of the cognitivist view is Nietzsche's: “as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason.” Hume's own theory anticipated such a synthesis (in his awkward analysis of “ideas” as both necessary causes and effects of emotions) while Spinoza and Hobbes clearly defended cognitive theories with the wisdom of reconciliation in mind. The aim of a cognitive theory is not to reduce volatile emotion to cool and calm belief, nor is the emphasis on emotion a romantic attempt to extol the passions and excoriate reason—though that exercise may have its place in philosophy too; it is rather to understand reason and the passions together and appreciate their shared properties, similarities and complementarity as well as their obvious differences and oppositions. So understood, cognitive theories have, generically, gained widespread acceptance; only a few reactionaries in philosophy and psychology still insist on a cognition-free concept of emotion, however backhandedly cognitive concepts might be acknowledged as presuppositions, causal preconditions or criteria for the appropriate labelling of emotion rather than as proper constituents of emotion.

scholarly journals A Brief Review of Cognitive Theories in Gender Development

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-66
Author(s):  
Alyssa West
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognitive Theory ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Schema Theory ◽  
Developmental Theory ◽  
Gender Development ◽  
Gender Schema ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Gender Schema Theory

In this paper I review three cognitive theories that attempt to explain the mechanisms and processes through which we develop an understanding of gender. Cognitive-developmental theory, gender schema theory, and social cognitive theory of gender development and differentiation are compared in this article through the exploration of empirical evidence. Cognitive-developmental theory emphasizes the development of cognitive processes which allow for the understanding of gender. Gender schema theory highlights the active role schemas play in acquiring and interpreting gender relevant information, and social-cognitive theory stresses the role of the environment. I found that there is a considerable amount of overlap with the evidence between each theory. Therefore, rather than each theory existing in opposition to one another, there are multiple relevant factors at play concerning both cognition and the social environment in the development of gender. Thus, the main conclusion is that there is a need for greater theoretical integration with regard to understanding gendered development.

The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-269
Author(s):  
René Rosfort
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Emotional Experience ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Philosophy Of Emotions ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
Primary Contribution

Abstract This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.

Cognitivist Frameworks of Learning and Instruction

2021 ◽  
pp. 51-79
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Human Memory ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Instructional Models ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Compilation Process ◽  
Cognitive Revolution

This chapter summarizes the main research results on the functioning of human memory and how cognitive instructional models integrate these findings into their proposals for optimizing learning. It also covers some of the main cognitive theories of instruction where we highlight the cognitive theory of multimedia learning and the cognitive load theory. These theories appeared alongside an emerging framework called the “cognitive revolution” in the 1950s. In this framework, human cognition can be compared to a biological computer that represents and processes information that comes from the outside world through various sensory systems. This information must be recorded in memory and then retrieved so that any biological or digital system can perform the activities that are expected in various situations. Learning in this framework is to form new mental schemes in long-term memory, to integrate simple and already formed schemes into more complex ones, and to automate some schemes through a compilation process. The cognitive theories of instruction take the way human memory works very seriously.

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