scholarly journals Biological weapons convention: implementation and responsibilities in the lab

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Kylie Brown

The rising global risk of terrorism and the increasing sophistication of terrorists have raised the potential for misuse of biotechnology. Addressing threats posed by the misuse of biotechnology requires a concerted response at international, national, facility and personal levels. It is incumbent on those in the life sciences to be actively engaged in supporting the government?s efforts in responding to this threat.

1993 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-90
Author(s):  
Oliver Thränert

One of Erhard Geissler's main arguments supporting his proposed Vaccines for Peace program (VFP) refers to the intended strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). With a view to the real threat of proliferation of biological agents and the lack of verification measures in the convention, this goal is definitely praiseworthy. However, I doubt that VFP as originally outlined in the August, 1992 Politics and the Life Sciences article can achieve this. I have four concerns.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-673
Author(s):  
Kiwako Tanaka ◽  

Current advances in the life sciences have brought about immense improvements in the areas of health and agricultural productivity worldwide. The technology and knowledge that are used for such advances can, however, be potentially misused as biological weapons. This dual-use nature of the life sciences has become a serious concern, particularly with developments in synthetic biology or “-omics” technologies, such as genomics and proteomics, combined with the increasingly widespread accessibility and use of communications technologies. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a unique multilateral legal framework that is envisaged to play a significant role in preventing such misuse and misconduct. This paper analyzes the outcomes of the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, which was held in December 2011, in light of recent scientific and technological developments in the life sciences. It recognizes the establishment of an annual review channel of scientific and technological developments during the intersessional periods between review conferences as a step forward in addressing the dual-use issues related to the BWC. This paper also recommends that, to further strengthen its applicability, this review channel must be utilized effectively to translate the outcomes of the review into national implementation measures, including codes of conduct, education, and awarenessraising.


Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen ◽  
Tobias Vestner

Abstract Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 78 (Supplement_3) ◽  
pp. 27-30
Author(s):  
Takashi Sakata ◽  

Abstract Working Group 2 of the Healthy Diet Research Committee of International Life Sciences Institute Japan (WG2) assessed the concept and practice of healthy eating in the ready-to-eat food/meal industry in Japan. WG2 interviewed 14 arbitrarily selected member companies that included “health” or “nutrition” in their management policy, and sent a questionnaire to 338 member companies of the Japan Ready-Made Meal Association. Ready-to-eat food/meal suppliers mainly referred to Dietary Reference Intakes for Japanese, the Japanese Food Guide, and/or Healthy Japan 21 for their menu construction. They increased dietary fiber, variety, vegetables, whole-grain cereals, millet rice, and soy bean products; and reduced energy, carbohydrates, and salt in “healthy” food. They tended to avoid making direct appeals to health. Many companies reduced the salt content without drawing attention to the practice. They continually strive to improve flavor as the single most important factor for selling healthy food. The cycling of menus is used to increase diversity in food consumption. These industries require both academia and the government to define priorities for increasing and decreasing particular nutrients as the main targets and to establish the maximum time for balancing each nutrient.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-06
Author(s):  
Robert Skopec

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.


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