The life sciences, security, and the challenge of biological weapons: An overview

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moodie
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Biological Weapons

scholarly journals Biological weapons convention: implementation and responsibilities in the lab

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Kylie Brown
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Global Risk ◽  
The Government ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

The rising global risk of terrorism and the increasing sophistication of terrorists have raised the potential for misuse of biotechnology. Addressing threats posed by the misuse of biotechnology requires a concerted response at international, national, facility and personal levels. It is incumbent on those in the life sciences to be actively engaged in supporting the government?s efforts in responding to this threat.

Negotiating Measures to Manage Biological Risks: The Need for New Thinking and New Approaches

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-424
Author(s):  
Michael Moodie
Keyword(s):  
International System ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Community ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Security Risks ◽  
Multilateral Negotiations ◽  
Structure And Dynamics ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
Unique Nature

AbstractThis essay considers the difficulties confronting the international community in addressing the challenge of biological weapons through multilateral negotiations. After a brief review of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the article addresses four categories of factors that help understand the relative lack of success: those related to the structure and conduct of the negotiating process, those stemming from the unique nature of the life sciences, those associated with domestic political dynamics in the United States, and those associated with changes in the structure and dynamics of the international system. It closes with reflections on how the international community can embed negotiations in a broader strategy for bolstering capabilities to manage the security risks related to the advances of the life sciences and related technology.

Bioweapons and Dual-Use Research of Concern

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 654-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nariyoshi Shinomiya ◽  
◽  
Masamichi Minehata ◽  
Malcolm Dando ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Recombinant Dna ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Research ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Recombinant Dna Technology ◽  
Research Activities ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Living Organisms ◽  
Responsibility Of Scientists

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) strictly prohibits State Parties from developing, producing, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retaining microbial and other biological agents that have no justification for peaceful purposes. At the time the convention was concluded, progress in the life sciences received little attention. Recent technological advances, especially in biotechnology, have brought attention, however, to the issue of dual-use research of concern (DURC). Dual-use research is defined as biological research with a legitimate scientific purpose that may, if misused, pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security. The most important and burdensome point of DURC is that we cannot escape the dual-use dilemma existing in all research activities. The DURC concept is an old but in a sense a new issue to be dealt with. Here we focus on the bioweapons and DURC – a subject that has received attention worldwide. In this review, we start with an overview of the historical development of bioweapons and then discuss their prohibition regimes focusing mainly on the BWC framework. Dramatic progress in biotechnology/recombinant DNA technology around the turn of the century brought a new experimental paradigm and affected the direction in which the life sciences should go. The Fink report and Lemon-Relman report have presented potential options for the healthy development of the life sciences. Exploring several important DURC case studies helps in understanding the nature of the dual-use dilemma more deeply. DURC in the area of the life sciences has been expanding broadly and has reached the neurosciences. Synthetic biology has introduced innovative approaches in creating novel living organisms. The convergence of chemistry and biology has become an inevitable stream in the recent development of the life sciences. Under these circumstances, the responsibility of scientists is becoming increasingly important. To deal appropriately with dual-use issues, risks and benefits must first be evaluated fairly and clearly, which makes the development of DURC evaluation methods an urgent issue. Both top-down approaches such as rules for smoothly processing of research, funding policies, and oversight mechanisms, and bottom-up approaches, i.e., researcher-oriented self-governance need to be mutually harmonized so that the life sciences may be applied more securely. The education of life scientists and the importance of outreach to society are also key means to success.

Life Sciences and Bio-Security

2013 ◽  
pp. 45-57
Author(s):  
N. Kalinina
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Military Application ◽  
Scientific Experiments ◽  
Scientific Achievements

The paper discusses the modern risks to global security in the context of non-proliferation of biological weapons and the problems relating to elimination of such risks. Also, the author considers a number of scientific issues that have relation to Convention on prohibiting development, production and accumulation of bacteriological (biological) and tocsin weapons and on their destruction. The author studies the dangers of scientific experiments with weapons application, as well as the issues of monitoring the life sciences, including responsibility of scholars for excluding military application of the scientific achievements.

Preventing the Misuse of Biology: Lessons from the Oversight of Smallpox Virus Research

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan B. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
World Health ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
International Governance ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Smallpox Virus ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Virus Research

Certain basic research findings in the life sciences have the potential for misuse by states or sophisticated terrorist organizations seeking to develop more lethal or effective biological weapons. The recognition of this problem has led to proposals for new systems of governance, including the international review and oversight of “dual-use” research. The case of the World Health Organization's Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research (VAC), which oversees all research with the live smallpox virus, offers some useful lessons for assess- ing these proposals. This article examines how the VAC has dealt with conten- tious policy issues, describes the strengths and weaknesses of the oversight process, and discusses the implications for the international governance of dual-use research.

The “Vaccines for Peace” Program: Does It Really Help to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention?

1993 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-90
Author(s):  
Oliver Thränert
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Biological Agents ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
The Real ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

One of Erhard Geissler's main arguments supporting his proposed Vaccines for Peace program (VFP) refers to the intended strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). With a view to the real threat of proliferation of biological agents and the lack of verification measures in the convention, this goal is definitely praiseworthy. However, I doubt that VFP as originally outlined in the August, 1992 Politics and the Life Sciences article can achieve this. I have four concerns.

Dual-Use Issues in the Life Sciences: Outcomes of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-673
Author(s):  
Kiwako Tanaka ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Genomics And Proteomics ◽  
National Implementation ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

Current advances in the life sciences have brought about immense improvements in the areas of health and agricultural productivity worldwide. The technology and knowledge that are used for such advances can, however, be potentially misused as biological weapons. This dual-use nature of the life sciences has become a serious concern, particularly with developments in synthetic biology or “-omics” technologies, such as genomics and proteomics, combined with the increasingly widespread accessibility and use of communications technologies. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a unique multilateral legal framework that is envisaged to play a significant role in preventing such misuse and misconduct. This paper analyzes the outcomes of the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC, which was held in December 2011, in light of recent scientific and technological developments in the life sciences. It recognizes the establishment of an annual review channel of scientific and technological developments during the intersessional periods between review conferences as a step forward in addressing the dual-use issues related to the BWC. This paper also recommends that, to further strengthen its applicability, this review channel must be utilized effectively to translate the outcomes of the review into national implementation measures, including codes of conduct, education, and awarenessraising.

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