scholarly journals Triggers for cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit: A case study in Public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 053131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Benjamin ◽  
Shubhayan Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Thermodynamic Limit ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Game

Study on Cooperative Evolution Behaviors in Spatial Public Goods Game Based on Self-Questioning Mechanism

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1783-1787
Author(s):  
Rui Xue Feng ◽  
Juan Ge
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Self ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Intensity Parameter ◽  
Cooperative Evolution

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.

scholarly journals Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlastimil Křivan ◽  
Ross Cressman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Opting Out ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
The Common

Abstract The theoretical and experimental research on opting out (also called conditional dissociation) in social dilemmas has concentrated on the effect this behavior has on the level of cooperation when used against defectors. The intuition behind this emphasis is based on the common property of social dilemmas that individuals are worse off the more their opponents defect. However, this article shows clearly that other opting out mechanisms are better at increasing cooperative behavior. In fact, by analyzing the stable Nash equilibria for the repeated multi-player public goods game with opting out, our results provide a strong argument that the best opting out rule is one whereby the only groups that voluntarily stay together between rounds are those that are homogeneous (i.e., those groups that are either all cooperators or all defectors), when these groups stay together for enough rounds. This outcome emerges when defectors are completely intolerant of individuals who cooperate (e.g., defectors exhibit xenophobic behavior toward cooperators) and so opt out whenever their group has a cooperator in it. The strong preference by defectors to be with like-minded individuals causes all heterogeneous groups to disband after one round.

Prosociality Beyond Big Five Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility: Is Openness/Intellect Associated With Cooperativeness in the Public Goods Game?

2021 ◽  
pp. 089020702110281
Author(s):  
Erin C. R. Lawn ◽  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Simon M. Laham ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Analytic Formula ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Charitable Behavior ◽  
The One

Who is cooperative? Although Big Five (B5) Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility are correlates of charitable prosociality, distinctions between “charity” and “cooperation” suggest that additional traits could be associated with cooperative prosociality. Echoing prior theoretical and empirical indications that B5 Openness/Intellect may play a role in cooperation, Study 1 ( N = 119; exploratory) revealed a significant correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperativeness in the one-shot Public Goods Game that did not generalize to charitableness in the Dictator Game. We therefore conducted three preregistered replications to discern the robustness of this Openness/Intellect–cooperativeness link. As expected, Openness/Intellect showed no consistent correlation with charitable behavior. Surprisingly, the predicted correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior was also inconsistent, partially replicating in Study 3 ( N = 304) but not Studies 2 or 4 ( Ns = 131; 552). Across our replications, cooperative behavior was most strongly correlated with Honesty-Humility (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .15, p = .005). The correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior across our replications was significant and identical in magnitude to that between Agreeableness and cooperative behavior, though this effect-size was weak (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .08, p < .001). We therefore conclude that Openness/Intellect is a nonnull but very modest correlate of cooperativeness.

scholarly journals A Heterogeneous Network Modeling Method Based on Public Goods Game Theory to Explore Cooperative Behavior in VANETs

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1802
Author(s):  
Qiuhua Wang ◽  
Hao Liu ◽  
Xing Jin ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Heterogeneous Network ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Modeling Method ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Approaches To Study ◽  
Game Theoretic

Cooperative vehicular networking has been widely studied in recent years. Existing evolution game theoretic approaches to study cooperative behavior in Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) are mainly based on the assumption that VANET is constructed as a homogeneous network. This modeling method only extracts part attributes of vehicles and does not distinguish the differences between strategy and attribute. In this paper, we focus on the heterogeneous network model based on the public goods game theory for VANET. Then we propose a Dynamic Altruism Public Goods Game (DAPGG) model consisting of rational nodes, altruistic nodes, and zealots to more realistically characterize the real VANET. Rational nodes only care about their own benefits, altruistic nodes comprehensively consider the payoffs in the neighborhood, while zealots insist on behaving cooperatively. Finally, we explore the impacts of these attributes on the evolution of cooperation under different network conditions. The simulation results show that only adding altruistic nodes can effectively improve the proportion of cooperators, but it may cause conflicts between individual benefits and neighborhood benefits. Altruistic nodes together with zealots can better improve the proportion of cooperators, even if the network conditions are not suitable for the spread of cooperative behavior.

scholarly journals Common Knowledge Promotes Cooperation in the Threshold Public Goods Game by Reducing Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

scholarly journals Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Minggang Yu ◽  
Ming He ◽  
Ziyu Ma ◽  
Mingguang Zou ◽  
Lei Wan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Theoretical Derivation ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Average Abundance ◽  
Actual Control

One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

scholarly journals The Pizzagame: A virtual public goods game to assess cooperative behavior in children and adolescents

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1432-1443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Keil ◽  
Andrea Michel ◽  
Fabio Sticca ◽  
Kristina Leipold ◽  
Annette M. Klein ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Game

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

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