A Price Coordination Mechanism for Purchasing Supply Chain Based on Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ai-Ying Gao ◽  
Kai Liu ◽  
Yi-Xue Lei ◽  
Yong-Jie Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism

Coordination of a Supply Chain with Demand Stimulation and Random Demand Disruption

2011 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Jia Luo ◽  
Jiao Jin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Penalty Costs ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This chapter develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disruption and they share the quantity deviation costs. We find that an all-unit wholesale quantity discount-subsidy mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. We give the coordination mechanism of the supply chain after the demand disruption and find that the demand disruption remarkably influences the price-service level decisions of the centralized supply chain and the coordination mechanism of the decentralized supply chain. In particular, the expected quantity differs from the planned quantity although the penalty costs prevent from this deviation.

scholarly journals Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jue-Ping Xie ◽  
Huai-Ying Lei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Gain Coefficient ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Innovative Capability ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovative Capabilities

Collaborative innovation between companies is critical for increasing supply chain value. However, as a dynamic game process, the collaboration between manufacturer, provider, and seller in the supply chain is influenced by a range of elements. This paper is set out to investigate the collaborative innovation strategy adopted by manufacturer, supplier, and distributor (the “three players”). To meet this end, an analytical framework was built to study the evolutionary game of collaborative innovation in supply chain enterprises. Based on the analysis, this research further studied the dynamic evolutionary mechanism and influencing elements through four different simulation cases. The research showed the following. (1) When the three players have equal innovative capability, they are more willing to contribute to innovation if the projected revenue is higher reflecting an increasing coefficient of collaborative innovation gains. As a result, the three players are more likely to agree on their cooperation approach. (2) When the three players have different independent and innovative capabilities, they are more willing to innovate if the collaborative innovation gain coefficient increases, but supply chain players with stronger capability are more active to innovate than their peers. In other words, strong innovators attach particular attention to innovation. (3) When any collaborative innovation could generate profits for all players in the supply chain, the player who enjoys the benefit but lacks innovative capability will be unwilling to cooperate with others if additional gains rise. Thus, better maintenance of the stability of the collaborative innovation system requires a strictly implemented coordination mechanism.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

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