NGOs as catalysts for international arms control? The ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the United States

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Oppermann ◽  
Dagmar Röttsches
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Chemical Weapons Convention ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States Imperative

1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Rene Beres
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Active Preparation

This paper argues that current US nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war fighting. The proponents of this counterforce strategy claim it is necessary to make US deterrence more credible. The author rejects this claim and shows how US strategy actually degrades US security. Moreover, the author contends that it actually encourages nuclear war because it is based on a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions. After examining these assumptions in detail, the author proposes an alternative strategy for nuclear war avoidance and for improving the likelihood of nuclear disarmament. This strategy involves a comprehensive test ban treaty, joint renunciation of first use, and the establishment of new and more extensive nuclear weapon free zones.

Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies

2000 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 66-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bates Gill ◽  
Evan S. Medeiros
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Nonproliferation ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Chemical Weapons Convention ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Foreign Ministry ◽  
Domestic Influences ◽  
Insight Into

Over the course of the 1990s, China's arms control and nonproliferation policies have undergone a remarkable evolution. Since 1992, China has signed three major, international arms control treaties – the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – which it had previously lambasted for years. In addition, Beijing has continued to improve on and clarify many of its previous nonproliferation commitments as well as to adopt a legally based export control system covering a variety of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies. These developments are mirrored by the expanding roles and growing influence of a number of new bureaucratic actors in China devoted to examining its participation in the international arms control and nonproliferation regime. Most notably, in 1997 China's Foreign Ministry established a department exclusively devoted to arms control and disarmament issues. Yet despite these broad trends, little is known about the actors and influences (external and internal) affecting Beijing's arms control and nonproliferation decision-making. Chinese writings on arms control, while growing in number, tend to be descriptive rather than analytical and usually provide little insight into China's policy-making on arms control and nonproliferation.

scholarly journals Adjoint backtracking for the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 2133-2150 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.-P. Issartel ◽  
J. Baverel
Keyword(s):  
Adjoint Operator ◽  
Real Data ◽  
Daily Basis ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Tracer Dispersion ◽  
International Monitoring ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Abstract. An international monitoring system is being built as a verification tool for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Forty stations will measure on a worldwide daily basis the concentration of radioactive noble gases. The paper introduces, by handling preliminary real data, a new approach of backtracking for the identification of sources after positive measurements. When several measurements are available the ambiguity about possible sources is reduced significantly. As an interesting side result it is shown that diffusion in the passive tracer dispersion equation is necessarily a self-adjoint operator.

Infrasound station IS25 of the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty : from design to certification

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
thomas philippe ◽  
sylvain carre
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring System ◽  
International Monitoring System ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Monitoring Tools ◽  
International Monitoring ◽  
Deep Forest ◽  
International Data ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

<p>CEA is operating the French segment of the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Construction of IMS stations was started on the late 90’ and one last station was pending before completing commitment of France.</p><p>Taking into account experience learned over the years, design was thought to combine enhanced detection capability and robustness. It gives also the opportunity to improve out monitoring tools and technics.</p><p>Station run 9 sensors spread out on a deep forest in Guadeloupe; power is distributed with buried cable while data are received with optical fibre to a central facility from which frames are sent to the International Data Center to the CTBTO. Constructiion was carried out in 2019.</p><p>IS25 was certified by the PTS of the CTBTO in November 2020</p>

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