Access and agenda-setting in the European Union: Advocacy NGOs in comparative perspective

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Thiel ◽  
Emek M Uçarer
2019 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 119-133
Author(s):  
Ariadna H. Ochnio

The scope of extended confiscation is determined, inter alia, by the choice of triggering offences in Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union. The question arises whether EU law guarantees appropriate limits of extended confiscation considering its specificity and the growing range of application in national legal orders. The study compared the normative framework of extended confiscation adopted in the criminal law of Poland, Romania, Germany, Austria, France, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, and England and Wales. The list of offences, relevant for the scope of extended confiscation, is to be assessed by the Commission by 4 October 2019. The conclusions of the study concern the need to introduce, at the level of EU law, adequate safeguards against the disproportionate application of extended confiscation.


Author(s):  
Liesbet Hooghe ◽  
Christian Rauh

This chapter examines the functions and organization of the European Commission services, arguing that they are a bureaucracy with unique agenda-setting powers at the heart of the European Union polity. It begins with an overview of the origins and evolution of the Commission services, focusing on the influence of Jean Monnet, first President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and how the services were shaped by national bureaucratic models as well as international organization models. The chapter proceeds by discussing the Commission services’ powers, structure, and functioning and what the officials think about the role of the institution with respect to agenda-setting, nationality, and EU governance. It argues that while the Commission bureaucracy has become more circumspect of bold political initiatives, neither its capacity nor its will to play a strong policy role in Europe have been significantly weakened.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Beers

Daniel Beers looks at the experience of judicial reform across the post-communist cases, and gleans several lessons. Among the most important is that “institutional solutions have important limitations as drivers of the reform process.” Not only do informal practices sometimes negate the effects of institutional reforms, but when they do, the entire concept of judicial reform is undermined by cynicism. Moreover, highly autonomous courts can be as hazardous as dependent ones, because they can become targets of politicians jealous of their authority. Beers finds two important sources of meaningful reform. First, the European Union has played a widely acknowledged role in judicial reform in the post-communist region. More surprisingly, Beers finds a strong positive role for low-level actors—individuals and firms who turn to the courts to resolve disputes and court employees committed to improvement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Finke ◽  
Stefanie Bailer

To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the ‘EMU Positions’ data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors’ positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 146511652096146
Author(s):  
Christian Rauh

Analyses of strategic agenda-setting in the European Union treat the European Commission as a unitary actor with perfect information. Yet, the constraints for correctly anticipating acceptable policies vary heavily across its individual Directorates-General. Do these internal rifts affect the Commission’s agenda-setting ability? This article tests corresponding expectations on the edit distances between 2237 Commission proposals and the adopted laws across 23 years. The quality of legislative anticipation indeed varies with the responsible Directorate-General. Legislative proposals are more likely to remain unchanged if they face less parliamentary involvement, are less complex, were drafted by an experienced Directorate-General, and were coordinated more seamlessly within the Commission. However, the uncovered variation also calls for more systematic research on the distribution of legislative capacities inside the Commission.


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