The Immediate Hardship of Unemployment: Evidence from the US Unemployment Insurance System

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-36
Author(s):  
Mark Stater ◽  
Jeffrey B Wenger
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
The Us ◽  
Unemployment Insurance System

Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Accounts: The Best of Both Worlds

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1302-1340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Setty
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Precautionary Savings ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
Savings Accounts ◽  
The Us ◽  
Unemployment Insurance System ◽  
The Unemployed ◽  
Government Benefits

Abstract Unemployment accounts are mandatory individual savings accounts that can be used only during unemployment or retirement. Unlike unemployment insurance, unemployment accounts solve the moral hazard problem but provide no public insurance to workers. I study a hybrid system that borrows from concepts of both unemployment insurance and unemployment accounts, in which workers are mandated to save when employed and can withdraw from the account when unemployed. Once the account is exhausted, the unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits. This hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more efficiently than an unemployment insurance system because it provides government benefits selectively. As a consequence, young workers can reduce their precautionary savings and better smooth their consumption over the life cycle. Calibrating the model to the US economy, I find that, relative to an optimal unemployment insurance system, the optimal hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 2.4%, measured as consumption equivalent variation.

Der Einfluss der Agenda 2010 auf die Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Search Model ◽  
Transition Rates ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Reservation Wages ◽  
Dynamic Search ◽  
Unemployment Insurance System ◽  
Agenda 2010

AbstractThis paper examines the impacts on reservation wages of unemployed persons and on transition in employment due to the reform of the unemployment insurance system in Germany in the course of the Agenda 2010. An dynamic search-model is developed, on which reservation wages are simulated for different groups of unemployed. Afterwards, increases in the transition rates in employment are forecasted due to the reductions in reservation wages. It is shown that the reform of the unemployment transfer payments mainly affect unemployed persons with a high income before unemployment. For these persons the transition rates in employment are increased by 5% to 9% if they are eligible for social welfare. For unemployed persons without eligibility for social welfare the transition rates in employment are increased by 9% to 22%.

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