Unanimity, Consensus and Peripheral Parties as Determinants of EU Policy Coordination in Federal Member States

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-223
Author(s):  
Álvaro Morcillo Laiz
Author(s):  
Jan L. C. Manders

A description is given of the key elements of European Union (EU) policy and EU directives, which may affect the desired switch from landfill to Waste-to-Energy (WTE) and recycling of waste within the 27 EU countries. The most important directive is the one which forces individual member states to reduce the landfill levels for MSW to 35% of the quantity of the base year 1995.


2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 493-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Dewandre ◽  

In this article, I argue that Hannah Arendt’s well-known but controversial distinction between labour, work, and action provides, perhaps unexpectedly, a conceptual grounding for transforming politics and policy-making at the EU level. Beyond the analysis and critique of modernity, Arendt brings the conceptual resources needed for the EU to move beyond the modern trap it fell into thirty years ago. At that time, the European Commission shifted its purpose away from enhancing interdependence among Member States with a common market towards achieving an internal market in the name of boosting growth and creating jobs. Arendt provides the conceptual tools to transform the conceptualisation of relations and of agents that fuels the growing dissatisfaction among many Europeans with EU policy-making. This argument is made through stretching and re-articulating Arendt’s labour-work-action distinction and taking seriously both the biological and plural dimensions of the human condition, besides its rational one. By applying this shift in an EU context, EU policies could change their priorities and better address the needs and expectations of plural political agents and of European citizens.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderick Parkes

AbstractAs migration cooperation has grown in stature at the European level, a premium has been set on its conceptual coordination with related areas of EU policy. The Mobility Partnerships which the bloc recently signed with Moldova and Cape Verde appear as a model of this kind of coordination. Indeed their advocates believe they can regulate migration in such a way that the Union’s economic, social, development and neighbourhood policies all benefit. A simple tri-partite method is here employed to gauge the complementarity of one of the Partnerships, that with Moldova, with its broader policy context. The present analysis suggests that the political exigencies involved in realising the agreement led to conceptual overstretch. Although the Partnership seldom clashes with its broader policy context, the considerable demands placed on its coordinators in the European Commission mean that the Partnership’s positive contribution to related policy areas remains bitty and lacking in coherence.


Author(s):  
Maksymilian Kosma Jabłecki

The aim of the study is to analyze if the subsidiarity principle in the context of the law solutions introduced by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2018/957 amending Directive 96/71 concerning the posting of employees in the framework of the provision of services should be considered justified and proportionate. The arguments presented will show the opinion that the subsidiarity principle is one of the basic rules for conducting economic policy in the European Union. On this basis it will be investigated whether policy powers should be delegated to the lowest possible level of government, close to the citizens concerned by the policy, unless there are undeniable benefits to running it at a higher level in closer policy coordination. It should be considered if the European Commission proposal pursues a purpose other than the declared one and thus violates the principle of proportionality. It will be proved that smart and clear rules are needed that are adapted to the rapidly growing mobility of EU businesses and citizens, which will prevent the progressive loss of competitiveness of the EU market, while accelerating social convergence and preventing illegal activities affecting intra-EU migrant workers.The issues mentioned above and the conclusions may lead, according to the author, to reflection on the importance of the fact, that the division of competences between Member States and the EU institutions is ultimately a political decision that arises in the context of a conflict of interest and indicate that economic analyzes can only provide arguments for or against policy centralization. Furthermore, it should be noted that the integration is a dynamic process and therefore the results of the analysis regarding the justification for the application of the subsidiarity principle may lead to divergent assessments by the Member States, as the conditions of the functioning of economies are rapidly changing.


Author(s):  
Annette Bongardt ◽  
Francisco Torres

The Lisbon (2000–2010) and its successor, the Europe 2020 strategy (2011–2020), denote EU-wide exercises in economic policy coordination for economic and institutional modernization. They set an ample reform agenda with common targets to transform a host of common challenges facing the EU and its members (as varied as globalization, the paradigm shift to a knowledge economy, demographic aging, or climate change) into economic opportunities and quality growth. The economic and political economy arguments for EU-level coordination rested on positive spillovers from trade and peer pressure, respectively. The Europe 2020 strategy, a revised Lisbon rather than a new strategy, set a renewed vision of a European social market economy that also plays an important role in the global context (the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). Built on the Lisbon strategy’s governance framework, Europe 2020 inherited a problem-laden legacy with respect to governance and ownership of reforms and in addition faced the impact of large negative transnational spillovers, which put in sharp focus that there was an as-yet-unaccounted-for euro-area dimension to the reform agendas. The sovereign debt crisis (2010–2014) added urgency to dealing with the EU’s structural weaknesses and economic governance building. The European Semester was set up as the chief instrument to help overcome compliance and implementation problems, inserted within broadened economic policy coordination, of which structural reforms under the Europe 2020 strategy constitute one of three blocks. The OMC method affords member states the possibility of finding their own consensual path toward agreed economic reform targets within the strategy’s adequate, 10-year timeframe. The central idea continues to be the promotion of reforms tailored to member states’ heterogeneous situations and preferences and that so are also politically sustainable. Without being framed and perceived in terms of desirable reforms in line with socioeconomic objectives and preferences, reforms carry potential for a political backlash. The Europe 2020 strategy also captures the fundamental and long-term issues for economic development and competitiveness, notably institution building, and outlines a forward-looking model of society with social and environmental dimensions. The European Commission came to base its assessment of the implementation of structural reforms on the broader objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and also included the respect for the European social pillar in the European Semester. Nonetheless, Europe 2020 results have been mixed. The OMC does not feature sanctions for non-compliance. The sovereign crisis context added compliance-enhancing mechanisms that were absent before (market and peer pressure, conditionality in countries subject to adjustment programs) although those came essentially to a halt when financial market pressure subsided, and ECB actions had the side effect of relieving pressure. Efforts undertaken to improve implementation include a structural reform support program to make country-specific recommendations more effective. Yet, close to the end of its term the Europe 2020 strategy continues to be held back by member states taking insufficient ownership of reforms and not prioritizing the relevant ones from an EU point of view, a lack of visibility and ultimately, governance (the unanimity requirement).


Author(s):  
Mark A. Pollack ◽  
Helen Wallace ◽  
Alasdair R. Young

This chapter examines trends and challenges in European Union policy-making during times of crisis. It first considers the main trends in EU policy-making that emerge from policy case studies, including experimentation with new modes of policy-making, often in conjunction with more established modes, leading to hybridization; renegotiation of the role of the member states (and their domestic institutions) in the EU policy process; and erosion of traditional boundaries between internal and external policies. The chapter proceeds by discussing the issue of national governance as well as the interaction between European and global governance. Finally, it explores how the EU has responded to the challenges of coping with enlargement from fifteen to twenty-eight member states, digesting the reforms adopted following the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, and responding to the economic dislocation associated with the global financial crisis.


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