scholarly journals Cost-sharing contract in a closed-loop supply chain considering carbon abatement, quality improvement effort, and pricing strategy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Seyed Taghi Akhavan Niaki ◽  
Nima Alizadeh-Basban
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Motivating Factors ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Quality Improvement Effort ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Market Shares

The high competition in today's market persuaded companies to provide some attractive options for products to obtain more market shares. Therefore, in this research, three motivating elements are devised in the framework of a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a distributor under stochastic demand, where green production via carbon abatement, quality enhancement efforts, and returning and remanufacturing policies are used. In line with reducing carbon emission two possibilities are applied in this paper involving the green technologies investment and the trade and cap policy. As simultaneous consideration of all motivating factors raises conflicts between the members in terms of undertaking the costs, a cooperative supply chain, as well as a cost-sharing (CS) contract in non-cooperative form, is devised to alleviate the conflicts and boost the performance of the supply chain. In order to find the optimal decision variables and profits in the CS contract, two game-theoretical approaches, namely Nash and Stackelberg, are applied. The results present the sufficiently of both the cooperative chain and the CS contact. In addition, the analysis of parameters in the CS contract in Stackelberg game indicates that when the distributor undertakes a part of the costs, positive impacts on the other motivating factors are observed. However, there is no interaction among the motivating factors in the Nash game.

scholarly journals A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Huimin Xiao ◽  
Youlei Xu ◽  
Shiwei Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Building Material ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Sustainable Operations ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Fairness Concerns

This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Zheng ◽  
Petros Ieromonachou ◽  
Tijun Fan ◽  
Li Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Purpose Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end. Findings The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Research limitations/implications This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic. Practical implications The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers. Originality/value Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

scholarly journals Pricing decision of a dual-channel supply chain with different payment, corporate social responsibility and service level

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Le Zhang ◽  
Lei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Payment Methods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Strategies such as price, CSR, and service have an important impact on enterprises and supply chains. This paper proposes a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the product pricing, CSR level, and service level in the supply chain, this paper employs the Stackelberg game to depict supply chain participants' optimal decisions and analyze the influence of explanatory variables on the optimal decision with retailer's payment methods. The results state that market share, service level, CSR, and financing interest rate significantly impact the pricing decision of all participants in the supply chain. In addition, strategies of CSR level and service level are also affected by the discount rate of advance payment, financing interest rate, return on investment, and opportunity cost rate. This paper incorporates CSR and service level into the objective function, considers a variety of retailers' payment methods, enriches the supply chain's pricing model, and is of great value to scientific decision-making of enterprises and sustainable development of supply chains.

Coordination contract for a competitive pharmaceutical supply chain considering corporate social responsibility and pricing decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1515-1535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Johari ◽  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and pricing decisions are proposed for a competitive two-level pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprising two pharma-manufacturers and one pharma-retailer. In the investigated PSC, the pharma-manufacturers competitively invest in the CSR effort to produce a new medicine and sell two substitutable products to the market through the pharma-retailer, deciding on selling prices of manufacturers’ products. The PSC under consideration is modeled in three decision-making structures, i.e., decentralized, centralized, and coordinated models. In the decentralized model, the pricing and CSR decisions are individually obtained using a pharma-manufacturers–Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model as a benchmark, the best performance of the entire PSC system is achieved. Finally, to encourage all PSC members to agree on the coordination plan, a CSR cost-sharing contract is proposed. Our results reveal that under competitive environment, the proposed CSR cost-sharing contract is able to increase market demand by significantly decreasing selling prices and increasing level of the CSR efforts.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Research on Contract Coordination in the Manufacturing Supply Chain Given China’s Work Safety Constraints

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zongkang Yang ◽  
Qiang Mei ◽  
Qiwei Wang ◽  
Suxia Liu ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Work Safety ◽  
Product Demand ◽  
Manufacturing Supply Chain ◽  
Leading Position ◽  
Safety Constraints ◽  
Total Profit

With supply chain management’s increasing importance in work safety, this paper establishes the leading enterprise with core enterprises as work safety units. These guide the small and medium-sized enterprises within the supply chain to focus on improving work safety according to the leading position of the supply chain’s core enterprises. Therefore, the Stackelberg game model is applied to build and explain supply chain node-enterprises’ optimal centralized and decentralized operational decisions. This research was conducted in the context of enterprise work safety constraints’ influence on the manufacturing supply chain’s equilibrium results. It also reveals the necessity in supply chain node enterprises’ contract coordination design by comparing the two decision models’ equilibrium results. Ultimately, the manufacturing supply chain’s overall profit and work safety can reach a level that includes centralized decisions through revenue- and cost-sharing contracts. Furthermore, profits to the supply chain’s node enterprises also improve, and a Pareto optimality is achieved. An enlightened management demonstrates the importance of core enterprises’ leading position in the supply chain, and the supply chain node enterprises’ levels of work safety, product demand, and total profit can be promoted through revenue- and cost-sharing contracts.

Supply chain models with imperfect quality items when end demand is sensitive to price and marketing expenditure

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Unit Price ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Supply Chain Model

This paper studies supply chain model for imperfect quality items under which unit price and unit marketing expenditure imposed by the buyer, regulates the demand of the item. It is presumed that with the accustomed supply chain model, all produced items are of good quality, coincidentally, it engrosses some percentage of defective items. Thus, inspection process becomes essential for the buyer to segregate the defective items, which are then sold at discounted price at the end of the screening process. In this paper, a supply chain model is ensued to substantiate the interaction and democracy of the participants in the supply chain, the buyer and seller, is pitched by non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretical approaches. In the non-cooperative method, the Stackelberg game approach is used in which one player behaves as a leader and another one as a follower. The co-operative game approach is based on a Pareto efficient solution concept, in which both the players work together to enhance their profit. Lastly, to demonstrate the significance of the theory of the paper, numerical examples including sensitivity analysis are presented.

Dynamic cooperative advertising strategy in OAO supply chain with customer return

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1537-1553
Author(s):  
Duanyang Cao ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Lingli Yang ◽  
Jian Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Influence Factors ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Optimal Advertising ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Customer Returns

Nowadays many manufacturers are increasingly adopting their own online direct channel and the offline retail channel to sell their products as the quick development of e-commerce and third party logistics. To gain more and more market share, the manufacturer and the retailer implement unconditional return strategy, which does not affect secondary sales. We build a differential game model for the optimal advertising and the optimal advertising cost sharing proportion for centralized and decentralized OAO (Online and Offline) supply chain considering customer returns rates. We further analyze how the returns rates affect the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. The results show that the returns rates, the brand reputation and the influence factors of retail channel goodwill on demand of online direct channel strongly influence the optimal advertising decisions. Furthermore, the retailer does not support for the manufacturer advertising efforts in Stackelberg game. Compared with the centralized OAO supply chain, the decentralized system results in channel inefficiency. To coordinate the channels, we design a two-way advertising cost-sharing contract. By this contract, each member of the supply chain reaches a win-win situation and is willing to cooperate. Numerical studies verify the conclusions of this paper.

scholarly journals Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuyong Qian ◽  
Sen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

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