A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Nature ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 364 (6432) ◽  
pp. 56-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Nowak ◽  
Karl Sigmund
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat

Comparison of GRIT versus GRIT/TIT-FOR-TAT

1995 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-322
Author(s):  
Brian Betz
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Communication Analysis ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat

120 subjects played a six-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game in which a simulated other employed either GRIT or GRIT/Tit-For-Tat with varying levels of communication. Analysis indicated that the addition of Tit-For-Tat to GRIT offers no advantages over the standard GRIT strategy.

scholarly journals The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

2013 ◽  
Vol 280 (1766) ◽  
pp. 20131475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrikis Krams ◽  
Hanna Kokko ◽  
Jolanta Vrublevska ◽  
Mikus Āboliņš-Ābols ◽  
Tatjana Krama ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Term Benefit ◽  
Behavioural Strategies

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. It creates the obvious dilemma in which there is always a short-term benefit to cheating, therefore cooperating individuals must avoid being exploited by non-cooperating cheaters. This is achieved by following various decision rules, usually variants of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The strength of TFT, however, is also its weakness—mistakes in implementation or interpretation of moves, or the inability to cooperate, lead to a permanent breakdown in cooperation. We show that pied flycatchers ( Ficedula hypoleuca ) use a TFT with an embedded ‘excuse principle’ to forgive the neighbours that were perceived as unable to cooperate during mobbing of predators. The excuse principle dramatically increases the stability of TFT-like behavioural strategies within the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

ON LOCAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME WITH PARETO UPDATING RULE

2000 ◽  
Vol 11 (08) ◽  
pp. 1539-1544 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Small World ◽  
Small World Networks ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Regular Lattices ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Updating Rule ◽  
Erratic Behavior

Prisoner's Dilemma games with two and three strategies are studied. The corresponding replicator equations, their steady states and their asymptotic stability are discussed. Local Prisoner's Dilemma games are studied using Pareto optimality. As in the case with Nash updating rule, the existence of tit for tat strategy is crucial to imply cooperation even in one dimension. Pareto updating implies less erratic behavior since the steady state configurations are mostly fixed points or at most 2-cycle. Finally, Prisoner's Dilemma game is simulated on small-world networks which are closer to real systems than regular lattices. There are no significant changes compared to the results of the regular lattice.

Rationality, Morality, and Exit

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg ◽  
Roger D. Congleton
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Simulation Experiment ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Alternative Programs ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Behavioral Disposition ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Exit Option

The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

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