How much will you share?: Exploring attitudinal and behavioral nudges in online private information sharing.

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Rees ◽  
Roozmehr Safi ◽  
Seung-Lark Lim
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information

Revaluating Face: A Note on Differences in Private Information Sharing Between Two Communitarian Societies

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel K.‐D. Schulz ◽  
Stephen B. Salter ◽  
Juan Claudio Lopez ◽  
Philip A. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information

Information Sharing, Holdup, and External Finance: Evidence from Private Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3075-3104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bird ◽  
Stephen A Karolyi ◽  
Thomas G Ruchti
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Estimation Bias ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Proprietary Costs ◽  
External Finance ◽  
Financing Costs ◽  
Loan Financing ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
Share Information

Abstract To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential estimation bias from unobservable borrower quality. This setting corroborates our inference that voluntary information sharing reduces lender holdup and alleviates financial constraints for private firms. Received May 25, 2017; editorial decision August 8, 2018 by Editor David Denis.

Sharing Demand Information with Retailer Under Upstream Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Jain
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Downward Pressure ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Intensity Of Competition ◽  
Share Information

We analyze demand information sharing collaboration between two manufacturers and a retailer under upstream competition. The manufacturers produce partially substitutable products, which are stocked by the retailer that sells them in the market characterized by random demand. The manufacturers are privately informed about uncertain demand and decide on whether to share this information with the retailer. We show that by not sharing information, a manufacturer ends up distorting its wholesale price upward to signal its private information to the retailer, and under upstream competition, this distortion is propagated to the competing manufacturer. Thus, although a manufacturer’s decision to not share information may benefit or hurt its own profit, this always benefits the competing manufacturer. Under low intensity of competition, signaling-driven distortions exacerbate double marginalization and hurt all parties, whereas under more intense competition, these distortions help manufacturers offset downward pressure on wholesale prices. Thus, in equilibrium similarly informed manufacturers share information in the former case but not in the latter case. Additionally, when manufacturers differ in their information accuracies, only the better-informed manufacturer shares information. The retailer always benefits from both manufacturers sharing information, and its benefits are larger when the better-informed manufacturer shares information. We show existence of a contracting mechanism the retailer can employ to enable information sharing. Finally, we analyze manufacturers’ information acquisition decisions and find that under competition, two manufacturers acquire minimal information so that they are better off not sharing information in the information sharing game. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

scholarly journals Decentralized Private Information Sharing Protocol on Social Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Shu-Chuan Chu ◽  
Lili Chen ◽  
Sachin Kumar ◽  
Saru Kumari ◽  
Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Social Networking ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Mass Distribution ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Networking Sites ◽  
Control Protocol ◽  
Shared Information ◽  
Community Finding ◽  
Target Community

Social networks are becoming popular, with people sharing information with their friends on social networking sites. On many of these sites, shared information can be read by all of the friends; however, not all information is suitable for mass distribution and access. Although people can form communities on some sites, this feature is not yet available on all sites. Additionally, it is inconvenient to set receivers for a message when the target community is large. One characteristic of social networks is that people who know each other tend to form densely connected clusters, and connections between clusters are relatively rare. Based on this feature, community-finding algorithms have been proposed to detect communities on social networks. However, it is difficult to apply community-finding algorithms to distributed social networks. In this paper, we propose a distributed privacy control protocol for distributed social networks. By selecting only a small portion of people from a community, our protocol can transmit information to the target community.

scholarly journals Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies ◽  
Jan Zabojnik
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Unknown Parameter ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Profit Function ◽  
Additional Information

Abstract We study an organization, consisting of a manager and a worker, whose success depends on its ability to estimate a payoff-relevant but unknown parameter. If the manager has private information about this parameter, she has an incentive to conceal it from the worker in order to motivate him to search for additional information. Due to a time-inconsistency problem, the manager conceals her information more often than if she could commit to an information sharing policy, but even a manager with commitment power shares her information less than would be efficient. We also show that managers who are more likely to get informed are more willing to share their information and that unless the manager’s information substantially improves the worker’s productivity, managerial and worker abilities are substitutes in the firm’s profit function. (JEL D21 D82, L23)

It Takes Two to Tango

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heiko Borchert
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Information Management ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Infrastructure Development ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Public And Private Stakeholders ◽  
Core Issues

This article focuses on the information requirements of public and private stakeholders engaged in critical infrastructure protection (CIP).With its emphasis on information management rather than information sharing, the article builds on existing research suggesting that the notion of information sharing inadvertently renders cooperation more difficult as it evokes impressions of information “dominance” rather than joint information ownership. The article proposes a joint public-private information management agenda based on core issues providing actionable information to tackle immediate threats and crosscutting issues looking at the long-term issues that are relevant to understand the overall context in which critical infrastructure development occurs.

scholarly journals Public-Private Partnerships for Information Sharing in the Security Sector: What's in It for Me?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Van Goethem ◽  
Marleen Easton
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Pilot Project ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Actors

There is little research on public-private information sharing partnerships within the security sector and the benefits it may bring to both sectors. This contribution uses insights from previous research on the benefits of public-private partnerships from organisational science, information management, innovation economics, and technology studies to examine whether they are also valid within the security sector. In a first phase, this analytical framework is used to screen insights from partners involved in triple-helix collaboration in the field of innovation, technology and security. In a second phase, in-depth interviews are conducted with public and private actors involved in setting up a pilot project where information exchange is central. The research results show that traditional benefits such as increased effectiveness, efficiency, improved relationships, creation of learning opportunities and obtaining a strategic, operational, and/or economic advantage that were found in other contexts are also confirmed in the security sector. In addition, Belgian security actors saw improved decision-making and service delivery, increased personnel safety and a more integrated security chain as potential benefits. Understanding these benefits may facilitate the design of future public-private partnerships in the security sector.

scholarly journals Does CEO tenure influence corporate bond rating properties?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Xia Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Corporate Bond ◽  
Bond Rating ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
The Impact

This study examines whether and how corporate bond rating quality varies with CEO tenure. Due to the expansive roles of credit ratings in capital market, managers have incentives to maintain or improve their ratings. Accumulated firm experience makes longer-tenured CEOs better at strategic communication with rating agencies and thereby more able to achieve the desired rating outcomes, leading to lower rating quality. Consistent with this prediction, I find that ratings are less accurate, less timely, and more volatile for issuers with longer-tenured CEOs. All these results hold after controlling for the impact of CEO tenure through public information sharing, suggesting that longer-tenured CEOs manage credit ratings through private information sharing with rating agencies. Moreover, investors do not understand such rating management by longer-tenured CEOs.

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