"Metaphor to myth transformation" and the assertion of negative existentials: A reply to Sarbin.

1969 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-604
Author(s):  
James E. Dublin
Keyword(s):  
Negative Existentials

Negative existence statements: Kripke, Strawson, and topic noun phrases

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-333
Author(s):  
Jay David Atlas
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Negative Existentials

AbstractThe paper focuses on the treatment of existential statements (including negative existentials), and critically engages Kripke's recent (2013) volume of John Locke lectures. It discusses Kripke's views, reaches some obvious conclusions about their theoretical adequacy, and contrasts Kripke's analysis with that of Atlas, comparing their adequacy as theories of the linguistic phenomena.

Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Burgess
Keyword(s):  
Negative Existentials

scholarly journals Negative existentials

Pragmatics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-616
Author(s):  
Zoltán Vecsey
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Approach ◽  
The World ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Negative Existentials ◽  
Static Semantic ◽  
Alternative Theories

Abstract Negative existentials containing empty NPs are understood colloquially as representing how things stand in the world. Moreover, utterances of such sentences seem to express propositions or thoughts that are informative and true. Standard static semantic theories cannot provide a straightforward account of these intuitive phenomena. In such frameworks, sentences with empty NPs are considered as being unable to express truth-evaluable contents. This paper investigates two alternative theories of negative existentials. A common feature of these theories is that they adopt a dynamic approach to meaning. I will argue that neither of these alternatives provides a reassuring solution to the apparent truth-conditional problem generated by the utterances of negative existentials.

Quantified Negative Existentials

dialectica ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Kroon
Keyword(s):  
Negative Existentials

Negative Existentials

1960 ◽  
Vol 57 (20) ◽  
pp. 629-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Cartwright ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Negative Existentials

Against Kripke’s solution to the problem of negative existentials

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-415
Author(s):  
Marco Hausmann
Keyword(s):  
Negative Existentials

Abstract In this paper, I try to show that Kripke’s proposed solution to the problem of negative existentials fails. I try to show that Kripke’s proposal fails because it entails that anybody who has (or had) good reasons to believe that there are no propositions has (or had) also good reasons to believe that he or she does not exist. However, there were philosophers (most notably Quine) who had good reasons to believe that there are no propositions even though they didn’t have good reasons to believe that they do not exist. I conclude that Kripke’s proposed solution to the problem of negative existentials fails.

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