The illusory truth effect: No repetition necessary

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Wright ◽  
Xiaoning Guo ◽  
Drew Brown ◽  
Chris Manolis ◽  
John Dinsmore ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

scholarly journals The effects of repetition frequency on the illusory truth effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aumyo Hassan ◽  
Sarah J. Barber
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Repetition Frequency ◽  
Processing Fluency ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Theoretical Understanding ◽  
The Real ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
New Information ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

AbstractRepeated information is often perceived as more truthful than new information. This finding is known as the illusory truth effect, and it is typically thought to occur because repetition increases processing fluency. Because fluency and truth are frequently correlated in the real world, people learn to use processing fluency as a marker for truthfulness. Although the illusory truth effect is a robust phenomenon, almost all studies examining it have used three or fewer repetitions. To address this limitation, we conducted two experiments using a larger number of repetitions. In Experiment 1, we showed participants trivia statements up to 9 times and in Experiment 2 statements were shown up to 27 times. Later, participants rated the truthfulness of the previously seen statements and of new statements. In both experiments, we found that perceived truthfulness increased as the number of repetitions increased. However, these truth rating increases were logarithmic in shape. The largest increase in perceived truth came from encountering a statement for the second time, and beyond this were incrementally smaller increases in perceived truth for each additional repetition. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of the illusory truth effect and have applications for advertising, politics, and the propagation of “fake news.”

Repetition is good? An Internet trial on the illusory truth effect in schizophrenia and nonclinical participants

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 1058-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Moritz ◽  
Ulf Köther ◽  
Todd S. Woodward ◽  
Ruth Veckenstedt ◽  
Alice Dechêne ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

scholarly journals A catastrophic media failure? Russiagate, Trump and the illusion of truth: The dangers of innuendo and narrative repetition

Journalism ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 146488491987800
Author(s):  
Graham Majin
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Media Effects ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Narrative Repetition ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

The journalistic coverage of Russiagate, between 2017 and March 2019, has been described as ‘a catastrophic media failure’. Drawing on political and social psychology, this article seeks to enrich, and refresh, the familiar journalistic concepts of agenda-setting, framing and priming by combining them under the heading of the ‘news narrative’. Using this interdisciplinary approach to media effects theory, Russiagate is considered in terms of the Illusory Truth Effect and the Innuendo Effect. These effects hypothesise that the more audiences are exposed to information, the more likely they are to believe it – even when they are told that the information is unreliable. As a specific example, we focus on the stance taken by BBC News – which has an obligation to journalistic impartiality. We ask what implications arise from this analysis with regard to audience trust.

scholarly journals On Known Unknowns: Fluency and the Neural Mechanisms of Illusory Truth

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 739-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei-Chun Wang ◽  
Nadia M. Brashier ◽  
Erik A. Wing ◽  
Elizabeth J. Marsh ◽  
Roberto Cabeza
Keyword(s):  
Brain Region ◽  
Perirhinal Cortex ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Behavioral Evidence ◽  
Known Unknowns ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

The “illusory truth” effect refers to the phenomenon whereby repetition of a statement increases its likelihood of being judged true. This phenomenon has important implications for how we come to believe oft-repeated information that may be misleading or unknown. Behavioral evidence indicates that fluency, the subjective ease experienced while processing information, underlies this effect. This suggests that illusory truth should be mediated by brain regions previously linked to fluency, such as the perirhinal cortex (PRC). To investigate this possibility, we scanned participants with fMRI while they rated the truth of unknown statements, half of which were presented earlier (i.e., repeated). The only brain region that showed an interaction between repetition and ratings of perceived truth was PRC, where activity increased with truth ratings for repeated, but not for new, statements. This finding supports the hypothesis that illusory truth is mediated by a fluency mechanism and further strengthens the link between PRC and fluency.

scholarly journals Investigating the robustness of the illusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Alan Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Need For Cognitive Closure ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Study 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

scholarly journals A reproducible systematic map of research on the illusory truth effect

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma L. Henderson ◽  
Samuel J. Westwood ◽  
Daniel J. Simons
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Grey Literature ◽  
Open Science ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Systematic Map ◽  
Systematic Mapping ◽  
Science Practices ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Exposure Tasks ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

AbstractPeople believe information more if they have encountered it before, a finding known as the illusory truth effect. But what is the evidence for the generality and pervasiveness of the illusory truth effect? Our preregistered systematic map describes the existing knowledge base and objectively assesses the quality, completeness and interpretability of the evidence provided by empirical studies in the literature. A systematic search of 16 bibliographic and grey literature databases identified 93 reports with a total of 181 eligible studies. All studies were conducted at Western universities, and most used convenience samples. Most studies used verbatim repetition of trivia statements in a single testing session with a minimal delay between exposure and test. The exposure tasks, filler tasks and truth measures varied substantially across studies, with no standardisation of materials or procedures. Many reports lacked transparency, both in terms of open science practices and reporting of descriptive statistics and exclusions. Systematic mapping resulted in a searchable database of illusory truth effect studies (https://osf.io/37xma/). Key limitations of the current literature include the need for greater diversity of materials as stimuli (e.g., political or health contents), more participants from non-Western countries, studies examining effects of multiple repetitions and longer intersession intervals, and closer examination of the dependency of effects on the choice of exposure task and truth measure. These gaps could be investigated using carefully designed multi-lab studies. With a lack of external replications, preregistrations, data and code, verifying replicability and robustness is only possible for a small number of studies.

scholarly journals PENGARUH INDUKSI GAYA KOGNITIF REFLEKTIF TERHADAP PERSEPSI AKURASI BERITA PALSU (FAKE NEWS) PADA SITUASI EFEK KEBENARAN SEMU (ILLUSORY TRUTH EFFECT)

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Muh. Zulfajri Shadiq Taswin ◽  
Whisnu Yudiana
Keyword(s):  
Random Sampling ◽  
Simple Random Sampling ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Visual Priming ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Post Test ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

Penyebaran informasi yang begitu cepat ternyata kurang dapat diimbangi dengan jaminan bahwa informasi tersebut benar adanya. Fenomena beredarnya berita di dunia maya yang kontennya tidak sesuai dengan kenyataan, dikenal dengan istilah berita palsu (fake news). Semakin sering seseorang mendengar sebuah informasi, terlepas dari apakah informasi tersebut benar atau tidak, semakin mungkin pula ia mempercayai bahwa informasi tersebut benar. Fenomena tersebut dinamakan dengan efek kebenaran semu (illusory truth effect). Kecenderungan menggunakan salah satu dari dua proses kognitif yang ada, yakni proses tipe 1 (intuitif) atau tipe 2 (reflektif), ketika menerima berita palsu dinamakan gaya kognitif. Orang dengan gaya kognitif reflektif cenderung lebih mungkin untuk mampu membedakan berita palsu dari berita asli, dibandingkan orang dengan gaya kognitif intuitif. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah dalam situasi efek kebenaran semu terjadi, seseorang yang diinduksikan gaya kognitif reflektif lebih mampu menilai berita palsu sebagai palsu dibandingkan orang yang tidak terinduksi. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan eksperimen dengan metode between participant post-test only design yang dilakukan pada 215 mahasiswa Fakultas Psikologi Universitas Padjadjaran menggunakan simple random sampling. Induksi gaya kognitif reflektif diberikan pada kelompok eksperimen menggunakan metode Visual Priming gambar patung The Thinker. Data hasil penelitian dianalisis menggunakan uji statistik Mann-Whitney U dua sampel bebas. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa tidak terdapat pengaruh induksi gaya kognitif reflektif terhadap persepsi akurasi berita palsu dalam situasi adanya efek kebenaran semu. Penjelasan dominan yang menjadi dugaan peneliti ialah karena induksi menggunakan visual priming gambar patung The Thinker tidak dapat direplikasi pada penelitian ini.

The Effect of Repetition on Truth Judgments across Development

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Fazio ◽  
Carrie Sherry
Keyword(s):  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Young Age ◽  
Developmental Origins ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Research Studies ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

According to numerous research studies, adults who hear a statement twice are more likely to think that it is true compared to when they have only heard it once. Multiple theoretical explanations exist for this “illusory truth effect.” However, none of the current theories fully explain how or why people begin to use repetition as a cue for truth. This preregistered study investigates those developmental origins in 24 5-year-olds, 24 10-year-olds, and 32 adults. If the link between repetition and truth is learned implicitly, then even 5-year-olds should show the effect. Alternatively, realizing this connection may require metacognition and intentional reflection, skills acquired later in development. Repetition increased truth judgments for all three age groups and prior knowledge did not protect participants from the effects of repetition. These results suggest that the illusory truth effect is a universal effect learned at a young age.

scholarly journals Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David G. Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Need For Cognitive Closure ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

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