The Role of Agency in Visual Perspective Taking

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Clinton ◽  
Aidan Osterby ◽  
Joseph Magliano
NeuroImage ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 117 ◽  
pp. 386-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Martin Kronbichler ◽  
Sebastian Weissengruber ◽  
Andrew Surtees ◽  
Dana Samson ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleanor Katherine Alice Ward ◽  
Patric Bach ◽  
Katrina L McDonough ◽  
Giorgio Ganis

Embodied accounts of visual perspective taking suggest that judgements from another person’s perspective are less effortful if one’s own body position aligns with that of the other person, indicating a causal role of posture in visual perspective taking. Using our adapted mental rotation paradigm, here we tested whether movement has a causal role in perspective taking, by restricting participants’ movement in half of the experimental trials. Here we show, using our previously validated task, that the perceptual representation of another’s visual perspective is not influenced by participants’ ability to move. These data therefore rule out active physical movement as a causal explanation of visual perspective taking and instead argue that postural readjustments when making judgements from another’s perspective are a bodily consequence of the mental transformations of a person’s actual to imagined position in space.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 693-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Michael ◽  
Thomas Wolf ◽  
Clément Letesson ◽  
Stephen Butterfill ◽  
Joshua Skewes ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Schneider ◽  
Anne Grigutsch ◽  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Romi Zäske ◽  
Stefan R. Schweinberger

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.


Author(s):  
Jing Zhai ◽  
Jiushu Xie ◽  
Jiahan Chen ◽  
Yujie Huang ◽  
Yuchao Ma ◽  
...  

NeuroImage ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 118462
Author(s):  
Yuan-Wei Yao ◽  
Vivien Chopurian ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Claus Lamm ◽  
Hauke R. Heekeren

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