Reasoning.--Analogy and experience.--Demonstration and probable reasoning.--Inferring and proving.--Systemization.

2011 ◽  
pp. 172-193
Author(s):  
Mark Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Abraham Sesshu Roth

Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume's psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume's recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we recognize that this reflective and deliberate reasoning constitutes a significant portion of all probable reasoning, it becomes legitimate to ask how Hume accommodates this reasoning in his psychology, his ‘science of man.’ I believe that Hume has an answer to this question. I will explain in what way Hume could have thought that probable reasoning can be sophisticated: in short, sophisticated probable reasoning involves the use of the concept of evidence or epistemic support (section II). Hume's psychology, constrained by his empiricism, must therefore explain how we come to have this idea.


1867 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorimer

Aristotle has a saying, which he has frequently repeated and which is often quoted, to the effect that the same degree of precision is not attainable in all branches of inquiry, and that it would be just as absurd to exact demonstration from a politician or an orator, as to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician. It is a saying full of truth and acuteness. To the cultivators of ethical and political philosophy, for whom it was intended, it is invaluable both as an encouragement and a warning; and yet, in behalf of the latter more especially, I often wish that it had never been said. Proceeding from such a master, I am persuaded that it has often tempted them to rest satisfied with a degree of success far short of the limits which the nature of their subjects really imposed; whilst, on the other hand, it has afforded an apology for excluding social and political philosophy from the meditations of learned bodies like this. I do not mean that they have been formally excluded. I know that the constitution of this, and of most similar societies, has always embraced the social as well as the physical sciences. But so rarely have those of us who were occupied with the former availed ourselves of the privileges of Fellowship, that it has come to be regarded almost as a matter of admission on our part, that our subjects defy scientific treatment: that when we talk of tracing out laws of social wellbeing or progress, we use words which either have no meaning at all, or which indicate a very faint analogy between the methods which we affect to follow and those really employed in the physical sciences: and that pretty nearly all that can be done is to hand us and our subjects over to the companionship of party politicians and popular declaimers.


2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Hare ◽  
Doug Phillippy

Identifies characteristics of mathematically maturity at the calculus level and provides a project focusing on implicit differentiation that is designed to build students' mathematical maturity by helping them connect calculus concepts with prerequisite material. Gives prelesson assignment and lesson outline with examples of student responses that indicate weak understanding of problems and their probable reasoning. Solutions are included.


Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This chapter addresses circularity and insufficiency worries that have been raised against Locke’s same consciousness account of personal identity. The chapter distinguishes different versions of circularity problems and shows that Locke has resources to respond to Joseph Butler’s circularity objection. The more pressing worry concerns the question of whether sameness of consciousness is sufficient for personal identity, which is the so-called insufficiency worry. A response to this question calls for an examination of whether sameness of consciousness can ontologically ground personal identity. The chapter proposes that Locke has resources to accept, on the basis of probable reasoning, that same consciousness that has a metaphysical foundation that most likely has relational structure. The advantage of this reading is that it brings to light that he not merely criticizes substance accounts of identity, but also that he has the resources to develop a plausible—though probable—alternative that avoids circularity and insufficiency.


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