Free will, or the free choice of moral good and evil.

2011 ◽  
pp. 219-243
Author(s):  
Emanuel Swedenborg
Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Cheryl K. Chen

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA

AbstractAccording to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world.


2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.


Author(s):  
Shira Weiss

Albo focuses his exegetical interpretation on his conception of free choice in a unique reading of the Exodus narrative. In the biblical description of the plagues that God brought upon the Egyptians, it is written that God “hardened Pharaoh’s heart” so that he would not agree to allow the Israelites to leave his land. The literal meaning of the narrative implies that God restrained Pharaoh’s free will. Such an interpretation calls God’s justice into question, since Pharaoh is held morally responsible for his refusal to liberate the Israelites. In an effort to reconcile the seeming conflict, Albo creatively interprets this enigmatic narrative, concluding that God did not deprive Pharaoh of his free choice, but rather preserved his volitional will, thereby maintaining divine justice. By hardening Pharaoh’s heart, God gave Pharaoh the fortitude to withstand the pressures of the plagues and exercise free choice whether or not to liberate the Israelites.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Levi

A model of free will is proposed, appealing to the similarity with simple, two-body chemical reactions where the energy curves for the reagents and for the products cross. The system at the crossing point has a freedom of choice to perform the reaction or not. The Landau-Zener formula, corresponding to the opportunity of meeting twice the crossing point, is interpreted as free will with an afterthought and generalized to the cases when a subject thinks about a choice n times. If the probability distribution pn of afterthoughts is known, the probability of a final yes decision is given. The results are generalized to situations where a preference for or against a change exists or where the freedom is only partial, has to fight with conditioning factors, and possibly decreases with increasing instances of free choice.


2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerzy Kosiewicz

Foul Play in Sport as a Phenomenon Inconsistent with the Rules, yet Acceptable and DesirableAuthor considers assumptions related to foul play in sport as a phenomenon, that affect the body, psyche, or relationships - various social involvements, conditionings, and determinants of those involved with that particular form of athletic activity. This includes fouls committed on and off the field, as well as those not even related to a particular game. Our considerations include fouls of a verbal or acoustic nature; fouls in the form of printed materials; those in the form of visual commentary in films, TV shows, Internet appearances, whether in feature films, dramatized documentaries, documentaries or reports presented in a different publications, festivals, exhibitions, during which co-participants, adversaries or competitors make comments on past or future events during or beyond the competition.Fouls in sport, particularly those committed by athletes during competition, will always be inconsistent with the accepted rules of the game, that is, with the official regulations. Fouls will also always influence - in more or less annoying, depressing, painful or even tragic ways - the fate and the health of athletes.No logical - conditional, cause and effect - connection exists between a foul and the rules. Neither the need for nor praise of foul play can stem from the regulations. Yet people directly associated with the sport tolerate it because there is a widespread, quiet acquiescence of such play. Foul play is strongly opposed by supporters of the fair play principle, by those who do not regard sports competition as a phenomenon that can be considered independently beyond moral good and evil.Foul play is seen also as a desirable phenomenon, when inter alia, regardless of the various penalties imposed on players and team, it helps - in the final balance of losses and benefits - to achieve the planned success. Moreover, it is worth adding that, for instance, the so-called "good foul" in basketball enables one to stop the game clock, the so-called pure-play time of the referee. This creates the possibility of obtaining at least one more point (for a possible 3-point shot from a distance) than the team that executes its two one-point penalty shots granted for the offense (that is, "good foul").Foul play may also enhance the course of the sports spectacle, and encourage spectators to cheer more frequently. This is particularly important when professional athletic contests are treated as a form of business. The dramatization of foul play as a creation of "game" within a game can also be an additional attraction of the competition; foul play might be used as sophisticated and spectacular trickery, that dismays and hurts in its pragmatic-aesthetic construction, both the referee and the opponent.Foul play in sports has so many forms and will probably never lose its popular and sometimes spectacular character. Knowing that, everything should be done to protect players from bothersome health, interpersonal, and cultural disablements resulting from foul play.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Federica BERGAMINO

The paper aims to show how the act of free will in Thomas Aquinas is not exercised merely in the choice between good an evil, but consists more essentially in the free choice ofthe better. What plays the key role in the analysis is Thomas's metaphysical conception of the good and its relationship to the free subject. The special causality of the good -and more concretely, of the particular good- is noted, and then choice is examined in light of the analogical nature of the «better».


2020 ◽  
Vol 100 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 219-233
Author(s):  
Michael Jaworzyn

Abstract This article provides an account of how Caspar Langenhert (1661–c. 1730) attempted to reconcile teaching a controversial “egoist” metaphysics in Paris with his reasons for rejecting Calvinism, leaving the Netherlands, and joining the Catholic Church. Langenhert had renounced Calvinism especially because he took the Calvinist account of free will to be philosophically, morally, and scripturally dubious. He preferred the notion of indifference in explaining freedom. That did not seem to accord well with his later work, the Novus Philosophus (1701–1702), whose supposedly “egoist” metaphysics appears to deny such freedom to creatures. Langenhert’s own defence would have been that there was no conflict here, because of the unusually strong distinction he drew between the domains of metaphysics and theology, but his attempts to sidestep his apparent unorthodoxy seem to have been unconvincing to the Parisian authorities, and Langenhert was required to cease teaching.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-121
Author(s):  
John E. Woods

The Vision of Islam forms part of a series, entitled Visions of Reality,designed to focus on religions as worldviews. According to the statement of theeditorial board on the flyleaf, each religion studied in the series will be presentedin the context of its own inner dynamic or ethos using a methodologyappropriate to itself. Murata and Chittick have succeeded admirably in livingup to this commiunent by allowing Islam to speak through abundant quotationsfrom the Qur'an and the hadith.The outgrowth of an introductory course on Islam taught by the authors atthe State University of New York at Stony Brook for more than a decade, Visionis organized in an innovative manner. After a brief introduction to the Qur'an,its translations, and the life of the Prophet, the authors recount the "hadith ofGabriel" transmitted by both al-Buk:haf1 and Muslim on the authority of 'Umaribn al-Kha.t.tab. According to this repon, the Prophet was questioned by anunknown stranger about the significance of submission (islam), faith (iman),and doing what is beautiful (Ihsan ). After explaining these concepts, the Prophetthen identified this mysterious individual as the angel Gabriel, the being throughwhom God revealed the Qur'an. The remainder of the book is structured aroundthese three elements or dimensions, as the authors term them.Dealing first with the several senses of submission, acceptance, or commitment,Part I describes the essential practices of Islam: the five pillars. An oftenmisunderstood sixth pillar, jihad or struggle, is also discussed cogently. Theauthors then explain the historical articulation of these practices in the formationof the Sunni and Shi'i schools (madhahib), the Shari'ah, and Islamic jurisprudence.Here and elsewhere, variations among the schools are noted.Part II, dealing with imiin, accounts for more than two-thirds of the book,an indication of the relative weight the authors give this dimension. The threefundamental principles of faith-divine unity, prophecy, and eschatology-arethe major topics of this section. The nature of God's absolute unity and transcendenceis explored through a discussion of His signs, attributes, and acts (asmanifested in creation), and Islamic angelology. Here, the text is infused withthe metaphysics of illuminationist philosophy. Notions such as good and evil,human free will and determinism, are linked convincingly with the concepts ofdivine unity and the hierarchy of creation. This argument, in tum, leads logicallyto an account of the role of prophecy and humanity's acceptance of ...


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document