scholarly journals Free Will with Afterthoughts: A Quasichemical Model

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Levi
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Chemical Reactions ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Quasichemical Model ◽  
Conditioning Factors ◽  
Crossing Point

A model of free will is proposed, appealing to the similarity with simple, two-body chemical reactions where the energy curves for the reagents and for the products cross. The system at the crossing point has a freedom of choice to perform the reaction or not. The Landau-Zener formula, corresponding to the opportunity of meeting twice the crossing point, is interpreted as free will with an afterthought and generalized to the cases when a subject thinks about a choice n times. If the probability distribution pn of afterthoughts is known, the probability of a final yes decision is given. The results are generalized to situations where a preference for or against a change exists or where the freedom is only partial, has to fight with conditioning factors, and possibly decreases with increasing instances of free choice.

scholarly journals Evidence for entropy maximisation in human free choice behaviour

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Rens ◽  
Philipp Schwartenbeck ◽  
Ross Cunnington ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Inference Model ◽  
Choice Behaviour ◽  
Self Evaluation ◽  
Utilitarian Value ◽  
Entropy Maximisation

The freedom to choose between options is strongly linked to notions of free will. Accordingly, several studies have shown that individuals demonstrate a preference for choice, or the availability of multiple options, over and above utilitarian value. Yet we lack a decision-making framework that integrates preference for choice with traditional utility maximisation in free choice behaviour. Here we test the predictions of an active inference model of decision-making in which an agent actively seeks states yielding entropy (availability of options) in addition to utility (economic reward). We designed a study in which participants freely navigated a virtual environment consisting of two consecutive choices leading to reward locations in separate rooms. Critically, the choice of one room always led to two final doors while, in the second room, only one door was permissible to choose. This design allowed us to separately determine the influence of utility and entropy on participants' choice behaviour and their self-evaluation of free will. We found that choice behaviour was better predicted by an inference-based model than by expected utility alone, and that both the availability of options and the value of the context positively influenced participants' perceived freedom of choice. Moreover, this consideration of options was apparent in the ongoing motion dynamics as individuals navigated the environment. These results show that free choice behaviour is well explained by an inference-based framework in which both utility and entropy are optimised.

scholarly journals Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness: From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Janew
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Trace Back ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Universe

Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its entirety and movement, however, there arises a freedom of choice being more than reinterpreted necessity and unpredictability. Although decisions ultimately involve the whole universe, they are free in varying degrees also here and now. The unity and openness of the infinite enables the individual to be creative while this creativity directly and indirectly enters into all other individuals without impeding them. A contrary impression originates only in a narrowed awareness. But even the most conscious and free awareness can neither anticipate all decisions nor extinguish individuality. Their creativity is secured.

scholarly journals On Vendler’s freedom of choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. e460
Author(s):  
Ana Clara Polakof
Keyword(s):  
Free Choice ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
Alternative Semantics ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Existential Import ◽  
The One ◽  
Short Essay

In this short essay, we will provide some contemporary remarks to Vendler (1962 and 1974). We will propose that his characterization of the Free Choice Item any can be properly explained if we take into account an alternative semantics framework. We will assume with Menéndez-Benito (2010) that it is a universal indeterminate pronoun, and with Aloni (2007) that it involves an exhaustification operator to explain its behavior. We will show that, if we take into account this approach, we will be able to explain what Vendler called freedom of choice, lack of existential import, lawlike propositions, among other characteristics. In addition, we will try to do some linguistics in philosophy, and try to explain how a proper understanding of FCI may help to better understand some reference related problems. Finally, we will show that if we take into account a speech act theory, as the one proposed by Searle (1985), we may account for some of the FCI particular behavior with regard to free choice.

scholarly journals Evil and Free Will: Contemporary Free-Will Defense and Classical Theism

2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Divine Omnipotence ◽  
Voluntary Consent ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Free Will Defense

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.

The Hardening of Pharaoh’s Heart

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shira Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Literal Meaning ◽  
Divine Justice ◽  
Exodus Narrative

Albo focuses his exegetical interpretation on his conception of free choice in a unique reading of the Exodus narrative. In the biblical description of the plagues that God brought upon the Egyptians, it is written that God “hardened Pharaoh’s heart” so that he would not agree to allow the Israelites to leave his land. The literal meaning of the narrative implies that God restrained Pharaoh’s free will. Such an interpretation calls God’s justice into question, since Pharaoh is held morally responsible for his refusal to liberate the Israelites. In an effort to reconcile the seeming conflict, Albo creatively interprets this enigmatic narrative, concluding that God did not deprive Pharaoh of his free choice, but rather preserved his volitional will, thereby maintaining divine justice. By hardening Pharaoh’s heart, God gave Pharaoh the fortitude to withstand the pressures of the plagues and exercise free choice whether or not to liberate the Israelites.

scholarly journals La natura analogica del bene: radice metafísica della libertà della scelta in Tommaso d'Aquino

2004 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Federica BERGAMINO
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The paper aims to show how the act of free will in Thomas Aquinas is not exercised merely in the choice between good an evil, but consists more essentially in the free choice ofthe better. What plays the key role in the analysis is Thomas's metaphysical conception of the good and its relationship to the free subject. The special causality of the good -and more concretely, of the particular good- is noted, and then choice is examined in light of the analogical nature of the «better».

scholarly journals Caspar Langenhert on Free Choice, Causation, and the Rejection of Calvinism

2020 ◽  
Vol 100 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 219-233
Author(s):  
Michael Jaworzyn
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Catholic Church ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
The Catholic Church

Abstract This article provides an account of how Caspar Langenhert (1661–c. 1730) attempted to reconcile teaching a controversial “egoist” metaphysics in Paris with his reasons for rejecting Calvinism, leaving the Netherlands, and joining the Catholic Church. Langenhert had renounced Calvinism especially because he took the Calvinist account of free will to be philosophically, morally, and scripturally dubious. He preferred the notion of indifference in explaining freedom. That did not seem to accord well with his later work, the Novus Philosophus (1701–1702), whose supposedly “egoist” metaphysics appears to deny such freedom to creatures. Langenhert’s own defence would have been that there was no conflict here, because of the unusually strong distinction he drew between the domains of metaphysics and theology, but his attempts to sidestep his apparent unorthodoxy seem to have been unconvincing to the Parisian authorities, and Langenhert was required to cease teaching.

scholarly journals The negation of cualquier NP

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Ana Clara Polakof
Keyword(s):  
Free Choice ◽  
Subject Position ◽  
Universal Quantifier ◽  
Alternative Semantics ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Object Position ◽  
Original Proposal ◽  
Syntactic Approach ◽  
The Subject

Even though the interpretation of Free Choice Items such as any has been on debate for more than 50 years (Vendler, 1974, Dayal, 1998, Horn, 2000, etc.), it is relatively more recent in Spanish (Menéndez-Benito, 2005, Giannakidou and Quer, 2013, among others). Some have analyzed it as a universal quantifier, neither taking its free choiceness into account nor contexts which seem to be problematic for the universal account (see, for instance, Etxepare and Uribe-Etxebarria, 2011). In this article, we defend that cualquier is a universal indeterminate pronoun which involves freedom of choice (as in the original proposal by Vendler, 1974). We will take into account data (taken from https://www.corpusdelespanol.org/web-dial) which has not been properly considered. We will analyze the interaction of negation and cualquier in Rioplantese Spanish in the subject position of negative generic statements, in the object position in negative episodic statements, and in a non argumental position. We will combine an alternative semantics approach to the analysis of the FCI cualquier, inspired in Menéndez-Benito (2010) and Aloni (2019), with a syntactic approach to negation inspired in Etxepare and Uribe-Etxebarria (2011).  

FREE WILL, ETHICS, AND HEALTH CARE

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-186
Author(s):  
R. J. H.
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Medical Care ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Fine Adjustment ◽  
Ethical View ◽  
Libertarian View

In a recent volume1 Arrow takes the libertarian view that individuals can and should make a free choice of whether and when they want to get medical care, when given all the information. Pellegrino comments on the limitations of this libertarian view: (1) We are not isolated individuals but social beings whose actions effect others as well as ourselves. (2) Society has now said that it will care for people when sick. But if they are sick because of what they willfully did then should society not provide care? For children it is difficult to argue that they should be punished for their parents' failings. (3) The sick person's ability to deal with "all" the facts is limited, especially so for children. Pellegrino advocates an ethical view of the right to medical care as well as a legal one. " . . . law is the coarse adjustment that guards against the grosser violations of human rights; ethics is the fine adjustment that sets a higher ideal than law can guarantee." It would seem that children should have the right to medical care.

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