The Wonder of Self-Reflective Conscious Awareness

1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 623-624
Author(s):  
Mardi J. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Awareness

Action and the Problem of Free Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Motor Control ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Control Processes ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Neuronal Processes

This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.

Inside insights: A phenomenology of interoception

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Leder
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
The West ◽  
Body Experience ◽  
Health And Wellbeing ◽  
Outer World ◽  
Body Experiences ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
And Control

This chapter undertakes a phenomenology of inner-body experience, starting with a focus on visceral interoception. While highly personal, such experience also reveals a level of the lived body that is pre-personal, beyond our understanding and control. In contrast to exteroception, elements of the visceral field can be inaccessible, or surface only indistinctly and intermittently to conscious awareness. Nonetheless, interoception is more than just a series of such sensations. This chapter argues for the “exterior interior”—that is, we interpret inner body experiences through models drawn from the outer world, and interoception itself is bound up with emotion, purpose, and projects. In the West, we tend to valorize the interiority of rational thought; by contrast, experience of the inner body is a kind of “inferior interior,” often overlooked or overridden, yet inside insights—gained from attending to messages from the inner body—may preserve our health and wellbeing.

Conscious awareness and time perception

PsyCh Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Montemayor
Keyword(s):  
Time Perception ◽  
Conscious Awareness

scholarly journals Links between rapid ERP responses to fearful faces and conscious awareness

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eimer ◽  
Monika Kiss ◽  
Amanda Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Fearful Faces

scholarly journals Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Low Degrees ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract It is an orthodoxy in cognitive science that perception can occur unconsciously. Recently, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters and Ian Phillips have argued that this orthodoxy may be mistaken. They argue that many purported cases of unconscious perception fail to rule out low degrees of conscious awareness while others fail to establish genuine perception. This paper presents a case of unconscious perception that avoids these problems. It also advances a general principle of ‘phenomenal coherence’ that can insulate some forms of evidence for unconscious perception from the methodological critiques of Lau, Peters and Phillips.

Word Awareness, Reading and Development

1977 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-206
Author(s):  
Marjorie H. Holden
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
First Grade ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Cognitive Changes ◽  
Developmental Factors ◽  
Language Structure ◽  
Early School ◽  
Discrete Responses

Research on young children's word awareness, the ability to identify the lexical constituents of a meaningful utterance, has received different interpretations: Either word awareness is related to linguistic and cognitive changes associated with the early school years or is a concept that children can learn when appropriate techniques are employed. This study was devised to clarify the nature of variables influencing word awareness during early childhood by analyzing responses of 26 kindergarten and 24 first-grade children to the Homophones Test of Word Awareness. Responses were assigned to seven categories representing a continuum characterized as ranging from discrete to global. Older children made fewer errors, and they gave a higher proportion of discrete responses. Younger children gave more global responses. Memory was evidently not the source of the younger children's inability to perform as well as the older ones. Rather, the difficulty appeared to stem from the younger children's inability to divorce sound from meaning in spoken messages. The role of developmental factors in children's conscious awareness of language structure and lexical units is supported by these findings.

scholarly journals Differential Visual Processing of Animal Images, with and without Conscious Awareness

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weina Zhu ◽  
Jan Drewes ◽  
Nicholas A. Peatfield ◽  
David Melcher
Keyword(s):  
Visual Processing ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Animal Images

A Note on Platonism in the Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards

1959 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 283-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rufus Suter
Keyword(s):  
New England ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Theological School

Recent published allusions to Platonism in the minds of Calvinists, and the compatibility of its position there, brings back the memory of Professor William Wallace Fenn's interpretation of the thought of Jonathan Edwards, in lectures more than twenty-five years ago at the Harvard Theological School. Since this interpretation is no longer popular among writers, it might be of interest to mention it again. Professor Fenn liked to picture Edwards as the protagonist of a New England Tragedy. There was tragedy in the outward failures of his life. But the more devastating tragedy was his inward failure as a Christian philosopher. This, according to Fenn's interpretation, arose from Edwards' self-conscious awareness of being unable to reconcile his Platonism with his Calvinism.

scholarly journals Reducing Implicit Prejudice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Calvin K Lai ◽  
Kelly M. Hoffman ◽  
Brian A. Nosek
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Prejudice Reduction ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Real World Application ◽  
Implicit Prejudice ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Conscious Control ◽  
Open Issues

Implicit prejudice are social preferences that exist outside of conscious awareness or conscious control. We summarize evidence for three mechanisms that influence the expression of implicit prejudice: associative change, contextual change, and change in control over implicit prejudice. We then review the evidence (or lack thereof) for five open issues in implicit prejudice reduction research: 1) what shows effectiveness in real-world application; 2) what doesn’t work for implicit prejudice reduction; 3) what interventions produce long-term changes in implicit prejudice; 4) measurement diversity in implicit prejudice reduction research; and 5) the relationship between implicit prejudice and behavior. Addressing these issues provide an agenda for clarifying the conditions and implications of reducing implicit prejudice.

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