Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-458
Author(s):  
Michele Landis Dauber
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Federal Spending ◽  
Opportunity To Respond ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Social Security Act ◽  
History Of

Howard Gillman is unconvinced by my argument that New Deal lawyers turned to the history of federal disaster relief in support of key spending measures, such as the Social Security Act. Likewise, he is unpersuaded by Justice Stone's suggestion to Frances Perkins that she could “do anything under the taxing power.” I understand why Stone's comment grates on Gillman's modern ear; it grated on mine too. What is Stone talking about, and how could his comment be squared with our understanding of the pre–New Deal period as one of sharp limits to federal power imposed by the courts? Gillman's conviction that, in this era, the Supreme Court exercised substantial veto power over federal spending leads him to some critical misreadings of key cases and misstatements of fact. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to his comments and, in particular, to include some details regarding Supreme Court developments for which there was no space in the article itself.

Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community

2000 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gad Barzilai
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
New Era ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court

Some thirty years after the Bergman decision, Israel's constitutional structure and legal culture are still not responsive to minority needs or, more broadly, to the social needs of deprived communities. The liberal language and judicial review of Knesset legislation that were empowered by Bergman have not reconciled this problematic discrepancy between jurisprudence and social needs.The Bergman ruling signified the onset of a new era in Israel jurisprudence — the era of liberalism, in that it generated the notion of judicial counter-majoritarianism as the center, however problematic, of democracy. It was a modest ruling and a careful one, dwelling only on procedural deficiencies as cause for judicial abrogation of parliamentary legislation. Later on, after 1992, and propelled by the spirit of judicial activism, the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive judicial policy. It asserted the need for much more active judicial review of the substance of Knesset legislation and even the possibility of annulling it if it fell within the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

scholarly journals Judicial Review, Judicial Revisionism and Judicial Responsibility

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 169-216
Author(s):  
Brian A. Langille
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
New Era ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law

Judicial review of the decisions of labour relations boards has been a nagging problem for the Supreme Court of Canada for decades. The decision of the Court in Le Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec et de L’Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board et al. provides an opportunity for and indeed provokes review of the work of the Court in dealing with this recurring problem. This essay begins by placing in perspective the concrete issue posed in the L’Acadie decision. But the particular facts of that case are used only as a vehicle to explore the nature of the problem of judicial review of labour decisionmakers and the history of the Court's handling of it. A fundamental thesis of this essay is that the Court's work can be best understood as comprising two distinct periods, the early years (pre-1979) and the new era (1979-1984?). This essay articulates the view that during the early years the Court developed a law of judicial review which was wholly inadequate both in functional and doctrinal terms. In the new era the Court simplified and reformed the law of judicial review of labour boards and labour arbitrators. It is only from the perspective of the Court's previous handling of the issue that the decision in L’Acadie can be truly understood. When so viewed the decision is perfectly inadequate. The case creates a new distinction based upon the old confusion of “jurisdiction”. This essay then develops the view that no theory of judicial review which revolves around the notion of “jurisdiction” can ever satisfactorily deal with the issues presented. In this respect the Court's own cases from the “new era” represent a much more sensible, if still a second best approach. Finally, suggestions for a legislative solution to the problem posed by L’Acadie are briefly explored.

scholarly journals When “Creeping Jurisdiction” Goes Awry: The Social Action Litigation to Ban Surrogacy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sital Kalantry
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Action ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Scholarly Attention

Significant scholarly attention has focused on the strong role played by the Supreme Court in the Indian constitutional democracy. Exercising its powers of judicial review, the Court will invalidate legislation if determines it to be in violation of the constitution. In the judicial appointments case, for example, it invalidated legislation that would have reformed the judicial appointments system. When there is no law, but the Court finds that certain circumstances in society violate the fundamental rights of certain groups of people, it may issue its own legislative-like guidelines. It did this in the internationally famous Vishaka case, in which it created guidelines on sexual harassment.

The Supreme Court and Political Eras: A Perspective on Judicial Power in a Democratic Polity

1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-368
Author(s):  
John B. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Current Trend ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
The Normative Question

American political history is often conceived as a series of stable eras, controlled by dominant party coalitions and demarcated by realigning elections, most often identified as those of 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. Since there is a lag in the corresponding reconstitution of the Supreme Court, it is often deemed a countermajoritarian drag on the workings of electoral democracy. An examination of judicial review in relation to political eras shows that view to be correct only in the New Deal era. Judicial review most commonly occurs within eras rather than across them, with a Court reconstituted by the prevailing coalition negating legislation passed by that coalition. This reality significantly alters the normative question of the Court's role in a democracy, and it raises questions about the concept of stable eras. The current trend of political party dealignment calls into question the continuing validity of the critical-elections approach.

scholarly journals Welfare state and judicial review. Aproximación a una teoría «posible» del estado social en el federalismo = Welfare State and Judicial Review

2014 ◽  
pp. 505
Author(s):  
Víctor J. Vázquez Alonso
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
American Exceptionalism ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Welfare State

En este trabajo se lleva a cabo una aproximación a la evolución del Estado Social en el Federalismo americano, destacando el papel que ha tenido en la misma el Judicial Review. Para ello, primeramente, se estudiarán las causas del denominado excepcionalismo americano, en lo referido a la falta de consagración constitucional de los derechos sociales. Se estudiarán aquí los frustrados intentos de la Corte Suprema de dotar de eficacia a ciertos derechos sociales a partir de la Enmienda Catorce. Una vez señalada esta excepción americana, se analizará cómo la construcción de un estado del bienestar en los Estados Unidos, desde el New Deal hasta nuestros días, ha ido de la mano de una interpretación de las categorías del federalismo favorable a los poderes del Congreso. Del mismo modo, se llamará la atención sobre las limitación que tienen los jueces estatales para dar eficacia a los derechos sociales de sus constituciones y de cómo a nivel estatal, se abre paso la idea de reformular la función judicial cuando se trata de aplicar disposiciones de carácter social que exigen políticas públicas. Finalmente, y a la luz de la última jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema, se insistirá en la necesaria deferencia judicial que reclaman las leyes estatales que sobre una interpretación concreta del federalismo implementan nuevas facetas del bienestar social.This paper addresses the evolution of the Welfare State in American Federalism, highlighting the role played by Judicial Review. With such an aim, we first study the causes of the so-called «American Exceptionalism», in reference to the lack of constitutional enforcement of social rights. Concretely, we will focus on the frustrated attempts of the Supreme Court to give efficacy to certain social rights through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Once this exception and its reasons are fully acknowledged, we are able to discuss how the construction of the welfare state in the United States, since the New Deal to the present day, has been accompanied by an interpretation of Federal categories very favourable to the powers of the National Congress. Similarly, we will analyse the limitations that state judges have when enforcing social rights protected in state constitutions as well as the current debate taking place at the state level regarding possible reformulations of the judicial function when it comes to implement provisions of social nature that require public policies. Finally, and in light of the recent case law of the Supreme Court, we will insist on the necessary judicial deference in cases in which Federal categories are used to implement new welfare goals.

8 Administrative Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Legislative Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter explains the history of ‘State Side orders’ and the development of applications for judicial review of administrative (as opposed to legislative) action in Ireland. It sets out the ramifications of the ultra vires doctrine, highlighting the East Donegal case. The importance of principles of natural justice is stressed, considering cases such as Healy. Then the way the term ‘reasonableness’ has been unpacked in Ireland is subjected to close examination, with reference to cases such as Keegan and O’Keeffe. The Meadows case and the doctrine of proportionality are analysed, as is the extent to which the Supreme Court adheres to a deferential approach to administrative bodies. Throughout this chapter the subtle differences between the Irish and English approaches to administrative law are singled out for attention and critique

Video as Text/Archive

2019 ◽  
pp. 778-797
Author(s):  
Bennett Capers
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Surveillance Cameras ◽  
American Law ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
History Of ◽  
Constitutional Protections

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

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