Pluralizing Universal “Man”: The Legacy of Transcendentalism and Teleology in Habermas's Discourse Ethics

1998 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stella Gaon
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Collective Development ◽  
Tacit Assumptions ◽  
Central Claim

The central claim of this article is that Habermas's program of discourse ethics fails to “detranscendentalize” the Enlightenment subject. On the contrary, tacit assumptions concerning a transcendental conception of reason and a subject that is teleologically predisposed toward its rightful end are the logical pillars of Habermas's two most crucial claims. First, unless Habermas presupposes an abstract and decidedly unencumbered moral discussant, he cannot maintain his claim concerning the rationality—and hence the unconditionality—of the moral principle he describes. Secondly, unless Habermas begs the question of the proper end of individual and collective development, he fails to support the claim that discourse ethics speaks to the emphatic dimension of moral reason.

Die Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
The Given ◽  
Moral Convictions

Within the Kantian ethics consciousness of the moral principle is a fact of reason which cannot be grounded in any antecedent data, empirical or rational. Hegel however argues that the fact of reason is necessarily embedded in the fact of „Sittlichkeit“, that a pure reason is an empty and chimerical construction, that moral knowledge is unavoidably rootet in the contingent moral convictions of the given cultural and social environment. This essay defends Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and – by generalizing Hegel’s hermeneutic approach – sketches the outlines of an explicatory concept of ethics which contradicts the scientistic understanding of moral philosophy characteristic for Kant, the utilitarianism and the supporters of discourse ethics likewise.

scholarly journals Repensar la democracia. Estrategia moral y perspectiva crítica en K.O.APEL

Daímon ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Domingo Viente García Marzá
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Architectural Theory ◽  
Critical Perspective ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
The Relationship

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar la actualidad de algunas de las aportaciones más importantes de K.O.Apel a la reflexión democrática, en concreto a la relación entre ética y democracia. Para este objetivo compararemos estas aportaciones con las de J.Habermas, compañero de viaje en la propuesta de la ética del discurso. Comprobaremos cómo nuestro autor supo avanzar y justificar la necesidad de una estrategia moral, más aún, de una arquitéctonica de la razón práctica que relacione fundamentación y aplicación. Solo así se puede dar razón de la perspectiva crítica tanto en la fundamentación de la idea de democracia como en la aplicación del principio moral a las instituciones que componen el sistema democrático. The aim of this paper is to show the actuality of K.O. Apel's most important contributions to democratic reflection, specifically the relationship between ethics and democracy. For this purpose, we will compare these contributions with those of J. Habermas, his colleague in the discourse ethics approach. We will see how our author achieved an advance in the justification of the need for a moral strategy, even more so for an architectural theory of practical reason hich includes the conditions of its application. Only in this way we can give a reason for the critical perspective, both in the foundation of the idea of democracy and in the application of the moral principle to the institutions that make up the democratic system.

scholarly journals Kant on Human Dignity: Autonomy, Humanity, and Human Rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
New Frontier ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Central Claim

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place a high demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights.

What Goes Wrong in Habermas’s Pragmatic Justification of (U)?

Dialogue ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
JUVÉNAL NDAYAMBAJE
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
Jurgen Habermas ◽  
Pragmatic Justification

In his moral theory, named ‘discourse ethics,’ Jürgen Habermas holds that a norm is morally valid only when it is universalizable. He establishes the principle of universalization (U) as the procedural principle for testing the moral validity of norms in moral discourse. He argues that this principle can be derived from the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general. By explicating the fiduciary status of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, and by distinguishing perspectival from comprehensive universalization, I argue that Habermas fails to justify his moral principle.

Discourse Ethics and Moral Rationalism

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-386
Author(s):  
Brian K. Powell
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Jurgen Habermas ◽  
Rational Requirement ◽  
Decisive Objection

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I raise the following question: can the ethical thought of Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel provide us with a way of showing that morality is a rational requirement? The answer I give is that (unfortunately) it cannot. I argue for this claim by showing that a decisive objection to Alan Gewirth’s line of thought in Reason and Morality also applies to discourse ethical arguments that try to show an inescapable commitment to a moral principle.

scholarly journals Aborto y discurso moral. Ideas clave de la Ética del discurso para el tratamiento de la interrupción voluntaria de la vida humana inicial

Daímon ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 123-139
Author(s):  
Dorando Michelini
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Issue ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Present Text

El presente texto aborda la problemática del aborto como una cuestión moral, y deja de lado otros enfoques relevantes (por ejemplo, pragmáticos y éticos), dado que estos, en opinión del autor, no tienen como horizonte último el punto de vista moral. A partir de los presupuestos conceptuales y metodológicos de la Ética del discurso, en tanto que ética de la corresponsabilidad solidaria no rigorista, se presentan conceptos ético-discursivos que pueden fundamentar las dos tesis siguientes: a) La interrupción arbitraria de la vida humana en la etapa inicial de desarrollo es una práctica injusta; b) En determinados contextos de interacción y en situaciones específicas de decisión, el principio moral que exige no interrumpir voluntariamente la vida humana inicial puede ser no aplicable o su aplicación no exigible. The present text addresses the problem of abortion as a moral issue, and leaves aside other relevant approaches (e.g. pragmatic and ethical), since these, in the author's opinion, do not have the moral point of view as their ultimate horizon. From the conceptual and methodological assumptions of Discourse Ethics, as ethics of non-rigorous solidary co-responsibility, discourse-ethical concepts are presented that can support the following two theses: a) The arbitrary interruption of human life in the initial stage of development is an unjust practice; b) In certain contexts of interaction and in specific situations of decision, the moral principle that demands not voluntarily interrupting the initial human life may not be applicable or its application may not be enforceable.

Kantian indifference about moral reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reason ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Philosophical Assumption

Abstract The pessimistic arguments May challenges depend on an anti-Kantian philosophical assumption. That assumption is that what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, or what May calls “optimistic rationalism.” I place May's book in the literature by explaining how that assumption is resisted by Christine Korsgaard, one of May's examples of a contemporary Kantian.

Saving the Self: Between the Enlightenment and the Deluge

2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 657-660
Author(s):  
Mary Gergen
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Enlightenment
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