Stratarchical Party Organization and Party Finance in Canada

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Coletto ◽  
Harold J. Jansen ◽  
Lisa Young

Abstract. Based on an examination of constitutional and other party documents, Canadian political parties have been described as stratarchically organized (Carty, 2002). We identify four models of internal party financial flows that correspond to different models of internal party organization. We then trace the financial flows into and within the four major Canadian political parties from 2004 to 2007 with a view to identifying the model of party organization that these flows indicate. Our evidence in some respects supports Carty's assertion that Canadian parties are stratarchically organized, but it also suggests that changes to the regulatory regime governing political finance have contributed to a centralization of power at the level of the national party and at the expense of candidates and local associations. This centralizing tendency is significant, as it may disrupt the bargain that underlies the stratarchical organization of Canadian parties.Résumé. À la lumière d'une revue des constitutions et de divers autres documents des partis politiques canadiens, ces derniers ont été décrits comme étant organisés de manière stratarchique (Carty, 2002). Nous dégageons quatre modèles de flux monétaires internes des partis qui correspondent à différents modèles d'organisation interne des partis politiques. Nous retraçons les entrées de fonds des quatre principaux partis politiques canadiens et leur distribution interne de 2004 à 2007 en vue d'identifier le modèle d'organisation de parti qui correspond à ces flux monétaires. Sous certains rapports, nos résultats appuient l'argument de Carty affirmant que les partis canadiens sont organisés de manière stratarchique, mais ils suggèrent aussi que les changements apportés au régime régulateur gouvernant le financement politique ont contribué à une centralisation du pouvoir au niveau national des partis et ce aux dépens des candidats et des associations locales. Cette tendance centralisatrice est importante, car elle peut rompre le compromis qui sous-tend l'organisation stratarchique des partis politiques canadiens.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Hamada ◽  
Khushbu Agrawal

Money is a necessary component of any democracy: it enables political participation, campaigning and representation. However, if it is not effectively regulated, it can undermine the integrity of political processes and institutions, and jeopardize the quality of democracy. Therefore, regulations related to the funding of political parties and election campaigns, commonly known as political finance, are a critical way to promote integrity, transparency and accountability in any democracy. Political finance regulations must adapt and adjust to political, economic and societal changes. This report contributes to the discussion of the future of political finance by exploring the following trends, opportunities and challenges related to money in politics that need to be taken into consideration when improving political finance systems: • mainstreaming political finance regulations into an overall anti-corruption framework; • supporting the implementation of existing political finance regulations and monitoring their performance; • harnessing digital technologies to ensure transparency and accountability in political finance; and • designing targeted political finance measures to encourage the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hopkin

This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's `nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book The Formation of National Party Systems. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Wojcik

Are the social networks of legislators affected more by their political parties or their personal traits? How does the party organization influence the tendency of members to work collectively on a day-to-day basis? In this paper, I explore the determinants of the relationships of legislators in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. I use exponential random graph models to evaluate the relative influence of personal traits versus party influence in generating legislator relationships. Despite a focus on personalism in Brazil, the analysis reveals that the effects of political parties on tie formation are roughly equal to the effects of personal traits, suggesting that networks may make political parties much more cohesive than contemporary literature would lead us to believe.


Author(s):  
Paul A. Dawson ◽  
James E. Zinser

Citizens participate in the electoral process both to enjoy intrinsic benefits and in the hope of future bene fits. Factors affecting the strength of these consumption and investment motives therefore will affect registration and turnout rates, levels of campaign contributions, and electoral margins. To some extent, the strength of these motives is fixed by relatively static factors: levels of district per capita income, the degree of income inequality, the partisan division of registered voters. However, both motives also are affected by factors more apt to vary: for example, statutory arrangements, the activities of political parties, levels and types of campaign expenditures. In particular, statutory arrangements and the activities of parties which reduce costs can increase participation. Moreover, substan tial efforts to alter the partisan division of registered voters can increase campaign contributions. Also, campaign expenditures channel motivations in partisan directions, stim ulate partisan turnout, and affect electoral margins. Results reported here suggest the likelihood of bipartisan support for policies facilitating registration and voting, challenge assumptions about the effects of incumbency on campaign contributions, raise doubts about legislated ceilings on cam paign expenditures, and weaken the case for public financing of congressional elections.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-317
Author(s):  
Chipo Dendere

AbstractWhat is the impact of access to political party finance – money that parties use to fund their campaign activities – on politics in Africa? While multiparty elections have become more regular in the developing world, many opposition parties are still failing to win elections. This paper argues that poor access to political finance weakens democratic consolidation and negatively impacts the participation of less-resourced candidates who are unable to self-fund. As a result, opposition parties are forced to rely on weak promises of aid from international donors and unreliable state funding. This in-depth analysis of political finance, based on extensive interviews with politicians and government officials in Zimbabwe, political documents, news reports and a review of court cases, reveals that uneven financing has weakened opposition parties and serves as an extra advantage for incumbents.


1953 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Landau

The scarceness of published material renders difficult a true estimate of the development of political ideas in Egypt in the nineteenth century. Nor is it any less difficult to trace the origins of the first political parties.The Arabi Rebellion of 1881-1882 was preceded by a long period of unrest, which finally crystallized in a self-styled National Party. This faction, led by army officers and civilians, kept its secret character for a few years, coming into the open only at the beginning of the Arabi Rebellion. Its importance in the anti-foreign struggle, however, has drawn attention to its humble but interesting origins. Research has provided us with fairly adequate, if still incomplete, material on this point. But hardly anything has been published, on the other hand, about another secret organization of that time, called ‘Young Egypt’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 754-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Cahill ◽  
Andrey Tomashevskiy

An important dimension of party positioning remains largely unexamined—that is, the clarity with which parties present policies to the electorate. Moreover, the effects of private campaign contributions on party positions are also vastly understudied. We address these gaps using a unique new data set on private contributions to political parties in eight Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from the early 1990s to the present. We argue that parties are incentivized to present increasingly ambiguous, or broad appeal, policy positions as a result of increased private campaign contributions. Broad appeal campaigns allow parties to appease their donors with more extreme policy preferences while maintaining the support of their more moderate base supporters. We find support for this argument and show that increasing donations are associated with increased policy ambiguity. Using new data, this article is the first to examine an important connection between political finance and party positioning on a cross-national and time-series basis.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881986362
Author(s):  
Sergiu Gherghina ◽  
Sorina Soare

In spite of extensive research dedicated to the rise and development of fringe populist political parties in Eastern Europe, little attention has been paid to the organizational determinants of their electoral performance. This article aims to fill this void in the literature and analyzes the extent to which particular types of leadership and party organization could influence the electoral performance of three political parties from Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova, and Romania. The qualitative analysis is conducted for the period 2012–2015 and uses a combination of primary (party statutes) and secondary sources (party histories, electoral databases, and literature). The results indicate how the existence of underdeveloped party organizations has a negative influence on the electoral performance, while strong and charismatic leaders are an insufficient condition for ensuring survival on the political arena.


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