scholarly journals The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Sanz
Keyword(s):  
Population Size ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Percentage Points

I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed list proportional representation and under an open list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party-lists. I find that the open list system increases turnout by between 1 and 2 percentage points. The results suggest that open list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to more voter turnout.

Driving Saints to Sin: How Increasing the Difficulty of Voting Dissuades Even the Most Motivated Voters

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. McNulty ◽  
Conor M. Dowling ◽  
Margaret H. Ariotti
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
New York State ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Political Methodology ◽  
York State ◽  
Cost Cutting ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Naturalistic Setting

The consolidation of polling places in the Vestal Central School District in New York State during the district's 2006 budget referendum provides a naturalistic setting to study the effects of polling consolidation on voter turnout on an electorate quite distinct from previous work by Brady and McNulty (2004, The costs of voting: Evidence from a natural experiment. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Palo Alto, CA). In particular, voters in local elections are highly motivated and therefore might be thought to be less affected by poll consolidation. Nevertheless, through a matching analysis we find that polling consolidation decreases voter turnout substantially, by about seven percentage points, even among this electorate, suggesting that even habitual voters can be dissuaded from going to the polls. This finding has implications for how election administrators ought to handle cost-cutting measures like consolidation.

Electoral System Changes and Voter Turnout: Reflections on New Zealand Local Elections

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
Jacky Yaakov Zvulun
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The Impact

Voter turnout in local and general elections is a key element in measuring citizen participation. From 2004, New Zealand local elections were unique in that local councils had the choice of two different electoral systems: plurality majority and proportional representation. We have here the opportunity to study more about New Zealand local elections and changes in electoral systems. This article analyses the impact of the "Single Transferable Vote” electoral system in those councils that adopted it, comparing it to those councils which used "First Past the Post". This article explains how the STV electoral system has not increased voter turnout and was not the cause of low voter turnout in the 2004-2007 local elections. It might, however, offer voters a better way to choose their preferences.

scholarly journals Does Lower Benefits Incentivize Refugee Naturalization? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederik Juhl Jørgensen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Social Assistance ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Low Education ◽  
Major Reform

Does lower benefits provide an incentive for refugees to naturalize? I identify the effect of lowering refugees’ benefits on their propensity to naturalize by leveraging quasi-random variation in refugees’ benefit levels induced by a major reform of the Danish social assistance system. The reform sharply reduced social assistance benefits by up to 50 percent for new refugees. I estimate the effect of this decrease in a regression discontinuity design and show that refugees’ propensity to naturalize jumps by about 13½ percentage points at the benefit cutoff. I demonstrate that this marked increase is most likely driven by increased incentives that drive refugees off welfare and into the labor market in the short-term. Moreover, I show that the positive effects on naturalization are concentrated among the most capable refugees who do not face the resource constraints that follow from low education.

scholarly journals What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW B. HALL
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
General Election ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Primary Election ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The U.S

This article studies the interplay of U.S. primary and general elections. I examine how the nomination of an extremist changes general-election outcomes and legislative behavior in the U.S. House, 1980–2010, using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections. When an extremist—as measured by primary-election campaign receipt patterns—wins a “coin-flip” election over a more moderate candidate, the party’s general-election vote share decreases on average by approximately 9–13 percentage points, and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35–54 percentage points. This electoral penalty is so large that nominating the more extreme primary candidate causes the district’s subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, on average, becoming more liberal when an extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when an extreme Democrat is nominated. Overall, the findings show how general-election voters act as a moderating filter in response to primary nominations.

Social Capital and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Saint's Day Fiestas in Mexico

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Atkinson ◽  
Anthony Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Omitted Variables ◽  
Reverse Causation ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Activity ◽  
Community Activities ◽  
Percentage Points

Social capital and community activity are thought to increase voter turnout, but reverse causation and omitted variables may bias the results of previous studies. This article exploits saint's day fiestas in Mexico as a natural experiment to test this causal relationship. Saint's day fiestas provide temporary but large shocks to the connectedness and trust within a community, and the timing of these fiestas is quasi-random. For both cross-municipality and within-municipality estimates, saint's day fiestas occurring near an election decrease turnout by 2.5 to 3.5 percentage points. So community activities that generate social capital can inhibit political participation. These findings may give pause to scholars and policy makers who assume that such community activity and social capital will improve the performance of democracy.

Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEREMY FERWERDA ◽  
NICHOLAS L. MILLER
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Central Question ◽  
World War ◽  
Foreign Occupation ◽  
The Relationship

Do foreign occupiers face less resistance when they increase the level of native governing authority? Although this is a central question within the literature on foreign occupation and insurgency, it is difficult to answer because the relationship between resistance and political devolution is typically endogenous. To address this issue, we identify a natural experiment based on the locally arbitrary assignment of French municipalities into German or Vichy-governed zones during World War II. Using a regression discontinuity design, we conclude that devolving governing authority significantly lowered levels of resistance. We argue that this effect is driven by a process of political cooptation: domestic groups that were granted governing authority were less likely to engage in resistance activity, while violent resistance was heightened in regions dominated by groups excluded from the governing regime. This finding stands in contrast to work that primarily emphasizes structural factors or nationalist motivations for resistance.

scholarly journals No extension without representation? Evidence from a natural experiment in collective bargaining

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Hijzen ◽  
Pedro S. Martins
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Employment Growth ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Causal Impact

AbstractIn many countries, collective bargaining coverage is enhanced by government-issued extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties to all firms and workers in the sector. This paper analyzes the causal impact of extensions using a natural experiment in Portugal that resulted in a sharp and unanticipated decline in the extension probability of agreements. Our results, based on a regression discontinuity design, indicate that extensions had a negative impact on employment growth. This effect is concentrated among nonaffiliated firms, which may reflect the limited representativeness of employer associations.

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