scholarly journals A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and Legal Profession

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Bonica ◽  
Maya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Profession ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Common Space ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
Scholarly Inquiry ◽  
The U.S

We extend the scaling methodology previously used in Bonica (2014) to jointly scale the American federal judiciary and legal profession in a common space with other political actors. The end result is the first dataset of consistently measured ideological scores across all tiers of the federal judiciary and the legal profession, including 840 federal judges and 380,307 attorneys. To illustrate these measures, we present two examples involving the U.S. Supreme Court. These data open up significant areas of scholarly inquiry.

The Karlsruhe Phenomenon

2020 ◽  
pp. 32-69
Author(s):  
Matthias Jestaedt
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
New Creation ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
The U.S

This chapter stresses that nothing in the Federal Constitutional Court’s growth was preordained. It depicts the Court’s initially fraught relations with political actors, ordinary judges, and legal academics, scrutinizing the institutional peculiarities that have made the Court what it is. The manner and direction in which the Court developed was recognizable merely in outline in the fundamental decision by the constitution’s founders for an institutionally independent constitutional adjudication, which according to the size and extent of its jurisdiction would be powerful. This was due to the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court in its totality was unprecedented both in terms of constitutional history and comparative constitutional development: during the deliberations on the Basic Law and Federal Constitutional Court Act, there were repeated specific references to the Staatsgerichtshof in Weimar and the U.S. Supreme Court. But both in its numerous distinctive details and even in the overall concept, the constitutional court of the Basic Law represents a new creation.

Part II Institutions and Constitutional Change, C The Courts, Ch.10 The Supreme Court of Canada and Appointment of Judges in Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dodek Adam ◽  
Way Rosemary Cairns
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Institutional Diversity ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Ideals ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

This chapter explains the constitutional status of the Supreme Court of Canada with attention to the Court’s composition, jurisdiction, and procedure. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 and considers whether and how that decision limits Parliament’s authority to make changes to the Court. Both the process for appointing Supreme Court of Canada justices and the process for appointing other federal judges to the country’s superior courts are explained. The authors argue that both appointment processes are inconsistent with democratic ideals of transparency and accountability. They examine the emerging scholarly and professional consensus on the importance of institutional diversity on the bench, and conclude that the continuing lack of diversity in the federal judiciary raises legitimate political and constitutional concerns.

scholarly journals Polarization and the Judiciary

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Hasen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Mechanisms ◽  
Federal Judges

The increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and citizenry affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal judges, including justices of the US Supreme Court. Polarization in the United States over the last few decades matters to the American judicial system in at least four ways. First, polarization affects judicial selection, whether the selection method is (sometimes partisan-based) elections or appointment by political actors. In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges on the basis of partisan affiliation or cues. Second, driven in part by selection mechanisms, polarization may be reflected in the decisions that judges make, especially on issues that divide people politically, such as abortion, guns, or affirmative action. The Supreme Court, for example, often divides along party and ideological lines in the most prominent and highly contested cases. Those ideological lines now overlap with party as we enter a period in which all the Court liberals have been appointed by Democratic presidents and all the Court conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents. Third, increasingly polarized judicial decisions appear to be causing the public to view judges and judicial decision making (at least on the US Supreme Court) through a more partisan lens. Fourth, polarization may affect the separation of powers, by empowering courts against polarized legislative bodies sometimes paralyzed by gridlock. The review concludes by considering how increased polarization may interact with the judiciary and judicial branch going forward and by suggesting areas for future research.

Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege

2010 ◽  
pp. 656-672
Author(s):  
Louis Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
Past Half Century ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
State Secrets ◽  
Past Half

This article discusses the concept of state secrets privilege which is designed to prevent private litigants from gaining access to agency documents sought in cases involving National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance, extraordinary rendition, and other intelligence programs. Before the Reynolds case, the Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege. Over the past half century, federal judges gave “deference” to the executive claims on sensitivity and confidentiality of agency records without ever looking at the disputed document. However in 1953, the Supreme Court was misled by the government. Since then, there has been an interest in having Congress enact legislation to assure greater independence for the federal judiciary and provide a more even playing field for private litigants.

Extra-judicial Actor Induced Change in Supreme Court Legitimacy

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 600-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles T. Armaly
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Affective Response ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Institutional Loyalty ◽  
Negative Statements ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Political Opinions ◽  
The U.S

Although public support for the U.S. Supreme Court is generally stable, various cues and heuristics affect how individuals derive political opinions. And while the Court is capable of conferring support on its own decisions, information from extra-judicial sources—such as presidential candidates—may have a potentially (de)legitimizing influence on individuals and their attitudes. Using a survey experimental design, I manipulate the source of negative statements about the judiciary to determine whether extra-judicial actors are capable of altering support for the Court and, if so, whether it is via ideological updating or is a purely affective response. I find that political actors unrelated to the Court are capable of producing change in attitudes and that those changes are affective. Those positive toward the cue source decrease their level of support upon hearing indicting statements, and vice versa, but individuals do not alter their perceived ideological distance from the Court. This finding has implications for the stability of the support on which the Court relies to expect compliance with its rulings, as well as how affective attachments to groups and their representatives influence institutional loyalty.

scholarly journals Who May Remove or Discipline Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Independent Counsel ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
Constitutional Analysis

This article examines two issues regarding the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause and the federal judiciary: first, is impeachment the sole permissible mechanism for judicial removal? Second, who, if anyone is authorized to discipline federal judges through sanctions short of removal? This article argues that a form of “strict originalism,” that is, the attempt to discern the Constitution’s resolution of particular issues according to the founders’ expectations regarding those very issues—makes sense with respect to political mechanisms for judicial discipline and removal. Political mechanisms are those which can by fully initiated and implemented by the elected branches of the federal government without the involvement of the judiciary. However, employing “neoclassical” constitutional interpretation—examining general values revealed by the founders’ debates about the Constitution as a whole rather than highly specific original understandings of particular questions—demonstrates that (1) federal judges may also be disciplined through judicially enforceable civil and criminal sanctions imposed through executive or independent counsel prosecution, and (2) the federal judiciary, subject to congressional regulation, may exercise powers of self-regulation for judges not sitting on the Supreme Court.

Black Federal Judges and Civil Rights in the Age of Obama

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-221
Author(s):  
Shenita Brazelton ◽  
Dianne M. Pinderhughes
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
President Obama ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
The Impact

We examine the demographics of the federal judiciary and the impact President Obama had on diversifying the federal bench. We discuss the record-breaking number of women and minorities Obama appointed to federal courts at all levels. Considering the historic and current struggles of African Americans in attaining civil rights, we focus our discussion on the appointment of Black federal judges. We highlight the historic firsts for African American appointees and the continuing need for Black federal judges, particularly in the South. We also discuss the inclusionary dilemma in the context of President Obama’s selections for staffing the federal judiciary. We discuss Obama’s decision not to appoint a third African American justice to the Supreme Court, but we examine his record-breaking number of African American appointments to the lower federal courts. Despite these historic appointments, President Obama’s appointment power was not unfettered. In the end, we assess the impact of Obama’s appointees in view of voting rights litigation. Voting rights are particularly pertinent for racial minorities who have been historically denied these rights but have made gains in electing minorities to public office. In the conclusion, we discuss the racial implications of the Trump administration’s attempts to reverse Obama’s judicial legacy.

scholarly journals 1968: One Year In the Life of the Mexican Federal Judiciary

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Héctor Fix-Fierro
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
And Performance ◽  
One Year ◽  
Federal Judges

1968 is considered a mythical year in many parts of the world. In Mexico, it has acquired an almost sacred status. The student movement is com¬monly viewed as the beginning of the prolonged process of democratic transition that has unfolded in the last decades. Although there is very abundant literature about the events of that year, the role that the Mexican Federal Judiciary (MFJ) played in them has practically not been examined. The article analyzes the si¬tuation and performance of the Supreme Court of Justice and the MFJ during that single year. For this purpose, the essay examines the following aspects: the composition, organization and resources of the federal courts; judicial statistics; judicial precedents; judicial ideology and public perception on the justice system; and finally, the intervention of federal judges in the judicial proceedings instituted against the students and other leftist political dissidents. The article concludes that the MFJ was subject to many constraints and limitations that, for good measure, hampered its role in the defense of constitutional order. Twenty years later the reforms leading to the transformation of the Supreme Court of Justice into a constitutional court were started, favoring a more active intervention of judges and courts in the protection and defense of fundamental rights.

The Pendulum of Precedent: U.S. State Legislative Response to Supreme Court Decisions on Minimum Wage Legislation for Women

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Hoekstra
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
State Legislators ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Minimum Wage Legislation ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

The impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions is contingent on the willingness of other political actors to implement those decisions. One important group of implementers is the U.S. state legislatures. However, in the pursuit of policy, state legislators must consider multiple goals when choosing among alternative policy options. In addition to considering the likelihood of review by state high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, state legislators have their own ideas about good policy and must also face reelection. When are legislators likely to follow precedent and when are they likely to ignore it in pursuit of these other goals? In this article, I examine the enactment of state minimum wage legislation for women in the first half of the twentieth century. The results show that even after controlling for legislative and constituent preferences, legislators heed the preferences of the U.S. Supreme Court—but not necessarily their own high courts—when deciding to pass minimum wage legislation. The results point to the need for scholars of state politics to pay greater attention to the role of judicial actors when studying policy adoption and legislative behavior.

The Role of Gender Norms in Judicial Decision-Making at the U.S. Supreme Court: The Case of Male and Female Justices

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane A. Gleason ◽  
Jennifer J. Jones ◽  
Jessica Rae McBean
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Gender Norms ◽  
Legal Profession ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Masculine Norms ◽  
Gender Impacts ◽  
The U.S

Although still a minority, the growing number of women on both the Bench and at the Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court has important implications for judicial decision-making and successful advocacy at the Court. Research in judicial behavior generally focuses on vote direction and the presence of female attorneys in a case. We offer a more nuanced account of how gender impacts both attorney success and judicial decision-making by drawing on work in social and political psychology and utilizing quantitative textual analysis to explore the tension between masculine norms of behavior that are valued in the legal profession and feminine norms of behavior that are expected of women, but devalued in the legal profession. Based on the Court’s long-standing disdain for emotional arguments, we examine how the emotional content in 601 party briefs shapes the Court’s majority opinions. Our results indicate that male justices evaluate counsel based on their compliance with traditional gender norms—rewarding male counsel for cool, unemotional arguments and rewarding female counsel for emotionally compelling arguments. However, we find no evidence that gender norms shape the opinions of female justices. Given that the justice system is supposed to be “blind,” our results highlight the durability of gendered expectations and raise questions about the objectivity of judicial decision-making.

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